Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Gaines v. Corizon Health

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division

November 2, 2018

DEANGELO GAINES, Plaintiff,
v.
CORIZON HEALTH, LOLIT JOSEPH, BRYAN BULLER, ALEXANDREA WARREN, MIKE NATALIE, FARRAH BUNCH, KAYLA MCDERMIT, GRAHAM MOORE, DEBORAH WHITE, KATHY EDRINGTON, JESSICA HIRT, NICHOLAS OSBORNE, MICHAEL ALUKER Dr., TAMMY OWEN, BARRY CLEVELAND, KARI PIERCE, CASSANDRA FELIX, INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, PEGGY MCWHIRTER, Defendants.

          ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT ALUKER'S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

          JAMES R. SWEENEY II JUDGE

         For the reasons explained in this Entry, the motion for summary judgment filed by Dr. Michael Aluker, [dkt. 235], is granted. The pending motion for summary judgment filed by the other defendants in this action will be discussed in a separate Entry to be issued as soon as possible in light of the Court's pressing caseload.

         I. Background

         Plaintiff Deangelo Gaines filed this civil rights action on April 25, 2016. At the time of filing, he was incarcerated at the Putnamville Correctional Facility (“Putnamville”). He filed an amended complaint on July 18, 2016. Dkt. 11. The Court screened the amended complaint and allowed claims to proceed against numerous defendants, one of whom was Dr. Aluker. Mr. Gaines seeks compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages.

         More specifically, Mr. Gaines alleges that he has a seizure disorder but that from January 14, 2013, when he arrived at Putnamville, until October of 2015, he was denied a helmet. He alleges that his requests for a seizure helmet were denied from April 2014 until June 2015 by, among others, Dr. Aluker. Mr. Gaines was provided a seizure helmet in October of 2015. Dr. Aluker is alleged to have been deliberately indifferent to Mr. Gaines' serious medical needs.

         Dr. Aluker seeks resolution of Mr. Gaines' claim against him through the entry of summary judgment. Mr. Gaines has not opposed the motion for summary judgment.

         II. Summary Judgment Standards

         The purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A “material fact” is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must set forth specific, admissible evidence showing that there is a material issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2008). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2011).

         A dispute about a material fact is genuine only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, then there is no “genuine” dispute. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

         Dr. Aluker's motion for summary judgment, brief in support, and Local Rule 56-1 notice were served on Mr. Gaines on or about March 22, 2018. Dkt. nos. 235, 236, 237, 238. As noted, even though Mr. Gaines requested one extension of time, no response has been filed, and the deadline for doing so has long passed.

         The consequence of Mr. Gaines' failure to respond is that he has conceded the defendant's version of the facts. Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[F]ailure to respond by the nonmovant as mandated by the local rules results in an admission.”); see S.D. Ind. Local Rule 56-1 (“A party opposing a summary judgment motion must . . . file and serve a response brief and any evidence . . . that the party relies on to oppose the motion. The response must . . . identif[y] the potentially determinative facts and factual disputes that the party contends demonstrate a dispute of fact precluding summary judgment.”). This does not alter the standard for assessing a Rule 56(a) motion, but does “reduc[e] the pool” from which the facts and inferences relative to such a motion may be drawn. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).

         III. Discussion

         A. Undisputed Facts

         The following facts, unopposed by Mr. Gaines and supported by admissible ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.