Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Rowe v. Meghan Miller HSA

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

September 25, 2018

JEFFREY ALLEN ROWE, Plaintiff,
v.
MEGHAN MILLER HSA, LPN DOUGLAS BEITLER, Defendants.

          ORDER AMENDING JULY 10, 2018, ORDER AND DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

          SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE.

         I. Amending July 10, 2018, Order

         The Court amends by interlineation the quote regarding objectively serious medical need in Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 2008), on page 19 of dkt. 93 to read:

An objectively serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor's attention.” Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

         II. Motion for Reconsideration

         Presently pending before the Court is plaintiff Jeffrey Allen Rowe's motion for reconsideration of the Court's July 10, 2018, Order granting in part defendants' motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff's partial motion for summary judgment, dkt. 93. Rowe asks the Court to reconsider its holding that defendants Melissa Wehrley, Dr. Bruce Ipple, Alicia Coomer and Amber Dillow were not deliberately indifferent to Rowe's serious medical need in violation of his Constitutional rights. Dkt. 102. The defendants filed a response in opposition. Dkt. 104. Rowe failed to file a reply, and the time to do so has passed. Each request for reconsideration is discussed separately below.

         A. Legal Standard

         Motions to reconsider orders other than final judgments are governed by Rule 54(b). “Motions to reconsider serve a limited function, to be used ‘where the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.'” Davis v. Carmel Clay Schs., 286 F.R.D. 411, 412 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (quoting Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990)) (additional quotations omitted). A court may grant a motion to reconsider where a movant demonstrates a manifest error of law or fact; however, a motion to reconsider is not an occasion to make new arguments. In re Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996); Granite St. Ins. Co. v. Degerlia, 925 F.2d 189, 192 n.7 (7th Cir. 1991). A motion to reconsider under Rule 54(b) may also be appropriate where there has been “a controlling or significant change in the law or facts since the submission of the issue to the Court.” Bank of Waunakee, 906 F.2d at 1191 (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)). Motions for reconsideration in the district courts are generally disfavored because “a re-do of a matter that has already received the court's attention is seldom a productive use of taxpayer resources because it places all other matters on hold.” Burton v. McCormick, No. 3:11-CV-026, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50891, 2011 WL 1792849, at *1 (N.D. Ind. May 11, 2011) (quoting United States v. Menominee Tribal Enters., No. 07-C-317, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45614, 2009 WL 1373952, at *1 (E.D. Wis. May 15, 2009)).

         B. Melissa Wehrley

         Rowe first requests that the Court reconsider its finding that Nurse Wehrley was not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need. Dkt. 102 at 1-2. He argues that the Court “either overlooked or did not properly credit” his evidence that he was suffering from excruciating pain and could barely move his thumb when he first saw Nurse Wehrley, and that Nurse Wehrley did not give him anything for his pain. Id. at 1-2.

         Rowe is mistaken that the Court overlooked or did not properly credit his evidence. In his statement of undisputed facts, Rowe stated:

         (Image Omitted)

Dkt. 78 at 5. Although the Court did not recite Rowe's statement that he was in “excruciating pain” and “could barely move his thumb” in its July 10, 2018, order, it is immaterial that he was in excruciating pain and could barely move his thumb when he first saw Nurse Wehrley because Nurse Wehrley addressed his medical need and applied an Ace wrap to Rowe's right hand, which, according to Rowe, provided “immediate improvement in comfort.” Dkt. 80-11 at 2. Rowe acknowledges that the circumstances in his statement of undisputed fact appear in chronological order, and that nurse Wehrley applied the Ace wrap after Rowe's complaints of excruciating pain. Dkt. 102 at 2, n. 1. Moreover, the Court acknowledged there was a dispute as to whether Nurse Wehrley actually provided Tylenol to Rowe, but the Court explained why the disputed fact was not material. See dkt. 93 at 25.

         Because Rowe fails to identify any newly discovered evidence or show that the Court made a manifest error of law or fact, Rowe's motion for reconsideration ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.