United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ENTRY GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
William T. Lawrence, Judge
Hayden filed this action on May 8, 2017, contending that his
constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated
at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (WVCF). Mr. Hayden
alleged that he broke his leg in May 2015 and has not
received adequate and proper medical care since. He was
represented by counsel when his complaint was filed. Mr.
Hayden's action is a state law claim for negligence.
After filing the complaint, Mr. Hayden's counsel withdrew
and Mr. Hayden is now proceeding pro se.
Corizon Health LLC now moves for summary judgment arguing
that Mr. Hayden failed to exhaust his available
administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a),
before filing this lawsuit. Mr. Hayden sought and received
two extensions of time in which to file a response to the
motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. Nos. 54, 55,
56, & 57. However, the deadline for responding -
September 14, 2018 - has passed and no response has been
reasons explained below, Corizon Health LLC's motion for
summary judgment, Dkt. No. 50, is granted.
Standard of Review
judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment
“bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying” designated evidence which
“demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
the moving party has met its burden, the non-movant may not
rest upon mere allegations. Instead, “[t]o successfully
oppose a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party
must come forward with specific facts demonstrating that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Trask-Morton
v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 534 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir.
2008). “The non-movant will successfully oppose summary
judgment only when it presents definite, competent evidence
to rebut the motion.” Vukadinovich v. Bd. of Sch.
Trs., 278 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
applicable substantive law will dictate which facts are
material.” National Soffit & Escutcheons, Inc.,
v. Superior Systems, Inc., 98 F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir.
1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The
substantive law applicable to this motion for summary
judgment is the PLRA, which requires that “[n]o action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 . . . until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e;
see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002).
“[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all
inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general
circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong.” Id. at
532 (citation omitted). The requirement to exhaust provides
“that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a
supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted.” Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88-89 (2006) (citation omitted).
Exhaustion of available administrative remedies
“‘means using all steps that the agency holds
out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the
issues on the merits).'” Id. at 90
(quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024
(7th Cir. 2002)). Proper use of the facility's grievance
system requires a prisoner “to file complaints and
appeals in the place, and at the time [as] the prison's
administrative rules require.” Pozo, 286 F.3d
at 1025; see also Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804,
809 (7th Cir. 2006).
exhaustion is an affirmative defense, “the burden of
proof is on the prison officials.” Kaba v.
Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2006). So here,
Corizon Health LLC, the Indiana Department of
Correction's contract provider of inmate health services,
bears the burden of demonstrating that Mr. Hayden failed to
exhaust all available administrative remedies before he filed
this suit. Id. at 681.
noted, despite two extensions of time, no response to the
summary judgment motion was filed by Mr. Hayden and the
deadline for doing so has passed. The consequence is that Mr.
Hayden has conceded Corizon's version of the events.
Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“[F]ailure to respond by the nonmovant as mandated by
the local rules results in an admission.”). This does
not alter the standard for assessing a Rule 56 motion, but it
does “reduc[e] the pool” from which the facts and
inferences relative to such a motion may be drawn. Smith
v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).
the following facts are accepted as true: at all times
relevant to this action, Mr. Hayden was an inmate at the
WVCF. An offender grievance process was available to Mr.
Hayden at all times relevant to this action. Mr. Hayden has
not filed any grievances concerning medical issues,
non-medical issues, or complaints. The issues concerning the
lack of proper medical treatment for his broken leg were not
grieved by Mr. Hayden at any time.
Health, LLC, has met its burden of proving that Mr. Hayden
had available remedies that he did not utilize. Ross v.
Blake,136 S.Ct. 1850 (2017) ...