United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND
Baker United States Magistrate Judge
issue is Plaintiff James Henley's motion to amend his
third amended complaint. Henley seeks leave to add official
capacity language to his complaint, which currently names
Defendant Troy Sunier only in his individual capacity. As
explained below, Henley fails to show good cause for his
delay in seeking to amend, and the Court denies his motion.
[Filing No. 54.]
amend his complaint at this late stage, Henley must
demonstrate the delay happened despite his diligence.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides
that the Court should freely grant leave to amend the
pleadings “[w]hen justice so requires.” But
amending the Case Management Plan requires good cause.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Therefore, when a party
seeks to amend the pleadings after the deadline in the case
management plan, the party is necessarily seeking to amend
the CMP and must show good cause. See Adams v.
City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 734 (7th Cir. 2014).
A good cause determination “primarily considers the
diligence of the party seeking amendment.”
Trustmark Ins. Co. v. Gen. & Cologne Life Re of
Am., 424 F.3d 542, 553 (7th Cir. 2005).
fails to make an argument that he had good cause for his
delay of nearly five months. The deadline for amending the
pleadings passed on March 1, 2018. [Filing No. 21.]
Henley filed his motion to amend on August 21, 2018.
[Filing No. 54.] Rather than attempt to show
diligence, Henley merely argues that other independent
reasons for denying leave to amend are not present. Without
any argument that this long delay occurred despite his
diligence, the Court cannot find good cause for it. Moreover,
this motion comes after Henley and Sunier filed cross motions
for summary judgment. Permitting an amendment would likely
cause additional delay, as the motions would likely need to
be withdrawn, revised, and resubmitted.
arguments that a different standard applies are unpersuasive.
Henley first argues that Rule 15(c)(1) permits
amended complaints to relate back to the date of the original
pleading when the plaintiff amends to correct a misnomer.
However, the relation back doctrine concerns whether the
statute of limitations bars the action, not the Court's
deadlines. See § 1496 Relation Back of
Amendments-In General, 6A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. §
1496 (3d ed.).
next cites Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796
(7th Cir. 2008), which acknowledges that “district
courts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where
there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated
failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the
defendants, or where the amendment would be futile.”
Henley admits that there has been delay, but argues that none
of the other listed reasons are present. Irrespective of
whether the other listed reasons are present, Henley does
nothing to dispel Sunier's contention that this amendment
comes after undue delay. Furthermore, Henley's argument that
Sunier would not be prejudiced is severely undermined by his
admission that Sunier would have the
“inconvenience” of having to redo his motion for
summary judgment. [Filing No. 54, at ECF p. 4.]
Henley argues that Rule 15(a)(2)'s lenient standard of
freely granting leave “when justice so requires”
should apply because he seeks to amend in response to an
argument he claims would normally be raised in a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. However, Henley's argument ignores the
applicable limits of Rule 16(b)(4), discussed above. Further,
no rule required Sunier to make his argument earlier.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (“a party may assert
the following defenses by motion . . .”); see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (containing no exclusion for arguments
that could have been raised in a Rule 12(b) motion). As
Sunier points out, Defendants are free to choose to conduct
discovery into a claim and to use that discovery to file a
dispositive motion under the considerably different standard
that comes with Rule 56. Additionally, the Court cannot
ignore that Henley is on the fourth version of his complaint;
justice does not require the Court to allow him a fifth
version this late in the litigation.
shown above, Henley fails to show good cause for waiting five
months after the deadline to amend his complaint, and
Henley's arguments that a more lenient standard applies
are unpersuasive. Therefore, the Court denies Henley's
motion to amend. [Filing No. 54.]
 Sunier also argues that the amendment
is futile, citing Will v. Mich. Dept. of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), Lett v. Magnant,
965 F.2d 251, 255 (7th Cir. 1992), and Rascon v.
Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1986).
The Court does not address this argument because Henley fails
to show good cause for his delay in seeking this
 In his motion for summary judgment,
Sunier argues some of the relief Henley seeks is unavailable
against Sunier in his ...