United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division
OPINION AND ORDER
JAMES T. MOODY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Ahmad El Samad (“El Samad”) brings suit against
defendant Ahmed F. Shoukry
(“Shoukry”). (DE # 1.) Plaintiff alleges that he and
defendant entered into two agreements: a partnership
agreement for the operation of a medical clinic
(“Partnership Agreement, ” DE # 15-1), and an
employment agreement (“Employment Agreement, ” DE
# 1-1 at 5-12). (DE # 1 ¶¶ 2, 6.) According to
plaintiff, defendant failed to meet the requirements of these
agreements, causing financial loss and other damages.
(Id. ¶ 7.) Based on these events, plaintiff
filed a complaint against defendant on September 18, 2017,
alleging “breach of contract, ” “breach,
” “extortion, ” and “false
moved to dismiss the complaint on October 13, 2017. (DE #
14.) That motion was fully briefed by the parties. On July
23, 2018, this court issued an order which (1) granted
defendant's motion to dismiss in part, (2) granted
plaintiff until August 22, 2018, to move for leave to amend
the complaint, and (3) reserved ruling on all other arguments
made by defendant in the motion to dismiss. (DE # 40.) The
deadline set in that order has now passed, and plaintiff has
not moved for leave to amend. For the following reasons, all
of the claims in plaintiff's complaint are dismissed.
has moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. A judge reviewing a
complaint under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard must construe it in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accept
well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all inferences in the
non-movant's favor. Erickson v. Pardus , 551
U.S. 89, 93 (2007); Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat'l City
Bank, 595 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010). Under the
liberal notice-pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the complaint need only contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
To satisfy Rule 8(a), “the statement need only
‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.'”
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
the federal pleading standard is quite forgiving, . . . the
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660,
662-63 (7th Cir. 2011); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,
570. A plaintiff must plead “factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). To
meet this standard, a complaint does not need detailed
factual allegations, but it must go beyond providing
“labels and conclusions” and “be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Sanjuan v. Am.
Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th
Cir. 1994) among other authorities). As the Seventh Circuit
recently explained, a complaint must give “enough
details about the subject-matter of the case to present a
story that holds together.” Swanson v. Citibank,
N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010).
I: Breach of Contract
of the complaint alleges breach of the Employment Agreement
(DE # 1 ¶ 6.) In its prior order, the court ruled that
plaintiff had not demonstrated he was the real party in
interest for claims related to the Employment Agreement.
(See DE # 40 at 7.) Instead, the court found that
The Institute of Foot & Ankle Reconstructive Surgery,
LLC, (the “Indiana LLC”), was the real party in
interest for those claims.
Rule 17(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest. Pursuant to Rule 17(a)(2), the court has given
plaintiff a reasonable amount of time, 30 days, to join or
substitute the Indiana LLC into the action. (DE # 40 at 7-8.)
Plaintiff failed to move for leave to amend the complaint or
otherwise join the Indiana LLC during that time period.
Accordingly, Count I of the complaint is dismissed.
Count II: Breach
II of the complaint alleges breach of both the Employment
Agreement and the Partnership Agreement. (DE # 1 ¶ 7.)
For the same reasons that Count I was dismissed, the court
also dismisses Count II to the extent it relates to breach of
the Employment Agreement.
the Partnership Agreement, the court previously ruled
that-due to the lack of relevant law and arguments provided
by both parties-it could not determine whether plaintiff was
the real party in interest for claims related to the
Partnership Agreement. (See DE # 40 at 9-10.)
However, for jurisdictional reasons, the court concluded that
plaintiff held the burden of demonstrating that he, and not
the Institute of Foot & Ankle ...