United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ENTRY DISCUSSING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WALTON PRATT, JUDGE.
se Plaintiff Santana Gray (“Mr. Gray”), who
is incarcerated at Pendleton Correctional Facility, brought
this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Defendants David Mosely (“Deputy Mosley),
Jace Dundich, (“Deputy Dundich”), Allen Ward
(“Deputy Ward”), and Renaird Sanford
(“Deputy Sanford”) (collectively,
“Defendants”), alleging that the Defendants used
excessive force against him while he was incarcerated at the
Marion County Jail awaiting a post-conviction hearing.
Deputies Dundich and Ward seek summary judgment because they
were not present at the events alleged by Mr. Gray. Deputy
Sanford seeks summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity. Dkt. . Deputy Mosley does not seek summary
judgment. Mr. Gray responded to the Motion and the Defendants
replied. The Motion is now ripe for review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material
fact” is one that “might affect the outcome of
the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To survive a motion for summary
judgment, the non-moving party must set forth specific,
admissible evidence showing that there is a material issue
for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). The court views the record in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor. Darst v. Interstate
Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2008). It
cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on
summary judgment because those tasks are left to the
fact-finder. O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc.,
657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2011).
dispute about a material fact is genuine only “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248. If no reasonable jury could find for the
non-moving party, then there is no “genuine”
dispute. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
following statement of facts was evaluated pursuant to the
standard set forth above. That is, this statement of facts is
not necessarily objectively true, but as the summary judgment
standard requires, the undisputed facts and the disputed
evidence are presented in the light reasonably most favorable
to Mr. Gray as the non-moving party. See Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150
January 3, 2017, Mr. Gray arrived at Marion County Jail's
book-in, awaiting his post-conviction hearing. While there,
Deputy Mosley handed Mr. Gray the wrong size of clothing.
This led to an “exchange of words” between the
two men and Deputy Mosley used a racial slur. Mr. Gray then
struck Deputy Mosley. Thereafter, Mr. Gray laid face down on
the ground with his hands in front of him. Deputy Sanford
then used his body weight to sit on or “straddle”
Mr. Gray and handcuffed him. Deputy Sanford continued to sit
on Mr. Gray while other officers beat him.
Defendants have produced affidavits and timecards that
demonstrate that Deputies Dundich and Ward were not working
at the time the alleged incident occurred. Dkts. -2,
-3, -8, -9. Mr. Gray does not dispute this in his
response, (Dkt. ), although he alleges that these
Defendants investigated the incident and are needed as
witnesses at trial.
Deputy Dundich and Deputy Ward
undisputed evidence shows that Deputy Dundich and Deputy Ward
were not working at the time of the incident and therefore
could not have been involved in the assault of Mr. Gray.
Although he asserts that they later investigated the
incident, and that they are needed as witnesses at trial,
these assertions do not support any constitutional claim
against Deputies Dundich or Allen Ward. “A damages suit
under § 1983 requires that a defendant be personally
involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation.”
Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517, 528 (7th Cir. 2014);
see Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir.
2010) (“[I]ndividual liability under § 1983
requires ‘personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional deprivation.'”) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, these individuals can
testify at trial regarding their investigation without being
Deputy Dundich and Deputy Ward were not present when the
incident occurred, they are entitled to summary judgment on
Mr. Gray's excessive force claim against them.