United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ENTRY DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND
DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
Jane Magnus-Stinson, Chief Judge
Marvel's petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenges
his disciplinary conviction in ISF 17-11-0270, for offense
B-202, possession of a controlled substance. For the reasons
explained in this Entry, Mr. Marvel's habeas petition
must be denied.
in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits,
Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004)
(per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v.
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without
due process. The due process requirement is satisfied with
the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a
limited opportunity to present evidence to an impartial
decision-maker, a written statement articulating the reasons
for the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it,
and “some evidence in the record” to support the
finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v.
Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v.
Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003); Webb v.
Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
The Disciplinary Proceeding
November 20, 2017, Mr. Marvel was charged with offense B-202,
possession of a controlled substance. The conduct report
On 11-20-17 at approximately 0730 am in 16 North, I officer
Alber . . . was performing a shakedown of offender Kyle
Marvel #249180 . . . when I found a small gray bag with
multiple folded up papers with crystal like powder in his
property box. I advised him of the conduct report and
identified him by his state issued i.d.
Dkt. 7-1. Photographs were taken and sent to internal affairs
(IA). Dkt. 7-3. Mr. Marvel was provided with a notice of
confiscated property form. Dkt. 7-2.
November 22, 2017, Mr. Marvel was provided a copy of the
Report of Conduct and Notice of Disciplinary Hearing
(Screening Report). Mr. Marvel was notified of his rights and
he pleaded not guilty. Mr. Marvel did not request any
witnesses but did request the “evidence sent to
lab.” Dkt. 7-5. A field test referred to as
“Methamphetamine/MDMA (Ecstasy) Reagent field test
15” was positive for methamphetamine. Dkt. 7-4.
November 28, 2017, the disciplinary hearing officer (DHO)
held a hearing. Dkt. 7-7. Mr. Marvel pleaded not guilty and
the hearing officer recorded Mr. Marvel's comment as
follows: “someone told the c/o I had something. Claims
this is neuroten. Not on meds.” Id. The
evidence requested at screening was considered and the
hearing officer relied on the staff reports and Mr.
Marvel's statement in finding Mr. Marvel guilty of
offense B-202, possession of a controlled substance. The DHO
imposed the following sanctions: a written reprimand, 20
hours of extra work duty, and the imposition of the suspended
demotion from credit class B to credit class C.
Marvel appealed to the Facility Head and the Indiana
Department of Correction (IDOC) Final Reviewing Authority,
both of which were denied. He then brought this petition for
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Marvel raises three grounds in support of his petition for
habeas relief. Each ground for relief is discussed below.
Mr. Marvel claims that the DHO did not rely on the evidence
he specifically asked for and based a guilty finding off of
faulty staff assumptions. Dkt. 2 at p. 3. Due process
requires “prison officials to disclose all material
exculpatory evidence, ” unless that evidence
“would unduly threaten institutional concerns.”
Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). In the prison
disciplinary context, “the purpose of the [this] rule
is to insure that the disciplinary board considers all of the
evidence relevant to guilt or innocence and to enable the
prisoner to present his or her best defense.”
Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Evidence
is exculpatory if it undermines or contradicts the finding of
guilty, see id., and it is material if disclosing it
creates a “reasonable probability” of a different
result, Toliver v. McCaughtry, 539 F.3d 766, 780-81
(7th Cir. 2008). The disciplinary record in this case does
not support Mr. Marvel's argument. The DHO, Angela
Hooker, specifically testified that she considered staff
reports, Mr. Marvel's statement, and the ...