United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ENTRY DISMISSING ACTION AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL
Jane Magnus-Stinson, United States District Court Chief Judge
Youngman, Sr., seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241(c) (3). For the reasons explained in
this Entry, his petition for writ of habeas corpus is
2006, Mr. Youngman was convicted by a jury in the District of
South Dakota of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a), 2246(2) and 1153, and
five counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(3) and 1153. He was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 280 months.
Youngman challenged his conviction, but not his sentence, on
appeal. United States v. Youngman, 481 F.3d 1015
(8th Cir. 2007). The Eighth Circuit rejected his arguments
and affirmed his conviction on all seven counts. Id.
In April 2008, Mr. Youngman filed a motion to vacate his
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He alleged, among other
things, that: his trial and appellate counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel; his sentence was
unreasonable and above the statutory maximum; and the
district court lacked jurisdiction because federal law does
not apply on the Rosebud Indian Reservation, where he
committed his crimes. The district court denied Mr.
Youngman's motion. United States v. Youngman,
No. 3:04-CR-30110, 2008 WL 5193414, at *8 (D.S.D. Dec. 10,
Youngman filed a previous petition under § 2241 in the
District of South Dakota, arguing that, in 1948, P.L. 80-772
was not legally enacted, nullifying federal courts'
general criminal jurisdiction over federal criminal statutes.
The district court dismissed Mr. Youngman's petition for
lack of jurisdiction, but also noted that his argument had
been rejected by other courts. Youngman v. United
States, No. 3:11-CV-03009, 2011 WL 2312092, at *2
(D.S.D. June 10, 2011).
Youngman has filed a second petition under § 2241 in
this Court, raising four grounds for relief. The Court
interprets his first ground-“statutory right to appeal
an illegal sentence via 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a)(1)(2) was
lost through a violation of F. R. Crim. P. 32 (C)(5) at
sentencing and ineffective counsel”-as an argument that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the presentence report's inclusion of his criminal
history. Mr. Youngman also argues that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to convict him because he is a Native
American. His final two arguments rely upon the Supreme
Court's 2016 decision in United States v.
Mathis, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016). Dkt. 1. The respondent
filed a return to the order to show cause on February 15,
2018. The petitioner sought, and received, two extensions of
time to file a reply. His last deadline of July 13, 2018, has
passed and the petitioner has not filed a reply. The matter
is now ripe for review.
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the presumptive
means by which a federal prisoner can collaterally challenge
his conviction or sentence. See Davis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974); United States v.
Bezy, 499 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 2007). With
authorization from the Circuit Court, a prisoner can bring a
successive § 2255 motion in limited circumstances, such
as when a “new rule of constitutional law is made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2).
Youngman, however, challenges his sentence and seeks habeas
corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
“A federal prisoner may use a § 2241 petition for
a writ of habeas corpus to attack his conviction or sentence
only if § 2255 is ‘inadequate or
ineffective.'” Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d
644, 645 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)).
Whether § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective depends on
“whether it allows the petitioner ‘a reasonable
opportunity to obtain a reliable judicial determination of
the fundamental legality of his conviction and
sentence.'” Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d
1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting In re
Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998)). To
properly invoke the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. §
2255(e), a petitioner is required to show “something
more than a lack of success with a section 2255 motion,
” i.e., “some kind of structural problem
with section 2255.” Id. The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit has identified three requirements to
invoke the savings clause:
In the wake of Davenport, we distilled that holding
into a three-part test: a petitioner who seeks to invoke the
savings clause of § 2255(e) in order to proceed under
§ 2241 must establish: (1) that he relies on “not
a constitutional case, but a statutory-interpretation case,
so [that he] could not have invoked it by means of a second
or successive section 2255 motion, ” (2) that the new
rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and
could not have been invoked in his earlier proceeding, and
(3) that the error is “grave enough . . . to be deemed
a miscarriage of justice corrigible therefore in a habeas
corpus proceeding, ” such as one resulting in “a
conviction for a crime of which he was innocent.”
Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012);
see also Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611 (referencing the
procedure as one to correct “a fundamental
defect” in the conviction or sentence).
Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied sub nom. Montana v. Werlich, 137 S.Ct.
1813 (2017). “The petitioner bears the burden of coming
forward with evidence affirmatively showing the inadequacy or
ineffectiveness of the § 2255 remedy.” Smith
v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Low, 503 Fed.Appx. 763, 765
(11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
2016, the Supreme Court in Mathis clarified the
process for determining whether a defendant's prior
state-law conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the
Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e). 136 S.Ct. at 2248. Here, however, the
petitioner was not sentenced pursuant to the ACCA, nor was
his sentence enhanced by the career offender enhancement
contained in the sentencing guidelines. Rather, his criminal
history was referenced in calculating his criminal history
score in his presentence investigation report. Dkt. 14.
Although the respondent concedes that Mathis is a
statutory interpretation case, and Mathis has been
held to apply retroactively,  because the petitioner was not
sentenced pursuant to the ACCA, or even the analogous
sentencing guideline enhancement, the holding in
Mathis does not apply to his case. He is therefore
not entitled to relief on this ground.
petitioner's two remaining arguments either were, or
could have been, addressed in his prior § 2255 motion.
First, his argument that the district court lacked
jurisdiction because he is a Native American was rejected by
the district court in his prior § 2255 motion.