United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Jane Magnus-Stinson, Chief Judge.
Terrence Paschall is serving a twenty-year sentence for his
2011 Marion County, Indiana, conviction for rape. He brings
this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 alleging that the Indiana Department of
Corrections (IDOC) has failed to properly calculate his
sentence. For the reasons that follow, Mr. Paschall's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
denied and the action dismissed with
prejudice. In addition, the Court finds that a
certificate of appealability should not issue.
Factual and Procedural Background
4, 2012, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Paschall was
sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment for rape. He did
not file an appeal of his sentence at that time. On September
9, 2013, Mr. Paschall filed a petition for “Jail Time
Credit.” On September 16, 2013, the trial court
modified Petitioner's sentence to include 326 days of
credit as opposed to 298 days in the original sentence. On
June 25, 2014, Mr. Paschall filed a motion to “Correct
Erroneous Sentence.” The trial court denied the motion
on July 3, 2014. Mr. Paschall filed a notice of appeal from
the denial of his motion to correct erroneous sentence on
July 15, 2014. However, the Indiana Court of Appeals
dismissed his appeal on November 26, 2014, due to his failure
to file an appellant's brief. Mr. Paschall did not seek
review from the Indiana Supreme Court.
April 3, 2017, Mr. Paschall filed this petition for a writ of
federal court may grant habeas relief only if the petitioner
demonstrates that he is in custody “in violation of the
Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a). Mr. Johnson's petition is governed
by the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”); see Lindh v.
Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).
Supreme Court has described AEDPA as “a formidable
barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims
have been adjudicated in state court” and has
emphasized that courts must not “lightly conclude that
a State's criminal justice system has experienced the
‘extreme malfunction' for which federal habeas
relief is the remedy.” Burt v. Titlow, 134
S.Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)); see also Renico v. Lett,
559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (“AEDPA . . . imposes a highly
deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, and
demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of
the doubt.”) (internal quotation marks, citations, and
Paschall asserts that the IDOC has failed to properly credit
him with credit time earned towards his sentence. Dkt. 2 at
4. He asserts that the respondent has only credited him with
326 days when he should have been entitled to 652 days.
See dkt. 2-2 at 1; dkt. 17 at 1; dkt. 21 at 1. The
respondent asserts that Mr. Paschall's claim is barred by
the statute of limitations, by procedural default, is not
cognizable and is without merit. Dkt. 16. In reply, Mr.
Paschall reasserts that his time has not been properly
calculated. Dkt. 21 at 1.
Statute of Limitations
attempt to “curb delays, to prevent
‘retrials' on federal habeas, and to give effect to
state convictions to the extent possible under law, ”
Congress, as part of AEDPA, revised several statutes
governing federal habeas relief. Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). “Under 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1)(A), a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief
has just one year after his conviction becomes final in state
court to file his federal petition.” Gladney v.
Pollard, 799 F.3d 889, 894 (7th Cir. 2015). “The
one-year clock is stopped, however, during the time the
petitioner's ‘properly filed' application for
state postconviction relief ‘is pending.'”
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 201 (2006) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).
Indiana Court of Appeals dismissed Mr. Paschall's appeal
on November 26, 2014. Dkt. 16-2 at 3. Mr. Paschall did not
seek further review by the Indiana Supreme Court, but he had
until December 26, 2014 to do so. See Rule 57(C) of
the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure. His
conviction became final on this date. Any petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, therefore, was due one year later, on
December 26, 2015. However, Mr. Paschall did not file this
petition until April 3, 2017, over a year after the
limitations period expired.
Paschall might be able to overcome the passage of the statute
of limitations if he can show that the deadline should be
equitably tolled. A petitioner is entitled to equitable
tolling if he can establish that he has “‘(1) . .
. been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented
timely filing.'” Socha v. Boughton, 763
F.3d 674, 684 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Holland v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). Mr. Paschall does
not argue that he should be entitled to equitable tolling,
and instead argues that “actual innocence” is a
gateway to overcome the limitations ...