United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
MELVIN R. LYTTLE, Petitioner,
J.E. KRUEGER WARDEN, Respondent.
ORDER DENYING PETITION AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL
WILLIAM T. LAWRENCE, JUDGE
R. Lyttle seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. For the reasons discussed in this Order, his
petition for writ of habeas corpus is
2009, Mr. Lyttle was convicted in the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York of conspiracy to
defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
371, fraud and swindles in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1341 and 2, fraud by wire, radio, or television
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2, money
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and
money laundering - interstate commerce in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 2. United States
v. Eldridge et al, 6:05-cr-06116-CJS-2, Dkt. No. 421
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2009). He was sentenced to a term of 168
months. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal.
United States v. Lyttle, 455 Fed.Appx. 61 (2d Cir.
2012). On appeal, Mr. Lyttle argued, among other things, that
the district court erred in failing to dismiss the indictment
as time-barred. See Id. at 65.
23, 2013, Mr. Lyttle filed a motion to vacate pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 in the Western District of New York, which
was denied. United States v. Eldridge etal,
6:05-cr-06116- CJS-2, Dkt. No. 555 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2015).
The district court rejected Mr. Lyttle's arguments,
including that the statute of limitations precluded the
indictment. Id. at 28 ("In essence, Lyttle is
re-arguing the statute of limitations issue he raised on
direct appeal... This issue need not be further
addressed."); see also Id. at 32-33 (dismissing
Mr. Lyttle's argument that the government's motion to
suspend the statute of limitations was filed in bad faith).
The Second Circuit denied his request for a certificate of
appealability because Mr. Lyttle failed to make a
"substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right." United States v. Lyttle, No. 15-1313
(2d Cir. Oct. 13, 2015) (unpublished).
5, 2016, Mr. Lyttle filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this Court
arguing, amongst other things, that his indictment was
time-barred. See Lyttle v. Daniels, No.
2:16-cv-000154-JMS-MJD, Dkt. No. 1, 44-47 (S.D. Ind. May 5,
2016). The Court denied his petition on August 1, 2016.
Lyttle v. Daniels, No. 2:16-cv-000154-JMS-MJD, Dkt.
No. 15. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment. See Lyttle v. United States, No. 16-3483
(7th Cir. Jan. 31, 2017).
Lyttle now files yet another § 2241 petition
challenging, as in the prior habeas action and his direct
appeals, the lawfulness of his conviction. He focuses his
current petition solely on the contention that his indictment
was time-barred. See Dkt. No. 1.
proceed under § 2241 after having filed a motion
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the § 2255 motion
must have been "inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of [the petitioner's] detention." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e). Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective if
the following three requirements are met: "(1) the
petitioner must rely on a case of statutory interpretation
(because invoking such a case cannot secure authorization for
a second § 2255 motion); (2) the new rule must be
previously unavailable and apply retroactively; and (3) the
error asserted must be grave enough to be deemed a
miscarriage of justice, such as the conviction of an innocent
defendant." Davis v. Cross, 863 F.3d 962, 964
(7th Cir. 2017) (citing Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d
775, 783 (7th Cir. 2016); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d
605, 610-11 (7th Cir. 1998)). "The petitioner bears the
burden of coming forward with evidence affirmatively showing
the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of the § 2255
remedy." Smith v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Low,
503 Fed.Appx. 763, 765 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
savings clause of § 2255(e) does not give Mr. Lyttle a
further bite at the post-conviction relief apple. Mr. Lyttle
fails to present anything new in his latest habeas petition.
Because he fails to identify any new rule that was previously
unavailable and that applies retroactively, his claims fail
to meet the criteria necessary to proceed under § 2241.
Indeed, all of his claim could have been, and in fact has
already been, brought on direct appeal, through a § 2255
motion, and through a § 2241 petition. "The
essential point is that a prisoner is entitled to one
unencumbered opportunity to receive a decision on the
merits." Potts v. United States, 210 F.3d 770
(7th Cir. 2000).
the petitioner's § 2241 petition is
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255(e). Prevatte v. Merlak, 865 F.3d
894, 901 (7th Cir. 2017). Final judgment consistent with this
Entry shall issue.