United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
LESLIE HAWKER as Personal Representative of the Estate of JERRY P. HAWKER, deceased, Plaintiff,
JOHN R. LAYTON individually and as Sheriff of Marion County, Indiana, CLARK COTTOM individually and as Sheriff of Sullivan County, Indiana, and CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
WALTON PRATT, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
matter is before the Court on Defendant, Correct Care
Solutions, LLC's (“CCS”) Motion to Dismiss,
filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
(Filing No. 57). Plaintiff, Leslie Hawker (“Mrs.
Hawker”), as Personal Representative of the Estate of
Jerry Hawker (“Mr. Hawker”), filed a Second
Amended Complaint, (Filing No. 52), against CCS asserting
violation of Mr. Hawker's constitutional rights under the
Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state law
claim of negligence. She alleges that Mr. Hawker, now
deceased, was denied or delayed medical care by CCS for a
prior cancer diagnosis, while in custody of the Sullivan
County and Marion County jails. (Filing No. 52.) CCS seeks
dismissal regarding only the federal claims. For the
following reasons, the Court grants
CCS's Motion to Dismiss.
following facts are not necessarily objectively true, but as
required when reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court
accepts as true all factual allegations in the Second Amended
Complaint and draws all inferences in favor of Mrs. Hawker as
the non-moving party. See Bielanski v. County of
Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008).
Hawker was a resident and citizen of Sullivan County,
Indiana. On March 14, 2016, Mr. Hawker had a cystoscopy,
which showed tumors inside his bladder and he was advised
that surgery should be performed immediately to determine the
extent and nature of the tumors. Id. at 2. The next
day, March 15, 2016, Mr. Hawker learned that one of the
persons responsible for raping his granddaughter would return
to her high school after the student's protective order
was modified. Id. After the school refused to
provide a safe environment for his granddaughter, Mr. Hawker
had a psychotic breakdown and was committed for treatment to
Union Hospital in Terre Haute, Indiana. Id. at 3.
March 30, 2016, Mr. Hawker was arrested outside the
Bloomington Meadows Psychiatric Hospital by a Sullivan County
Deputy Sheriff on a warrant issued by the Sullivan Circuit
Court. He was taken to the Sullivan County Jail and held on a
$32, 000.00 bond under the control of Defendant, Clark Cottom
(“Sheriff Cottom”), the Sheriff of Sullivan
County. Id. Sometime during his incarceration, Mr.
Hawker was transferred to the Marion County (Indiana) Jail,
under the control of Defendant, John Layton (“Sheriff
Layton”), the Marion County Sheriff. CCS is contracted
through the Marion County Jail to provide medical services
for its inmates. While in custody, Mr. Hawker was denied or
delayed medical care for his cancer surgery and treatment.
Id. He was confined in deplorable conditions and
alleges that he suffered cruel and unusual physical and
mental treatment, which caused him to lose weight.
Id. On January 14, 2018, Mr. Hawker died as a result
of his cancer and other complications arising from his
incarceration. Id. His wife, Mrs. Hawker, was
appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Jerry P.
Hawker in Sullivan Circuit Court, Cause No.
77C01-1802-EU-000010. (Filing No. 52 at 1.)
April 5, 2018, Mrs. Hawker filed a Second Amended Complaint.
Count 1 alleges the Defendants willfully ignored Mr.
Hawker's request and those of his family for proper
medical care and treatment and relief from the physical and
mental abuses to which he was subjected and Defendants were
deliberately indifferent in violation Mr. Hawker's Eighth
Amendment rights. Count 2 alleges the Defendants violated Mr.
Hawker's right to due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United states Constitution and he is
entitled to relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Count
3 alleges a state law negligence claim. (Filing No. 52.)
purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1),
12(b)(2), or 12(b)(6), district courts accept all
well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See
Scanlan v. Eisenberg, 669 F.3d 838, 841 (7th Cir. 2012);
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.
2008). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of
the complaint; a complaint must set forth a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, sufficient to provide the defendant with
fair notice of the claim and its basis.”
Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081 (citations and quotation
marks omitted). Although detailed factual allegations are not
required, the complaint must allege sufficient facts
“to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face” and which “allows the court to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Accordingly, “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
courts have original jurisdiction over cases involving
diversity of citizenship or a federal question. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1332; Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc.,
994 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1993). If the district
court has original jurisdiction over an action, it may also
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over “all other
claims that are so related to claims in the
action…that they form part of the same case or
controversy…”. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). If the
underlying federal claim that supported supplemental
jurisdiction is dismissed, courts have discretion in deciding
whether to continue to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The
court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if
the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction. Id. The dismissal of federal claims do
not require the court to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state-law claims. However, the court
“will normally relinquish [supplemental] jurisdiction
over the state-law claims.” Sullivan v.
Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir. 1998).
prevail on a federal deliberate indifference claim against
CCS, Mrs. Hawker would bear the burden of demonstrating on
the merits not only that Mr. Hawker's constitutional
rights were violated, but that they were violated because of
a policy, procedure, or practice of CCS. In its Motion to
Dismiss, CCS argues that Mrs. Hawker has failed to allege
that a policy, practice, or procedure of CCS violated Mr.
Hawker's constitutional rights. (Filing No. 58.) They
note correctly, that it is well established that deliberate
indifference claims and claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against a corporation like CCS cannot be based
upon the theory of respondeat superior. (Filing No.
58.) See Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612,
651 (7th Cir. 2001); Moore v. State of Ind., 999
F.2d 1125, 1129 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Iskander v.
Vill. of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982)
(holding that “a private corporation is not vicariously
liable under § 1983 for its employees' deprivations
of others' civil rights”). Accordingly, the Court
grants CCS's Motion to Dismiss Counts 1
Hawker does not object to dismissing the federal civil rights
claims; however, she asks the Court to maintain jurisdiction
over Count 3, her supplemental negligence claim against CCS.
(Filing No. 60 at 1.) Several factors influence the
Court's decision whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) directs that a
court may consider whether the claim raises novel or complex
issues of state law, whether the federal claim has been
dismissed, or “other compelling reasons.” Courts
also look to “principles of economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity” when evaluating whether to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction. City of Chicago v.
Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-73, 118
S.Ct. 523, 139 L.Ed.2d 525 (1997). All claims, including the
state law claim, remain pending against Sheriff Cottom and
Sherriff Layton in this action. In the interests of judicial
economy, fairness and convenience, the Court agrees to
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim