United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
JOSEPH E. MORROW, Petitioner,
RICHARD BROWN Warden, Respondent.
ENTRY DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND
DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
JANE MAGNUS-STINSON, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
petition of Joseph Morrow for a writ of habeas corpus
challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding identified as No.
WVE 17-10-0090. For the reasons explained in this Entry, Mr.
Morrow's habeas petition must be denied.
in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits,
Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004)
(per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v.
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without
due process. The due process requirement is satisfied with
the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a
limited opportunity to present evidence to an impartial
decision-maker, a written statement articulating the reasons
for the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it,
and "some evidence in the record" to support the
finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v.
Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v.
Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003); Webb v.
Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
The Disciplinary Proceeding
October 23, 2017, a Conduct Report was issued charging Mr.
Morrow with conspiracy to traffick. The Conduct Report
states: “On 10/11/2017, during an interview in the
Office of Investigations, Armark worker, M. Willard did admit
to giving Offender Morrow, Joseph #912838 approximately nine
(9) cell phones, K-2 (green leafy substance) and K-2
spray.” Dkt. 7-1 at 1.
Morrow was notified of the charge when he received the
Screening Report. He pled not guilty and requested a lay
advocate, Aramark employee M. Willard as a witness, video
evidence, and phone records. Mr. Morrow was not provided with
the requested witness or video evidence.
hearing was held on November 14, 2017. Based on Mr.
Morrow's statement, staff reports, witness statements,
and the case file summary, the hearing officer found Mr.
Morrow guilty. The sanctions imposed included the deprivation
of one hundred days earned credit time, a credit class
demotion, and the imposition of a suspended sanction from
another disciplinary action.
Morrow appealed to Facility Head and the IDOC Final Reviewing
Authority, both of which were denied. He then brought this
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Morrow raises three claims in his habeas petition: (1) denial
of his requested witness; (2) denial of video evidence; and
(3) insufficient evidence to support the finding of guilt.
The respondent argues that Mr. Morrow failed to exhaust the
first two claims making them procedurally defaulted, and that
the third claim lacks merits. The Court will address these
issues in turn.
respondent argues that Mr. Morrow's denial of witness and
evidence claims are procedurally defaulted because he failed
to raise these issues in his administrative appeals. In
Indiana, only the issues raised in a timely appeal to the
Facility Head and then to the Indiana Department of
Correction Appeals Review Officer or Final Reviewing
Authority may be raised in a subsequent Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A);
Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2002);
Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir.
respondent is correct that in Mr. Morrow's appeal to the
Facility Head he only challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence and did not raise claims regarding the denial of a
witness or evidence. See dkt. 7-11 at 1. Mr. Morrow
resists this conclusion by arguing that the respondent's
evidence shows he appealed the hearing officer's decision
to both the Facility Head and the Final Review Authority.
While it is true that Mr. Morrow completed both
administrative appeals, to exhaust he must raise each claim
he wishes to ...