United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ENTRY SCREENING AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND
DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE
WALTON PRATT, JUDGE
John Naylor (“Naylor”) is a prisoner currently
incarcerated at the Pendleton Correctional Facility
(“Pendleton”). He brings this civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
the plaintiff is a “prisoner” as defined by 28
U.S.C. § 1915(h), this Court has an obligation under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b) to screen his complaint before service
on the defendant.
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must dismiss the
complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. In determining
whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the
same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Lagerstrom
v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro
se complaints such as that filed by the plaintiff are
construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Obriecht v.
Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008).
complaint names Jeffrey King as the defendant. Naylor alleges
that Jeffrey King, who apparently was a hearing officer in a
disciplinary proceeding, violated his due process rights.
Naylor seeks injunctive relief in the form of expungement of
the disciplinary conviction and other demands, as well as
compensatory and punitive damages. Dkt. 2 at 13.
alleges that Mr. King issued a “false conviction”
and that he denied witnesses and was not an impartial
decision-maker. Naylor contends that he should have either
been cleared on the A-106 charge or been given a less severe
sanction. Naylor was placed in disciplinary segregation for
an unspecified period of time as a result of the guilty
finding. He alleges that this prevented him from having
contact visits with his mother who was battling cancer.
does not have a constitutional right to avoid false
disciplinary charges. Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463
F.3d 621, 624-25 (7th Cir. 2006) (due process rights are not
violated if a false conduct report is filed). “[E]ven
assuming fraudulent conduct on the part of prison officials,
the protection from such arbitrary action is found in the
procedures mandated by due process.” McPherson v.
McBride, 188 F.3d 794, 787 (7th Cir. 1999).
to the extent Naylor alleges that he was placed in
disciplinary segregation without due process, the due process
clause is triggered only when the government deprives an
individual of life, property or liberty. See Kentucky
Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,
459-60 (1989). Decisions and actions by prison authorities
which do not deprive an inmate of a protected liberty
interest may be made for any reason or for no reason.
Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir.
2001) (when no recognized liberty or property interest has
been taken, the confining authority is free to use any
procedures it chooses, or no procedures at all).
do not have a constitutional right to remain in the general
population.” Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524
(7th Cir. 2017) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 480 (1995)). An inmate has a due process liberty
interest in being in the general prison population only if
the conditions of his confinement impose “atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin,
515 U.S. at 484. “[B]oth the duration and the
conditions of the segregation must be considered in
determining whether due process is implicated.”
Isby, 856 F.3d at 524 (internal quotation omitted).
Here, Naylor does not allege the duration or any severely
restrictive conditions of his time in segregation. Nothing in
the complaint compels a conclusion that his segregation
resulted in an atypical and significant hardship in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Naylor's due process claim is dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
plaintiff can plead himself out of court by alleging facts
that show there is no viable claim.” Pugh v.
Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, ...