United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE
Jane Magnus-Stinson, United States District Court Chief Judge
matter is before the Court on Defendant Dan Gordon's
motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below,
the motion must be granted, and all claims against Mr. Gordon
must be dismissed.
Summary Judgment Standard
motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a
trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or
genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact
by citing to particular parts of the record, including
depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P.
summary judgment, a party must show the Court what evidence
it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its
version of the events. Gekas v. Vasilades, 814 F.3d
890, 896 (7th Cir. 2016). The moving party is entitled to
summary judgment if no reasonable fact-finder could return a
verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller,
570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court views the record
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws
all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.
Skiba v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717
(7th Cir. 2018). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility
determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are
left to the fact-finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761
F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court need only consider
the cited materials, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3), and the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly assured the district
courts that they are not required to “scour every inch
of the record” for evidence that is potentially
relevant to the summary judgment motion before them.
Grant v. Trustees of Indiana University, 870 F.3d
562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017). Any doubt as to the existence of
a genuine issue for trial is resolved against the moving
party. Ponsetti v. GE Pension Plan, 614 F.3d 684,
691 (7th Cir. 2010).
Lance Perkins failed to respond to Mr. Gordon's summary
judgment motion. Accordingly, facts alleged in the motion are
deemed admitted so long as support for them exists in the
record. See Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th
Cir. 2003) (“[F]ailure to respond by the nonmovant as
mandated by the local rules results in an admission”);
Brasic v. Heinemanns, Inc., 121 F.3d 281, 285-286
(7th Cir. 1997) (affirming grant of summary judgment where
the nonmovant failed to properly offer evidence disputing the
movant's version of the facts). See also S.D.
Ind. Local Rule 56-1 (“A party opposing a summary
judgment motion must . . . file and serve a response brief
and any evidence . . . that the party relies on to oppose the
motion. The response must . . . identif[y] the potentially
determinative facts and factual disputes that the party
contends demonstrate a dispute of fact precluding summary
judgment.”). This does not alter the summary judgment
standard, but it does “reduce the pool” from
which facts and inferences relative to the motion may be
drawn. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir.
Gordon has supported the following factual assertions with
admissible evidence, and Mr. Perkins has not rebutted them.
Therefore, they are undisputed for purposes of the motion for
summary judgment. However, the Court views these undisputed
facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Perkins as the
non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in his
favor. See Skiba, 884 F.3d at 717.
Perkins was arrested on February 11, 2013. At the time, Mr.
Perkins had $6, 530 in U.S. currency on his person. Law
enforcement officers seized that money. After his arrest, Mr.
Perkins was detained at the Wayne County Jail and released on
bond on February 12, 2013. Mr. Perkins did not return to the
Jail until April 27, 2013, when he was arrested for failing
same day, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant
at a residence shared by Timothy Price and Ashley Brooke
Osborne. Officers found $2, 820 in U.S. currency and seized
it for purposes of forfeiture. No evidence indicated that Mr.
Perkins lived at the Price-Osborne residence or that he was
otherwise connected to the $2, 820 found there.
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) initiated administrative
forfeiture proceedings for both the $6, 530 seized from Mr.
Perkins and the $2, 820 seized from the Price-Osborne
residence. On March 8, 2013, the DEA sent written Notices of
Seizure concerning the $6, 530 to Mr. Perkins at three
addresses, all by certified mail. Two of these addresses were
taken from court documents generated following Mr.
Perkins's arrest. A DEA investigation identified the
third address as Mr. Perkins's residence. The Postal
Service returned each notice, indicating that Mr. Perkins did
not reside at the address and that it did not have a
forwarding address for him.
March 8, 2013, the DEA also sent a Notice of Seizure to Mr.
Perkins by certified mail at the address of attorney David
Jordan, who represented Mr. Perkins in the criminal action
that was then pending. This notice was delivered and
addition to sending Mr. Perkins written Notices of Seizure,
the DEA posted notice online from March 25 through April 23,
2013, at www. forfeiture.gov.
respect to the $2, 820 seized from the Price-Osborne
residence, the DEA again posted notice online and sent
written Notices of Seizure to addresses associated with Mr.
Price and Ms. Osborne. The DEA did not attempt to send
written notice of this forfeiture proceeding to Mr. Perkins
because no evidence indicated that he lived at the ...