United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, New Albany Division
ENTRY DISCUSSING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
EVANS BARKER, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
William Easley brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging that Detective Sam Moss of the
Jeffersonville Police Department violated his privilege
against self-incrimination and his due process rights.
Detective Moss seeks summary judgment on Easley's claims
and Easley has not responded. For the following reasons, the
motion for summary judgment is granted.
motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a
trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). As the current version of Rule 56 makes clear, whether
a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely
disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing
to particular parts of the record, including depositions,
documents, or affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure
to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's
factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being
considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of
summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
Court views the record in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that
party's favor. Skiba v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co.,
884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court need only
consider the cited materials, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3), and the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly assured the
district courts that they are not required to “scour
every inch of the record” for evidence that is
potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion before
them. Grant v. Trustees of Indiana University, 870
F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017).
failed to respond to Detective Moss's summary judgment
motion. Accordingly, facts alleged in the motion are deemed
admitted so long as support for them exists in the record.
See Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“[F]ailure to respond by the nonmovant as mandated by
the local rules results in an admission”); Brasic
v. Heinemanns, Inc., 121 F.3d 281, 285-286 (7th Cir.
1997) (affirming grant of summary judgment where the
nonmovant failed to properly offer evidence disputing the
movant's version of the facts); see S.D. Ind.
Local Rule 56-1 (“A party opposing a summary judgment
motion must . . . file and serve a response brief and any
evidence . . . that the party relies on to oppose the motion.
The response must . . . identif[y] the potentially
determinative facts and factual disputes that the party
contends demonstrate a dispute of fact precluding summary
judgment.”). This does not alter the summary judgment
standard, but it does “reduce the pool” from
which facts and inferences relative to the motion may be
drawn. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir.
alleges in the Complaint that he was interviewed by officers
with the Jeffersonville Police Department on May 9, 2017 with
regard to an armed robbery. He also alleges that Det. Sam
Moss of the Jeffersonville Police Department denied his right
to counsel, failed to read him his Miranda rights,
and otherwise violated his privilege against
Moss did not interview or interrogate the Plaintiff at any
time. Although Detective Moss went to the scene of the
robbery, spoke with the victims, and attempted to locate
other vehicles suspected to have been involved in the
robbery, he did not interview Easley.
Moss moves for summary judgment arguing that he was not
personally involved in the alleged violations of Easley's
constitutional rights. Individual liability under §
1983… requires personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional deprivation.” Colbert v. City of
Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation omitted) (citing Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist,
699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Section 1983
creates a cause of action based on personal liability and
predicated upon fault. An individual cannot be held liable in
a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an
alleged constitutional deprivation. . . . A causal
connection, or an affirmative link, between the misconduct
complained of and the official sued is necessary.”)).
Moss has presented evidence that he was not involved in
Easley's interrogation. Because he was not involved in
the interrogation, he did not participate in any alleged
violation of Easley's rights. By failing to respond to
the motion for summary judgment, Easley has failed to dispute
this. It is therefore undisputed that Detective Moss did not
violate Easley's rights and Detective Moss is entitled to
summary judgment on Easley's claims.
foregoing reasons, Detective Moss's motion for summary
judgment, dkt. , is granted. Judgment