United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division
OPINION AND ORDER
William C. Lee, Judge
matter is before the Court for resolution of three pending
motions. Defendant REV Recreation Group, Inc., filed a motion
for summary judgment (ECF 29), to which Plaintiffs Vanessa
and Randy Mathews filed a response in opposition (ECF 37) and
REV replied (ECF 40). REV also filed a “Motion to
Strike Expert Opinion of Tom Bailey” (ECF 28), to which
the Mathews filed a response in opposition (ECF 36) and REV
replied (ECF 39). The last motion is the Mathews'
“Motion for Leave to Amend Plaintiffs' Brief in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Nunc Pro Tunc” (ECF 41), to which REV filed a response
in opposition (ECF 42) and the Mathews replied (ECF 43).
Because the undisputed material facts preclude the
Mathews' claims, REV's motion for summary judgment
(ECF 29) is GRANTED; REV's motion to strike expert
opinion (ECF 28) is DENIED AS MOOT; and the Mathews'
motion to amend their brief in opposition is DENIED AS MOOT.
judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is
“no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Disputes concerning
material facts are genuine where the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). In deciding whether genuine issues of
material fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
See Id. at 255. However, neither the “mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties, ” id., 477 U.S. at 247, nor the
existence of “some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts, ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), will
defeat a motion for summary judgment. Michas v. Health
Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.
judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits nor is
it a vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge v.
Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994).
Therefore, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the
facts in favor of the non-movant, if genuine doubts remain
and a reasonable fact-finder could find for the party
opposing the motion, summary judgment is inappropriate.
See Shields Enterprises, Inc. v. First Chicago
Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992); Wolf v.
City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989).
If it is clear that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy the
legal requirements necessary to establish his or her case,
summary judgment is not only appropriate, but mandated.
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Ziliak v.
AstraZeneca LP, 324 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 2003).
“A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Kvapil v.
Chippewa Cty., 752 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 2014)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding
whether a dispute exists, the Court must “construe all
facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party.” Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. v.
Artisan & Truckers Cas. Co., 796 F.3d 717, 723 (7th
Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Under Rule 56, the movant has
the initial burden of establishing that a trial is not
necessary. Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC,
770 F.3d 618, 627 (7th Cir. 2014). “That burden may be
discharged by showing . . . that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.”
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The nonmovant “must go beyond the pleadings (e.g.,
produce affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or admissions on file) to demonstrate that there is evidence
upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict in
[its] favor.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “The existence of a mere
scintilla of evidence, however, is insufficient to fulfill
this requirement.” Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d
629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). “[S]peculation and
conjecture” also cannot defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Cooney v. Casady, 735 F.3d 514, 519 (7th
Cir. 2013). In addition, not all factual disputes will
preclude the entry of summary judgment, only those that
“could affect the outcome of the suit under governing
law.” Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837
(7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Finally, “[t]he
court must not weigh the evidence presented or determine
credibility of witnesses; the Seventh Circuit instructs that
‘we leave those tasks to factfinders.'”
Winston v. Sauvey, 2016 WL 7480393, at *1 (E.D. Wis.
Dec. 29, 2016) (quoting Berry v. Chicago Transit
Auth., 618 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2010)).
October 30, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion to extend
the briefing schedule for the motion for summary judgment and
for permission to file briefs in excess of the page
limitations contained in this Court's local rules. Joint
Motion (ECF 35). The parties claimed that they needed more
time and more pages “[t]o fully address all of the
issues and laws involved in this complex and hotly disputed
case” and the “complex factual and legal issues
that this case raises.” Id., p. 2. The Court
has reviewed the parties' briefs (and all the evidence
submitted with them) and agrees this case is “hotly
disputed.” The only part of the case that is
“complex, ” however, is the facts, and even then
the situation is more messy than it is complex.
parties' claims and defenses are straightforward. The
following paragraph from the Plaintiffs' complaint
summarizes the basis for their lawsuit:
This case involves a defective 2014 Holiday Rambler
recreational vehicle that defendant designed, constructed,
and warranted but which it was not able to repair within a
reasonable number of chances or a reasonable amount of time
and whose express and/or implied warranties defendant
Complaint (ECF 21), p. 3. The Mathews purchased the RV, which
was manufactured and warranted by REV,  from Mellott
Brothers Trailer Sales in Willow Street, Pennsylvania, on May
7, 2014. Id., p. 4. The Mathews claim that the new
RV had problems or defects from the get-go and that
“[w]ithin a few short hours, problems with this new RV
began to occur, starting with defects in the room slide out
and electrical system fuses inexplicably ‘blowing'
that caused lights not to work, among other things.”
Id. The Mathews took the RV to an RV mechanic for
repair, and later to REV's factory on two occasions, but
they allege that the problems were not fixed and even more
appeared during the time they owned the vehicle. The Mathews
state that the problems with the RV that arose within hours
after they took delivery were a harbinger and that
“[t]heir nightmare was just beginning.”
Id. They elaborate as follows:
After acquiring the vehicle, the Mathews Family discovered
that the RV did not conform to the representations of
defendant inasmuch as it developed continuing malfunctions,
defects and problems and that was unfair and/or deceptive
and/or unconscionable to the Mathews Family. . . . Ever since
purchasing the RV, the RV has been defective in spite of
repeated repair attempts with no success. The warrantor's
agent tried fixing the RV's many defects repeatedly,
telling Plaintiffs each time that it was repaired afterwards.
The Mathews Family would then realize later that it
wasn't. In spite of the Mathews Family's numerous
complaints and defendant's warranty-covered repair
attempts, serious and substantial accident damage as well as
slideout defects in the RV were never fixed at all and that
was unfair and/or deceptive and/or unconscionable to the
Mathews Family. The Mathews Family notified both the dealer
and the defendant of this and many more defects in the RV and
eventually asked the defendant to buy the RV back. It would
not do so and that was unfair and/or deceptive and/or
unconscionable to the Mathews Family.
Id., pp. 6-7. Based on those allegations, the
Mathews are pursuing the following claims against REV:
1) “[B]reach of express and/or implied warranties by
the defendant in Pennsylvania and/or Virginia and/or
Indiana.” Id., p. 3. 2) “[V]iolation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. 2301, et seq.”
Id., p. 14; and 3) “[V]iolation of applicable
state Udap laws, being the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law, and/or the Virginia
Consumer Protection Act, and/or the Indiana Deceptive
Consumer Sales Act[.]” Id., p.
The Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages “[o]r, in the
alternative . . . equitable relief including
rescission[.]” Id., p. 17.
cheerfully acknowledges that when the Mathews purchased the
RV they “were provided a One Year Limited
Warranty.” Defendant's Memorandum, p. 2. This
Limited Warranty, like all such warranties, imposed duties on
both the seller/manufacturer and the purchasers. REV was
bound to repair any faulty or defective “components,
assemblies and systems” of the RV “for twelve
months from the original retail purchase.”
Id., p. 3 (citing Exh. D (ECF 30-4), Limited
Warranty). In order to take advantage of the Limited
Warranty, the Mathews were required by its express terms to:
“notify Warrantor or one of its authorized servicing
dealers of the defect within the warranty coverage period and
within five (5) days of discovering the defect; and . . .
deliver your [RV] to Warrantor or Warrantor's authorized
servicing dealer at your cost and expense.”
Id. The Limited Warranty further provides that
“[i]f the repair or replacement remedy fails to
successfully cure a defect after Warrantor received a
reasonable opportunity to cure the defect(s), your sole and
exclusive remedy shall be limited to Warrantor paying you the
cost of having an independent third party perform repair(s)
to the defect(s).” Id. This clause, explains
REV, sets forth the “two remedies should a service item
occur: (1) as a repair remedy, REV will repair the issue
(under the terms of the warranty) . . .; and (2) if the
Repair Remedy fails, REV will pay the Mathews' actual
costs to have an independent third party (of the Mathews'
choosing) perform the repairs (the ‘Back-Up
Remedy').” Id., pp. 4-5.
argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on all of the
Mathews' claims for the following reasons:
Each count is premised upon the same allegation: REV failed
to live up to its express and/or implied warranties. The
evidence demonstrates, however, that REV fully performed
under its Limited Warranty. The Mathews presented their RV
for repair on only two occasions during the 1 year period of
the warranty. The Mathews also opted to deal with certain
purported issues on their own and outside of the express
terms of the Limited Warranty. Because the Mathews did not
adequately or timely avail themselves to the Repair Remedy
and Back-up Remedy of the Limited Warranty, Summary Judgment
is appropriate on all counts.
Id., pp. 1-2.
summarize, the Mathews assert that they purchased a
“lemon” and allege that REV is liable to them
because it failed to honor its warranties; and REV contends
it did all it could to remedy problems and that the Mathews
voided or nullified warranty coverage by failing to notify
REV of problems in a proper or timely manner and by having
the RV repaired by unauthorized mechanics.
The undisputed material facts establish that REV did not
breach any express or implied warranties.
the stage set, the Court will unravel what it referred to
above as the “messy” facts. Once the layers of
the onion are peeled away the undisputed material facts
become clear-and they bar the Mathews' claims.
the heart of REV's argument in support of its motion is
its contention that it did not breach any warranty, express
or implied, and that the undisputed facts show the
opposite-that REV addressed every problem or issue the
Mathews presented to them and that the Mathews did
not give REV notice of, or opportunity to cure, other alleged
problems. REV begins by stating that “[i]mmediately
following the purchase of the RV, the Mathews . . . allege
they experienced . . . issues, which they reported to the
selling dealership, via telephone. . . . But the RV was not
brought into the dealership for repairs.”
Defendant's Memorandum, p. 5 (citing Exh. A (ECF 30-1),
Deposition of R. Mathews). REV states that “[a]s the
weekend continued, the Mathews also noted that the shower
leaked . . . and the bedroom TV did not work. The Mathews did
not report those issues to the selling dealership. . . . Mr.
Mathews did not call anyone and did not report the issues to
anyone else, including, most notably, REV.”
Id. REV further claims that “[i]n June 2014,
the Mathews . . . allege they experienced [more] issues[,
]” that Mr. Mathews called Mellott Brothers to report
these additional problems, and “was given the number
for REV so he could find a closer authorized repair
center.” Id. According to REV, “contrary
to the terms in the Limited Warranty, in July 2014 Mr.
Mathews decided to take the RV to Johnson's RV to perform
repairs. Johnson's RV is not authorized by REV to perform
warranty service, but Mr. Mathews had used Johnson's RV
to service his previous RV. . . . Mr. Mathews did not notify
REV that the RV was at Johnson's. . . [and] no one from
Johnson's RV ever presented repair estimates or invoices
to REV.” Id., p. 6. According to REV, the
Mathews also took the RV to Johnson's in October of 2014
“to have a new slide cable installed.”
Id. REV claims that the Mathews did deliver the RV
to the company “for repairs beginning December 15,
2014[, ]” that the vehicle “was at the REV
factory from December 15, 2014 to December 19, 2014[,
]” during which time “[e]ach of the [issues
reported] . . . were remedied[.]” Id. (citing
Exh. C (ECF 30-3), Affidavit of A. Brooks; Exh. A, Deposition
of R. Mathews). A few weeks later, “[a]s a gesture of
goodwill, REV issued an additional warranty (‘extended
warranty'), administered under the terms of the original
Limited Warranty. The Extended Warranty was valid until
November 7, 2015.” Id., p. 8 (citing Exh. H
(ECF 30-8), Letter from J. Hurd to R. Mathews). REV contends
that “[o]n March 3, 2015, after experiencing an issue
with the cable for the main slide, Mr. Mathews contacted
REV” and “[t]his was the first time REV was
presented with an issue related to the main slide
cable.” Id. The vehicle was delivered to REV
for repairs and the Mathews “reported only three
issues:  The A/C ‘couldn't keep up'; 
Curbside slide had a broken cable;  Sealing tape on the
slides had failed.” Id. REV claims that it
“assessed the three issues, determining that the A/C
was functioning appropriately and remedying the other [two]
issues.” Id. According to REV, “[t]he
Mathews did not again present the RV to REV or any REV
authorized repair representatives for any additional
issues” and “have never presented REV with any
costs, estimates, or invoices under the Back-Up Remedy of the
Limited Warranty.” Id. Based on these factual
assertions, REV argues that it honored the terms of its
warranty but the Mathews did not, thereby foreclosing this
lawsuit and entitling REV to summary judgment.
Mathews don't actually dispute the material facts so much
as hide them within their broader narrative, which is that
the Holiday Rambler was a deeply flawed piece of machinery
that REV did not repair to the Mathews' satisfaction
after repeated opportunities to do so and therefore a jury
could conclude that REV breached its warranties. But while
the facts and evidence support the Mathews' contention
that the RV had numerous problems, they do not support the
allegations that REV failed to honor its warranty
obligations. The Mathews' frustration is understandable
(and palpable in their briefs), but the undisputed
facts-virtually all of which come directly from the testimony
of Plaintiff Randy Mathews-reveal that they do not have a
valid cause of action against REV. In this instance, no
conflicting evidence needs to be weighed and no credibility
determinations need to be made, and REV is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law for the reasons discussed below.
well established, as this Court has noted, that “to
prevail on a breach of warranty claim under Indiana law, the
plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a warranty; (2)
breach of that warranty; and (3) that the breach was the
proximate cause of the loss sustained.” Swan Lake
Holdings, LLC, 2010 WL 3894576, at *3 (citing
Irmscher Suppliers, Inc. v. Schuler, 909 N.E.2d
1040, 1048 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009); Frantz v. Cantrell,
711 N.E.2d 856, 860 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999); Peltz Const. Co.
v. Dunham, 436 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ind.Ct.App. 1982)).
“The standard to be applied in determining whether or
not there has been a breach of warranty is one of
reasonableness in light of surrounding circumstances.”
Id. (quoting Barnes v. Mac Brown and Co.,
Inc., 342 N.E.2d 619, 621 (Ind. 1976)). The same is true
with an implied warranty of merchantability. “Indiana
recognizes implied warranties of fitness for a particular
purpose and implied warranties of merchantability.”
Hyundai Motor Am., Inc. v. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d 947,
951-52 (Ind. 2005) (citing Ind. Code §§ 26-1-2-314,
315 (2003)). The “implied warranty of merchantability
is imposed by operation of law for the protection of the
buyer and must be liberally construed in favor of the
buyer.” Frantz v. Cantrell, 711 N.E.2d at 859.
“An action based on breach of warranty requires
evidence showing not only the existence of the warranty but
also that the warranty was broken and that the breach was the
proximate cause of the loss.” Id. at 860.
argues that “the Mathews cannot establish a breach of
the express warranty because REV addressed and repaired all
issues which it was presented with during the one-year
warranty period.” Defendant's Memorandum, p. 11.
REV states that “[a]s express warranties are
‘contractual in nature, the language of the warranty
itself is what controls and dictates the obligations and
rights of the various parties.'” Id.
(quoting Medline Indus. v. Ram Med., Inc., 892
F.Supp.2d 957, 968 (N.D.Ill. 2012)). REV also states that
“[a] warrantor is not obligated to perform repairs
which are presented to it outside the terms of an express
limited warranty.” Id., p. 13 (citing
Popham v. Keystone RV Co., 2016 LEXIS 127093, *13
(N.D.Ind. Sept. 19, 2016) (“When breach of an express
warranty occurs is a straightforward analysis: it must occur
if it is to occur at all, before the express warranty
ends.”)). REV argues that “[b]ecause the issues
the Mathews currently complain about were not presented to
REV in accordance with the Limited Warranty (i.e. five days
after discovery and to an authorized dealer) and not within
the 1 year period of the Limited Warranty, summary judgment
is appropriate.” Id., p. 14.
undisputed material facts in this case, the determinative
ones, are tucked within Randy Mathews' own sworn
testimony, and come into focus after a detailed (and somewhat
lengthy) examination of that testimony, as well as other
evidence submitted by both sides. To begin, Mr. Mathews
testified that the first problems he and his wife encountered
after taking delivery of the RV included the blowing fuses,
the refrigerator not working, and the leveling system working
only intermittently. R. Mathews Depo., (ECF 30-1), pp. 45-46.
Mr. Mathews called John Hurd at Mellott Brothers, who told
him to replace the fuses “and see what happened.”
Id., p. 47. Mr. Mathews did so, but it the problem
persisted. Id. Mr. Mathews called Mr. Hurd again,
“but as we got into the weekend they weren't
available.” Id., p. 47. Mr. Mathews recalled
making only one attempt to contact Mr. Hurd and did not
testify to making any follow-up calls concerning this issue.
Id., pp. 47-48. It was during that same weekend
trip-the one to Hershey, Pennsylvania, that the Mathews took
immediately after taking delivery of the RV-that they noticed
more problems, including a leaking shower door, condensation
forming on the refrigerator, and a television and DVD player
that did not work. Id., p. 48. However, when asked
whether he informed Mellott about these issues Mr. Mathews
conceded that “I did not.” Id. The
Mathews did not use the RV again until June 20, 2014, when
they set out on their second trip in the vehicle.
Id. Mr. Mathews testified as follows:
Q.: Between that trip to Hershey and [the June 20 trip], did
you take your unit anywhere to be serviced for those issues
that you had spotted on your first trip?
A.: I did not. I did not yet.
Q.: Did you call anybody, once you got home, about those
A.: No. Id., pp. 48-49. During their second trip,
the Mathews contend that fuses were still blowing, the
leveling jack still operated only intermittently, and the
curbside slide cable broke. Id., p. 49. The next
contact that the Mathews had with REV was on June 23, 2014,
when he called John Hurd at Mellott Brothers, who in turn
told him to call Tina. Id., p. 50-51. This is the
conversation that began the chain of events that culminated
in the Mathews taking the RV to Johnson's. Here is the
play-by-play from Mr. Mathews' deposition:
Q.: What did you and Tina discuss?
A.: Tina was kind enough to go through her list. She put me
on hold for a minute and went through her list and found me
what she called a factory [authorized] dealer in Gloucester,
Virginia. She gave me the phone number, and I called that
Q.: Did you report to Tina any of the problems that you were
experiencing with the RV?
A.: As a recap, yes.
Q.: And at that point, June 23rd, 2014, did you understand
that [REV] would work through factory-authorized dealers to
take care of warranty issues?
A.: I understood that they may have a preference of dealers
that they may want me to take it to, so I was agreeable to
use their recommendation.
Id., pp. 51-52. Of course, the dealer Tina
recommended turned out not to be factory authorized so Mr.
Mathews called Tina again for assistance:
Q.: Did you call Tina back?
A.: I'm pretty sure I did[.] I think I called her back
and we discussed having a dealer close by me service the
unit. And I understood the circumstance to be that they would
have to approve the repair. . . .
Q.: . . . How did you come to Johnson's R.V.?
A.: I had used Johnson's previously . . . .”
Q.: And you dropped your unit off on July 11th?
A.: That's right. . . .
Q.: . . . And after you called Rick Johnson to make this July
11 appointment, did you notify [REV] of that fact?
A.: Did I? No.
Q.: Okay. And when you dropped it off on July 11th, what did
you ask Rick Johnson to do?
A.: To focus on the soundbar, the television, the broken
cable mainly because the thing is inoperable with a broken
cable, and see if he could figure out why the converter was
Id., pp. 51-54. The RV remained at Johnson's
from July 11, 2014, until late August. Id. When Mr.
Mathews picked the vehicle up he was told by Rick Johnson
that “he had repaired the slide cable, that the sound
bar was not repairable and that the factory was going to send
him a replacement, and that the bedroom TV problem was yet to
be resolved. He thought it was the remote, and that he
couldn't find a fault with the converter at the time.
Id., p. 56. Mr. Mathews further testified as
Q.: And did Rick Johnson tell you he had been in touch with
the factory about these repairs?
A.: I was under the impression that he had been in touch with
the factory. . . .
Q.: Did you pay them[?]
A.: I didn't pay them anything on this. . . . .
Q.: So did you call Tina or anyone else with the factory from
that time, June 23rd of 2014 through August 27 of 2014?
A.: Not that I recall.
Id., pp. 57, 60.
repair visits to Johnson's are a subplot in themselves,
and a significant one-not so much for the reasons the parties
discuss, but (again) for the undisputed material facts that
are revealed when the devilish details are unraveled.
undisputed that the Mathews were told about the one-year
Limited Warranty at the time they purchased the RV. It is
also undisputed that the Mathews knew that under the terms of
that warranty, any mechanic to whom they took the unit for
servicing would have to obtain prior approval before
performing warranty repairs to the vehicle (having been told
that specifically by Tina). Mr. Mathews believed he could
have the RV serviced at Johnson's because the dealer Tina
told him to contact turned out not to be an
authorized servicer. But he concedes that his decision to
take the vehicle to Johnson's was unilateral and based on
the fact that he had done business with Johnson's in the
significance of the two repair visits to Johnson's,
according to the Mathews, is that they both involved a broken
curb side slide-out cable, and therefore constitute two
repair attempts under the Limited Warranty. Plaintiffs'
Response, p. 10. Making a leap of logic then, the Mathews
contend that when they agreed in May of 2015 to allow REV to
perform repairs to the unit in its factory-including
repairing a broken slide cable again-it was the
third time that REV repaired the same problem.
Id., p. 13 (“The RV was at [REV's] factory
repair facility a second time from May 1, 2015 until June 25,
2015 for repair of . . . [the] curb side slide out cable . .
. [third time].”). In other words, the first two
repairs completed at Johnson's should be imputed to REV
because Mr. Mathews mistakenly believed that
Johnson's was authorized to perform warranty repairs and
mistakenly believed that Ricky Johnson had contacted
the factory to obtain that authorization. The Mathews then
argue that the warranty in this case was breached because REV
had three opportunities to repair the problem with
the cable but it “failed to repair the RV's defects
within a reasonable amount of time and within a
reasonable number of repair attempts.”
Id., p. 22 (italics added); see also, id.,
p. 36 (“[REV] had a reasonable opportunity to repair
all alleged defects. . . . [REV] had several chances . . . to
repair the RV's many defects within the first
parties devote a lot of space to debating the issue, but in
the end it doesn't matter whether Johnson's was
authorized to perform work on the RV. The material undisputed
facts to be gleaned from the parties' debate about this
are that Mr. Mathews informed REV on June 23, 2014, during
his phone conversation with Tina, that the RV had mechanical
problems. Tina told him to contact an RV dealer near him that
turned out not to be an authorized servicer. Mr. Mathews
called Tina again and she told him he could take the RV to a
servicer near him but that the servicer would have to obtain
approval before performing repairs. The Mathews took the RV
to Johnson's for repair, the work was performed, and the
Mathews were told that the work was “covered”
under their warranty. In truth, and adding a quirky twist,
Johnson's never obtained approval for its work on the RV
nor did it get paid for that work, but not because REV
refused to honor its warranty. Instead, Johnson's never
submitted the necessary paperwork. The work was completed on
August 18, 2014, but Johnson's never obtained approval,
never received payment for the work, and the Mathews were
never charged for that work.
Johnson, the owner of Johnson's RV, was deposed and
testified as follows:
Q.: Tell us what happened there.
A.: Well, Mr. Mathews brought it in. We noticed that the
rearward cable was snapped on the slide-out. He also had some
other issues with the sound bar and the bedroom TV.
Q.: And what did you do?
A.: First called [the factory] about doing the warranty work
on there. They said they needed an estimate for repairs.
That's when I got them together.
We were very extremely [sic] busy at that time, and I
neglected to follow up on turning this in because we were so
busy. Mr. Mathews needed his RV back, so I repaired the RV
before I actually got authorization on the unit.
Q.: Okay. Did you ultimately get authorization to do the work