United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ORDER GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28
U.S.C. § 2241
Magntts-Stinson, Chief Judge
Jason Jahns seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). His petition for writ of habeas
corpus is granted.
was charged in the Northern District of Ohio (Western
Division) in No. 3:10-cr-00435-DAK with being a felon in
possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). In
2012, he pled guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement.
sentencing Jahns was deemed an armed career criminal, 18
U.S.C. § 924(e), and received an executed sentence of
240 months. Section 924(e) applies to persons with three
prior violent felonies or serious drug offenses. Jahns
objected to the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), § 924(e), but the district court concluded that
he had at least three convictions for violent felonies based
on two first degree and two second degree Kentucky burglary
convictions. See United States v. Jahns, No.
3:10-CR-435, 2012 WL 928725 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 2012).
the imposition of sentence, Jahns filed a direct appeal
arguing that second- degree burglary in Kentucky is not a
violent felony and that the ACCA's residual clause is
unconstitutionally vague. The Sixth Circuit disagreed,
concluding that the Kentucky statute describes generic
burglary under Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575
(1990), because it prohibits unlawful entry into a
“dwelling.” See United States v.
Jenkins, 528 F. App'x 483, 485 (6th Cir. 2013).
Because the burglary convictions counted as enumerated
violent felonies, the residual clause was irrelevant. The
Sixth Circuit casually noted that Jahns's fourth degree
burglary conviction in Ohio is also a violent felony for
purposes of the ACCA. Id.
then filed a motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255, again challenging the application of the ACCA. Jahns
raised the Supreme Court's decision in Descamps v.
United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013), as a change in law
making Kentucky burglary convictions invalid predicates under
the ACCA. The court denied relief, rejecting Jahns's
claim under Descamps and finding that Jahns's
argument had already been addressed in his direct appeal.
See Jahns v. United States, No. 3:10-cr 435-1 (N.D.
Ohio Feb. 3, 2015).
the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United
States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), which holds that the
residual clause in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
unconstitutionally vague, Jahns applied for authorization to
file a second § 2255 motion. The Sixth Circuit denied
this request concluding that the classification of
Jahns's burglary convictions as violent felonies did not
depend on the residual clause, so Johnson did not
apply. The Sixth Circuit explained:
Although Johnson announced a new, substantive rule
of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, Welch v. United States,
136 S.Ct. 1257, 1264-65 (2016), it “d[id] not call into
question application of the [ACCA] to the four enumerated
offenses, or the remainder of the Act's definition of a
violent felony.” Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2563.
And in rejecting Jahns's direct appeal, we have already
held that his prior Kentucky burglary convictions fall within
the ACCA's enumerated-offenses clause. Jenkins,
528 F. App'x at 485. Therefore, the holding in Johnson
does not apply to Jahns's sentence.
In re Jahns, No. 15-4103 (6th Cir. June 3, 2016).
21, 2016, Jahns filed this petition under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 attempting to challenge the classification of his
Kentucky burglary convictions as violent felonies under the
ACCA. In initially denying his petition, this Court concluded
that Jahns had not shown that § 2255 is inadequate or
ineffective to attack his sentence. Jahns appealed and the
Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded this action directing
this Court to reconsider its ruling and discuss the possible
effect of intervening case law; specifically the Supreme
Court's decision in Mathis v. United States, 136
S.Ct. 2243 (2016), and the Seventh Circuit's decisions in
United States v. Haney, 840 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir.
2016) (discussing Mathis in context of direct
appeal) and Holt v. United States, 843 F.3d 720 (7th
Cir. 2016) (discussing Mathis in context of
successive § 2255 motion). Based on this Mandate,
counsel was appointed to represent Jahns and the issues have
been fully briefed.
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the presumptive
means by which a federal prisoner can challenge his
conviction or sentence. See Davis v. United States,
417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974); United States v. Bezy, 499
F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 2007). Jahns, however, challenges his
sentence and seeks habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). “A federal prisoner may use a §
2241 petition for a writ of habeas corpus to attack his
conviction or sentence only if § 2255 is
‘inadequate or ineffective.'” Hill v.
Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 2012)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)). Whether §
2255 is inadequate or ineffective depends on “whether
it allows the petitioner ‘a reasonable opportunity to
obtain a reliable judicial determination of the fundamental
legality of his conviction and sentence.'”
Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir.
2015) (en banc) (quoting In re Davenport, 147 F.3d
605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998). To properly invoke the Savings
Clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), a petitioner is required
to show “something more than a lack of success with a
section 2255 motion, ” i.e., “some kind
of structural problem with section 2255.” Id.
“The petitioner bears the burden of coming forward with
evidence affirmatively showing the inadequacy or
ineffectiveness of the § 2255 remedy.” Smith
v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Low, 503 F. App'x
763, 765 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has identified the
three requirements to invoke the Savings Clause:
In the wake of Davenport, we distilled that holding
into a three-part test: a petitioner who seeks to invoke the
savings clause of § 2255(e) in order to proceed under
§ 2241 must establish: (1) that he relies on “not
a constitutional case, but a statutory-interpretation case,
so [that he] could not have invoked it by means of a second
or successive section 2255 motion, ” (2) that the new
rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and
could not have been invoked in his earlier proceeding, and
(3) that the error is “grave enough . . . to be deemed
a miscarriage of justice corrigible therefore in a habeas
corpus proceeding, ” such as one resulting in “a
conviction for a crime of which he was innocent.”
Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012).
Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied sub nom. Montana v. Werlich, 137 S.Ct.
1813 (2017). Each of the three requirements to invoke the
savings clause ...