United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
JARED S. FOGLE, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
ORDER DENYING CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE AND DIRECTING
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
TANYA
WALTON PRATT, JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on Petitioner Jared Fogle's
(“Fogle”) filing titled Constitutional Challenge
to § 2255 (f)(1-4). Dkt. 6. On February 26, 2018, the
Court directed the Clerk to treat Fogle's Motion to
Withdraw Plea of Guilty as Fogle's Motion for Relief
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Dkt. 1. The Court
thereafter provided notice to Fogle, pursuant to Castro
v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 383 (2003), so that he
could be afforded the opportunity to withdraw or amend the
motion to include all § 2255 claims which he believes he
has. Dkt. 3. Fogle was given notice that he has until April
6, 2018, to either supplement or withdraw his § 2255
motion.
I.
Constitutional Challenge
In an
attempt to “curb delays [and] to prevent
‘retrials' on federal habeas, ” Congress, as
part of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), revised several statutes governing federal
habeas relief. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404
(2000). AEDPA establishes a one-year statute of limitations
period for § 2255 motions. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
That period runs from:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
On
March 19, 2018, Fogle filed a “Constitutional Challenge
to § 2255(f)(1-4).” He asserts that § 2255(f)
is unconstitutional because it denies a party habeas corpus
relief by setting time limitations. He asserts the Court was
without authority in converting his motion to withdraw plea
to a motion for relief under § 2255 because it has been
over a year since his case was deemed “final.” As
argued, Fogle only implicates § 2255(1). He could have
argued that a § 2255 motion was timely under
§2255(f)(2)-(4), but does not attempt to argue his
motion is otherwise timely under § 2255(f) or under a
theory of equitable tolling.
The
Court rejects Fogle's attempt to characterize the AEDPA
one-year filing limitation as unconstitutional. See
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (finding that
limitations imposed by AEDPA were an illustration of the
principle that “the power to award the writ by any of
the courts of the United States, must be given by written
law”). The AEDPA one-year filing limitation does not,
as Fogle argues, act to suspend a petitioner's right to
file a writ of habeas corpus. Rather it imposes a
congressionally-intended limitation in order to further the
well-established goal of finality in criminal convictions.
See United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784
(1979) (noting that concern with finality of conviction for
purposes of limiting collateral attack has special force with
respect to convictions based on guilty pleas); Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 690 (1971) (“Finality
in the criminal law is an end which must always be kept in
plain view.”). Moreover, Fogle has had ample time to
file a motion under § 2255 and does not argue that there
were any impediments to doing so. See David v. Hall,
318 F.3d 343, 347 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that
AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations “is not
even arguably unconstitutional” as applied to
petitioner who “had ample time … in which to
bring his claim within the statutory deadline”).
Finally, where a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is
“inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention, ” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), a petitioner may
bring a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective
if the following three requirements are met: “(1) the
petitioner must rely on a case of statutory interpretation
(because invoking such a case cannot secure authorization for
a second § 2255 motion); (2) the new rule must be
previously unavailable and apply retroactively; and (3) the
error asserted must be grave enough to be deemed a
miscarriage of justice, such as the conviction of an innocent
defendant.” Davis v. Cross, 863 F.3d 962, 964
(7th Cir. 2017).
Because
the Court does not determine that any portion of § 2255
is unconstitutional, the Court will not certify the question
as otherwise required by Rule 5.1(b) and 28 U.S.C. §
2403. The U.S. Attorney General can suffer no prejudice by
the Court's determination that § 2255(f) is
constitutional. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS
Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 260 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd
on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (applying a
prejudice analysis to a district court's failure to
certify a constitutional challenge to state statute and
determining that where the state statute was not found by
appellate courts to be unconstitutional, the failure to
certify was “not momentous”).
II.
Further Proceedings
The
Court further construes the “constitutional
challenge” filing to be a motion to withdraw his §
2255 motion. The Clerk is directed to modify
dkt. 6 on the docket to be a “motion to withdraw §
2255 motion.” Because Fogle was given until April 6,
2018 to, either supplement or withdraw his § 2255
motion, the Court will not issue an order on the motion to
withdraw § 2255 motion or issue judgment in this action
at this time. To ensure that Petitioner has sufficient time
to consider these matters, Fogle shall have until
April 13, 2018, in which to either withdraw his
“motion to withdraw his § 2255 motion” or to
supplement ...