United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ENTRY DISCUSSING INSUFFICIENT CLAIMS AND DIRECTING
William T. Lawrence, United States District Court Judge
plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis,
Dkt. No. 6, is granted. He is assessed an
initial partial filing fee of Twenty-Five Dollars and
Forty-Six Cents ($25.46). He shall have through April
10, 2018, to pay this sum to the Court.
who is incarcerated at the Putnamville Correctional Facility,
filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that his civil rights were violated. The Court is
required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking
relief against a governmental entity or an officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. § 1915A(b).
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,
31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989); Gladney v. Pendelton Corr. Facility, 302
F.3d 773, 774 (7th Cir. 2002). The Court may, therefore,
dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S.
at 327; Gladney, 302 F.3d at 774. “Malicious,
” although sometimes treated as a synonym for
“frivolous, ” “is more usefully construed
as intended to harass.” Lindell v. McCallum,
352 F.3d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted);
accord Paul v. Marberry, 658 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir.
state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading
system, the plaintiff is required to provide a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is
entitled to relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). It is not
necessary for the plaintiff to plead specific facts, and his
statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of
what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957)); see Christopher v. Buss, 384 F.3d
879, 881 (7th Cir. 2004). However, a complaint that offers
“labels and conclusions” or “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To state
a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, “that is plausible on its
face.” Id. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. The complaint allegations “must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555;
Christopher, 384 F.3d at 881.
considering whether a complaint states a claim, courts should
follow the principles set forth in Twombly by first
“identifying pleadings that, because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Legal
conclusions must be supported by factual allegations.
Id. If there are well-pleaded factual allegations,
the Court must then “assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.” Id.
state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege that: (1) he was deprived of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and
(2) the deprivation was visited upon him by a person or
persons acting under color of state law. Buchanan-Moore
v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir.
2009); see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640
(1980). The Court is obliged to give the plaintiff's pro
se allegations, “however inartfully pleaded, ” a
liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
the plaintiff alleges that on September 18, 2017, defendant
Amber Cooper threw a bread rack at him hitting him in the
lower leg. Ms. Cooper is an Aramark employee. He filed an
informal grievance and was allegedly fired from his job for
no reason. He was also reclassified, losing his ability to
earn good time credit or participate in programming.
plaintiff alleges that Aramark retaliated against him for
engaging in conduct protected by the First Amendment.
Specifically, he alleges Aramark fired him and had him
reclassified for filing a grievance about Ms. Cooper throwing
a bread rack at him.
alleges an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment
claim against Ms. Cooper.
Insufficient Claims A. Retaliation.
plaintiff alleges that Aramark reclassified him after he
filed a grievance. He alleges this occurred in retaliation
for filing a grievance after Ms. Cooper threw a bread rack at
him. Reclassification of inmates, such as the plaintiff
alleges occurred here (loss of good time credit, inability to
participate in programming) is a task reserved to the Indiana
Department of Correction (“IDOC”). Aramark is a
private corporation contracted by the IDOC to provide food
services. Aramark employees do not ...