from the Hendricks Superior Court The Honorable Stephenie
Lemay-Luken, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 32D05-1703-F6-293
Attorney for Appellant Cara Schaefer Wieneke Wieneke Law
Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Attorney General
of Indiana Lee M. Stoy, Jr. Deputy Attorney General
Amber Keith challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting
her conviction of Level 6 felony escape. She argues the
State charged her with a crime of which she could not be
convicted because her home does not qualify as a place of
"lawful detention" from which to escape as required
for conviction of escape under Indiana Code section
35-44.1-3-4(c). We hold that, for persons on home detention,
a home is a place of lawful detention and, accordingly,
affirm Keith's conviction of escape.
and Procedural History
On March 1, 2017, pursuant to her conviction for a crime
about which the record gives us no additional information,
Keith was ordered to serve 180 days on home detention. The
home detention order stipulated Keith was to remain in her
home except to attend probation appointments and to have her
monitoring device maintained.
Keith was fitted with the monitoring device on March 6, 2017.
Probation/Home Detention Officer Chad Koebcke instructed
Keith in the use of the monitoring anklet that includes a GPS
tracking device and the other conditions of home
detention. When Keith left the home detention office at
approximately 10:00 a.m., Officer Koebcke told her "to
go directly home." (Tr. at 11.) She did not.
The GPS tracking device tracked Keith going to numerous other
locations prior to going home. Around noon, Keith went home
but then left again. Keith returned to her home around 2:00
p.m. During her travels, Officer Koebcke sent messages to her
monitoring unit advising Keith to "call [her home
detention] officer immediately[.]" (Id. at 13.)
She did not do so. "[A]t approximately five o'clock
(5:00) . . . the anklet lost power and died."
(Id. at 15.) Keith plugged it in "at
approximately eleven (11) eleven [sic] fifteen (15) that
evening." (Id.) During that power loss, the
home detention office "could not say for certain"
where she had been. (Id.)
The State charged Keith under Indiana Code section
35-44.1-3-4(c) (2014), which states "[a] person who
knowingly or intentionally fails to return to lawful
detention following temporary leave granted for a specified
purpose or limited period commits failure to return to lawful
detention, a Level 6 felony." The trial court found
Keith had been "granted temporary leave . . . to leave
from the . . . home detention office to her home and she
failed to do so[;] therefore she  committed the offense of
failure to return to lawful detention[.]" (Id.
at 21.) The trial court ordered Keith to serve 180 days
incarcerated, with credit for time served.
Keith asserts the State did not present sufficient evidence
to prove she committed escape because her home cannot be
considered "lawful detention" to which she failed
to return, as required under the statutory definition of
escape. See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-4(c). She
argues the ankle monitor, not her home, was the lawful
detention and she was not ever granted a temporary leave from
which she failed to return because she never left the ankle
As Keith agrees she did not go home as ordered, but rather
argues her home is not the place of lawful detention from
which the State was required to prove she escaped, we must
interpret the lawful detention statute. When faced with a
question of statutory interpretation, our review is de
novo. In re M.W., 913 N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ind.Ct.App.
2009). We first decide if the statute is ambiguous.
Id. If it is not, we need not and do not interpret
it, but instead apply its plain and clear meaning.
Id. If the statute is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we must
determine the legislature's intent so that we can give
effect to that intent. Maroney v. State, 849 N.E.2d
745, 748 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006). Statutes must be read in harmony
with related statutes. St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare
Ctrs., Inc. v. Poland, 828 N.E.2d 396, 402 (Ind.Ct.App.
2005), trans. denied. We assume the legislature
intended statutory language to be applied in a logical manner
consistent with the statute's underlying policy and
goals. B.K.C. v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1157, 1167
Lawful detention is ...