United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
OPINION AND ORDER
L. MILLER, JR. JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
Components Manufacturing, Inc. asks the court to reconsider
its ruling granting in part and denying in part MORryde Inc.
and MORryde International Inc.'s (collectively MORryde)
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. [Doc. No. 80]. Lippert
requests that the court reconsider that ruling to the extent
it dismissed Lippert's second amended complaint's
induced and contributory infringement claims with prejudice.
For the reasons that follow, the court denies the motion to
Standard of Review
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that a court may alter
or amend an interlocutory order any time before entry of
final judgment. See Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983) (“every order
short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the
discretion of the district judge”). Unlike a motion to
reconsider a final judgment, which must meet the requirements
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 or 60, “a motion
to reconsider an interlocutory order may be entertained and
granted as justice requires.” Akzo Coatings, Inc.
v. Aigner Corp., 909 F.Supp. 1154, 1160 (N.D. Ind.
might be appropriate when the facts or law on which the
decision was based change significantly after issuance of the
interlocutory order, or when “the [c]ourt has patently
misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the
adversarial issues presented to the [c]ourt by the parties,
or has made an error not of reasoning but of
apprehension.” Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese
Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990).
“These grounds represent extraordinary circumstances,
and . . . a motion to reconsider is to be granted only in
such extraordinary circumstances . . . Indeed, the
court's orders are not mere first drafts, subject to
revision and reconsideration at a litigant's
pleasure.” United States Securities and Exch.
Comm'n v. National Presto Indus., Inc., No.
02-C-5027, 2004 WL 1093390, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2004)
(internal quotations omitted). Motions to reconsider serve a
limited function: “to correct manifest errors of law or
fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus.,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996). A party
seeking reconsideration can't introduce new evidence or
legal theories that could have been presented earlier or
simply rehash previously rejected arguments. Id.
asks the court to reconsider its dismissal of the induced and
contributory infringement claims in the second amended
complaint because: (1) the court erred when it held that
Lippert didn't adequately plead MORryde's pre-suit
knowledge of the patents-in-suit; (2) the court erred when it
held that Lippert didn't adequately plead MORryde's
post-suit knowledge of the patents-in-suit; and (3) the court
erred when it dismissed Lippert's induced and
contributory infringement claims with prejudice.
MORryde's Pre-Suit Knowledge of the Patents-in-suit
argues that the court was incorrect in concluding that the
second amended complaint didn't adequately allege
pre-suit knowledge. First, Lippert contends that the second
amended complaint's allegation “since at least 2015
[the d]efendants . . . knew of the [a]sserted
[p]atents” meets the pleading requirement for pre-suit
knowledge of the patents-in-suit. But Lippert made this
argument in its response to MORryde's motion to dismiss
and at the hearing on the motion where the court rejected it,
holding it was a conclusory allegation. The court declines to
address it again. See Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole
v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996)
(a party seeking reconsideration can't simply rehash
previously rejected arguments).
also asserts that the court overlooked other factual
allegations in the second amended complaint that support its
contention that MORryde knew of the patents-in-suit and
specifically points to paragraph 21. While the court
addressed paragraph 21 when discussing whether the second
amended complaint's allegations met the pleading
standard, [see Doc. No. 74 at 30], and that alone
would allow the court to deny this previously raised and
rejected argument, the court will take this opportunity to
address Lippert's arguments more fully than it could in
its oral ruling.
On information and belief, [d]efendants, as part and in the
course of their business activities, regularly and actively
monitor the recreational vehicle industry and competitive
intellectual property, such as the [a]sserted [p]atents. On
information and belief, [d]efendants knew of the [a]sserted
[p]atents, listed at
http://www.lci1.com/patent-list, and knew that the
Lippert Products practiced the [a]sserted [p]atents.
No. 31 at ¶ 21]. Lippert argues that a plaintiff can
sufficiently plead pre-suit knowledge by alleging that
Lippert maintained a list of its patents on a website and the
parties are competitors who monitor each other's
intellectual property. Lippert relies heavily on Trading
Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. BCG Partners, Inc. to
support this argument, but in that case the court
specifically noted that:
The Court does not suggest that competitors may plead
knowledge for the purpose of indirect infringement solely by
pleading that the competitor would be monitoring the
plaintiff's patent filings and any patents issued to it.
However, that the litigants are competitors in the same
industry is a fact that makes knowledge of the patent at