United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ENTRY DISCUSSING COMPLAINT, DISMISSING INSUFFICIENT
CLAIMS, AND DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
William T. Lawrence, Judge
plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis,
Dkt. No. 6, is granted. The assessment of
even a partial filing fee is not feasible at this time.
David Runyon is an inmate at the United States Penitentiary
in Terre Haute, Indiana (“USP-TH”). The complaint
is now subject to the screening requirement of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b). This statute directs that the Court dismiss
a complaint or any claim within a complaint which “(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” Alvarado
v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 650 (7th Cir. 2001).
satisfy the notice-pleading standard of Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must
provide a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” which
is sufficient to provide the defendant with “fair
notice” of the claim and its basis. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)(citing Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955,
1964 (2007) and quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). The complaint
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face. . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(internal quotations
omitted). Pro se complaints are construed liberally
and “held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94 (internal quotation omitted); see also
Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n.2 (7th Cir.
complaint, Runyon alleges that on November 20, 2015,
defendant Edwards misled his security staff, including
defendant Brazzell, and used his position of authority to
trick Runyon into coming out of his cell under the false
pretense of a visit with his attorneys. When Runyon arrived
for the visit with attorneys, he alleges two unnamed FBI
officers were waiting to interview him. Runyon alleges that
by placing him in a room with FBI agents. Edwards endangered
his life by causing him to be labeled a “snitch.”
Mr. Runyon alleges this conduct violated his rights under the
Eighth Amendment. He seeks injunctive, declaratory, and
complaint can be understood to allege a Bivens claim
against the individual defendants. “Relief from
misconduct by federal agents may be obtained by a suit
against the agent for a constitutional tort under the theory
set forth in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
“authorizes the filing of constitutional tort suits
against federal officers in much the same way that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 authorizes such suits against state officers. . .
.” King v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d
634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Abella v. Rubino,
63 F.3d 1063, 1065 (11th Cir. 1995)(noting that “the
effect of Bivens was to create a remedy against
federal officers acting under color of federal law that was
analogous to the Section 1983 action against state
right implicated by Runyon's complaint is the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against the imposition of cruel
and unusual punishment. Constitutional claims are to be
addressed under the most applicable provision. See
Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2005);
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)
(“It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner
receives in prison and the conditions under which he is
confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment.”). The Constitution does not mandate
comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane
ones. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114
S.Ct. 1970, 1976 (1994).
alleges the defendants conduct caused him to be labeled a
“snitch” and would potentially placed him in
danger. However, he has not alleged that the defendants'
conduct either created or ignored a risk of harm because he
does not allege any facts that people who may harm him were
aware of his meeting with the unnamed FBI agents. For this
reason, his allegations do not rise to the level of a
constitutional deprivation. The claims against defendants
Edwards and Brazzell are dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
claims against defendants Krueger, Sample, and Rupska are
also dismissed because there are no factual allegations in
the complaint that these defendants personally participated
or had knowledge of the allegations in the complaint.
the Court has been unable to identify a viable claim for
relief against any particular defendant, the ...