United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ENTRY DISCUSSING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
JANE MAGNUS-STINSON, CHIEF JUDGE
reasons explained in this Entry, Carl Edward Beckner's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the
action dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the court finds
that a certificate of appealability should not issue.
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
petitioner is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the
Wabash Valley Correctional Facility who seeks a writ of
habeas corpus. The petitioner was convicted of Class A felony
dealing in cocaine by a jury on April 22, 2005, in an Indiana
state court, and was sentenced to thirty years'
imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals
affirmed the petitioner's conviction and sentence on
November 29, 2006. Dkt. 13-6. The petitioner filed a petition
for transfer with the Indiana Supreme Court on December 28,
2006, which was denied on January 25, 2007. Dkts. 13-3, 13-7.
The petitioner filed a pro se petition for state
post-conviction relief on October 3, 2007, and withdrew it on
February 14, 2013. Dkts. 13-1, 13-2. On July 28, 2017, the
petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas
petitioner raises several claims in his petition including
ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct,
Batson violation, and others. The respondent argues that the
petitioner's petition must be denied because it is
untimely and because his claims are procedurally defaulted.
attempt to “curb delays, to prevent
‘retrials' on federal habeas, and to give effect to
state convictions to the extent possible under law, ”
Congress, as part of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, revised several of the statutes
governing federal habeas relief. Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). Along with triggering dates not
applicable here, “[u]nder 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1)(A), a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief
has just one year after his conviction becomes final in state
court to file his federal petition.” Gladney v.
Pollard, 799 F.3d 889, 894 (7th Cir. 2015). “The
one-year clock is stopped, however, during the time the
petitioner's ‘properly filed' application for
state postconviction relief ‘is pending.'”
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 201 (2006) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).
petitioner's conviction became final on April 25, 2007,
ninety days after his petition to transfer was denied on
January 25, 2007. See Ind. App. R. 57(c). See
Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012)
(“[T]he judgment becomes final . . . when the time for
pursuing direct review . . . expires.”). He therefore
had one year from April 25, 2007, to file his petitioner for
a writ of habeas corpus in this Court.
petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in
state court during the pendency of his one-year period, on
October 3, 2007. That petition was pending until it was
withdrawn on February 14, 2013. During the pendency of the
petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief in state
court, the limitations period was tolled. See Socha v.
Boughton, 763 F.3d 674, 681 (7th Cir. 2014). Therefore,
as of February 14, 2013, the petitioner had 204 days
remaining, or until September 6, 2013, in which to file his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court.
the petitioner's one-year statute of limitations ran in
2013, and he did not file the instant petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in this Court until several years after that
date. Although the petitioner contends that his procedural
default should be excused because he received ineffective
assistance of counsel, he does not contend that he is
entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations
on any basis. Therefore, his claims are barred by the
one-year statute of limitations and his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus must be dismissed with
prejudice. See Altman v. Benik, 337 F.3d
764, 766 (7th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
corpus has its own peculiar set of hurdles a petitioner must
clear before his claim is properly presented to the district
court.” Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,504 U.S. 1, 14
(1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted). The petitioner has encountered the hurdle produced
by the one-year statute of limitations. He has not shown the
existence of circumstances permitting him to overcome this
hurdle, and ...