United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ENTRY DISCUSSING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION TO AMEND
EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
Antonio Thomas Collier, an inmate at the Correctional
Industrial Facility, filed this civil rights action alleging
that his First Amendment rights were violated. Specifically,
Mr. Collier alleges he filed a grievance against Mark Garrad,
the prison Maintenance Supervisor, and in response, Mr.
Garrad successfully sought to have Mr. Collier
“reclassed”/removed from his prison job in the
maintenance department. Mr. Collier seeks compensatory and
punitive damages. This retaliation claim is proceeding
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Now before the court is a
vague discovery request presented as a motion for preliminary
injunction and a motion to amend the complaint. Each of these
motions, dkts  and , is denied for the reasons set
Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Collier's motion for preliminary injunction seeks access
to general categories of discovery. Many of the discovery
categories referenced appear to be outside the scope
permitted by Rule 26(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure given the claim at issue in this action. In any
event, instead of filing a motion with the Court Mr. Collier
should have served his discovery requests on defendant's
counsel. In addition, any future discovery requests should be
made with more specificity. For example, Mr. Collier states
that he seeks entry upon designated land. Such a request is
too vague to elicit a meaningful response. If Mr. Collier
seeks entry on land he should state what land. In addition,
there should be an indication of how the requested discovery
is relevant to his claim or defense. Given the deficiencies
in the discovery request, defendant's counsel is not
expected to respond to the motion for preliminary injunction
as a discovery request. The motion for preliminary
injunction, dkt , is denied.
Motion to Amend
Collier seeks to amend his complaint. “District courts
have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where there is
undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to
cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants, or
where the amendment would be futile.” Heng v.
Heavner, Beyers & Mihlar, LLC, 849 F.3d 348, 354
(7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted).
motion to amend the complaint, dkt , is
denied for failure to comply with Local Rule
15-1 and because the proposed amendments would be futile.
although there is a document entitled “Amended Civil
Petition” and exhibits attached to the motion, no
amended complaint was filed along with the motion. The
Amended Civil Petition states in its entirety:
AMENDED CIVIL PETITION
Comes now Plaintiff, Antonio Collier, pro se, and
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, hereby amends the Complaint
filed in this matter.
Dkt. 20-1 at 1. The failure to include a copy of the proposed
amended complaint along with the motion to amend as required
by Local Rule 15-1(a) is a basis for denial of the motion to
the proposed changes outlined in the motion to amend are
futile. Mr. Collier states that he seeks to amend his
complaint to reflect that he intends to sue Maintenance
Supervisor Mark Garrad in his individual and official
capacities. Mr. Collier is currently understood to be sued
only in his individual capacity. Any claim against Mr.
Collier in his official capacity is subject to dismissal. An
official capacity claim against Mr. Collier would in essence
be against the State of Indiana. Such claims are barred by
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67 and n.14 (1985) (suit for
damages against state officer in official capacity is barred
by the Eleventh Amendment); see also Omosegbon v.
Wells, 335 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2003) (the state is
not a “person” that can be sued under 42 U.S.C.
Collier also seeks to amend his complaint to include a claim
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Unfortunately for
Mr. Collier, the facts alleged are insufficient to state a
claim under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. The
loss of a prison job is not tantamount to cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Similarly, the
Fourteenth Amendment does not create a protectable liberty
interest in the employment pursued by incarcerated
individuals. The Constitution does not “guarantee a
prisoner the right to a job.” Joihner v.
McEvers, 898 F.2d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing
Garza v. Miller, 688 F.2d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983); DeWalt v.
Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 2000). See also
Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 410 (7th ...