United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ENTRY GRANTING CORIZON'S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EXHAUSTION
EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
Robert Henderson, Jr. (“Mr. Henderson”) is a
state prisoner currently confined at the New Castle
Correctional Facility (“NCF”). Mr. Henderson
filed his complaint on April 27, 2017, alleging in relevant
part that Corizon, LLC (“Corizon”) has a
widespread custom of failing to provide proper care for his
serious medical needs, as evidenced by his failure to receive
a prescribed surgery over a period of weeks and months. In
the Court's screening Entry, it allowed the claim of
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, under the
Eighth Amendment, to proceed against Corizon. Other claims
are also proceeding against defendants GEO Group, Inc. and
Superintendent Butts, but they do not join in the motion for
Corizon moved for summary judgment seeking resolution of the
claim against it on the basis that Mr. Henderson failed to
exhaust his available administrative remedies. Mr. Henderson
has not opposed the motion for summary judgment.
reasons explained in this Entry, Corizon's unopposed
motion for summary judgment, dkt. , must be
judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material fact”
is one that “might affect the outcome of the
suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine only if a
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.
Id. If no reasonable jury could find for the
non-moving party, then there is no “genuine”
dispute. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party and all reasonable inferences are drawn in
the non-movant's favor. Ault v. Speicher, 634
F.3d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 2011).
applicable substantive law will dictate which facts are
material.” National Soffit & Escutcheons, Inc.,
v. Superior Systems, Inc., 98 F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir.
1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The
substantive law applicable to the motion for summary judgment
is the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA'”), which requires that a prisoner
exhaust his available administrative remedies before bringing
a suit concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a); see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25
(2002). “[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement
applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and
whether they allege excessive force or some other
wrong.” Id. at 532 (citation omitted).
exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines
and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative
system can function effectively without imposing some orderly
structure on the course of its proceedings.”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006) (footnote
omitted); see also Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655
(7th Cir. 2004) (“In order to properly exhaust, a
prisoner must submit inmate complaints and appeals ‘in
the place, and at the time, the prison's administrative
rules require.'”) (quoting Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)).
“In order to exhaust administrative remedies, a
prisoner must take all steps prescribed by the prison's
grievance system.” Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d
395, 397 (7th Cir. 2004).
exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative
defense, the burden of proof is on the defendant to
demonstrate that Mr. Henderson failed to exhaust all
available administrative remedies before he filed this suit.
Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 2006).
Corizon's motion for summary judgment, brief in support,
and Rule 56 notice were served on Mr. Henderson on or about
August 18, 2017. As noted, no response has been filed, and
the deadline for doing so has passed.
consequence of Mr. Henderson's failure to respond is that
he has conceded the defendant's version of the facts.
Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“[F]ailure to respond by the nonmovant as mandated by
the local rules results in an admission.”);
see S.D. Ind. Local Rule 56-1 (“A party
opposing a summary judgment motion must . . . file and serve
a response brief and any evidence . . . that the party relies
on to oppose the motion. The response must . . . identif[y]
the potentially determinative facts and factual disputes that
the party contends demonstrate a dispute of fact precluding
summary judgment.”). This does not alter the standard
for assessing a Rule 56(a) motion, but does “reduc[e]
the pool” from which the facts and inferences relative
to such a motion may be drawn. Smith v. Severn, 129
F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).
the following facts, unopposed by Mr. Henderson and supported