United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
WILLIAM C. DAVIS, Plaintiff,
THOMAS R. KANE, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, in his official capacity, Defendant.
ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON EXHAUSTION AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL
WILLIAM T. LAWRENCE, JUDGE
William C. Davis (“Mr. Davis”), is a federal
prisoner currently confined at the Federal Prison Camp
(“FPC”) in Terre Haute, Indiana. Mr. Davis filed
his complaint on April 4, 2017, bringing a claim under the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C.
§§ 702, 706, alleging that he should have been
approved to be placed in a Residential Reentry Center or
halfway house, for twelve months instead of nine.
Thomas R. Kane, Acting Director of the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”), in his official capacity, filed a motion
for summary judgment seeking resolution of the claim against
him on the basis that Mr. Davis failed to exhaust his
available administrative remedies. Mr. Davis opposed the
motion for summary judgment and the defendant replied. For
the reasons explained in this Entry, the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. 19, is
judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material fact”
is one that “might affect the outcome of the
suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine only if a
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.
Id. If no reasonable jury could find for the
non-moving party, then there is no “genuine”
dispute. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party and all reasonable inferences are drawn in
the non-movant's favor. Ault v. Speicher, 634
F.3d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 2011).
applicable substantive law will dictate which facts are
material.” National Soffit & Escutcheons, Inc.,
v. Superior Systems, Inc., 98 F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir.
1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The
substantive law applicable to the motion for summary judgment
is the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA'”), which requires that a prisoner
exhaust his available administrative remedies before bringing
a suit concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a); see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25
(2002). “[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement
applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and
whether they allege excessive force or some other
wrong.” Id. at 532 (citation omitted).
exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines
and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative
system can function effectively without imposing some orderly
structure on the course of its proceedings.”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006) (footnote
omitted); see also Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655
(7th Cir. 2004) (“In order to properly exhaust, a
prisoner must submit inmate complaints and appeals ‘in
the place, and at the time, the prison's administrative
rules require.'”) (quoting Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)).
“In order to exhaust administrative remedies, a
prisoner must take all steps prescribed by the prison's
grievance system.” Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d
395, 397 (7th Cir. 2004).
the defendant's burden to establish that the
administrative process was available to Mr. Davis. See
Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2015)
(“Because exhaustion is an affirmative defense, the
defendants must establish that an administrative remedy was
available and that [the plaintiff] failed to pursue
it.”). “[T]he ordinary meaning of the word
‘available' is ‘capable of use for the
accomplishment of a purpose, ' and that which ‘is
accessible or may be obtained.'” Ross v.
Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016) (internal quotation
omitted). “[A]n inmate is required to exhaust those,
but only those, grievance procedures that are capable of use
to obtain some relief for the action complained of.”
Id. at 1859 (internal quotation omitted).
basis of the pleadings and the expanded record, and
specifically on the portions of that record which comply with
the requirements of Rule 56(c), the following facts,
construed in the manner most favorable to Mr. Davis as the
non-movant, are undisputed for purposes of the motion for
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has promulgated
an administrative remedy system which appears at 28 C.F.R.
§ 542.10, et seq., and BOP Program Statement
1330.18, Administrative Remedy Program (“P.S.
1330.18”), which was in effect at FPC Terre Haute
during the entire time that Plaintiff was housed there. Dkt.
No. 20-1, ¶ 4. The BOP administrative remedy process is
a method by which an inmate may seek formal review of a
complaint related to any aspect of his imprisonment. 28
C.F.R. § 542.10. To exhaust his remedies, an inmate must
typically first file an informal remedy request through an
appropriate institution staff member via a BP-8 prior to
filing a formal administrative remedy request with the
Warden, Regional Director, and General Counsel. 28 C.F.R.
§ 542.13; P.S. 1330.18 at 4.
inmate is not satisfied with the response to his informal
remedy (BP-8), he is required to address his complaint with
the Warden via a BP-9. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14; P.S. 1330.18
at 4. An inmate is only permitted to include a single
complaint or a reasonable number of closely ...