United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
DANIEL W. OWENS, Plaintiff,
ROBERT J. DOWNEY, BRIAN K GABEHART, CHARLES E BEAVER, SHELLY BEAVER, CHARLES W BEAVER, BRIEANNA BEAVER, Defendants.
Jane Magnus-Stinson, Chief Judge
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Daniel Owens's
Motion to Amend Judgment. [Filing No. 103.] Mr.
Owens filed this lawsuit alleging constitutional and state
law claims after he was tried for and acquitted of criminal
trespass. [See Filing No. 33.] On May 26,
2017, the Court granted summary judgment for Sheriff Robert
Downey and Deputy Brian Gabehart (collectively, the
“Government Defendants”) on Mr.
Owens's constitutional claims and denied the Beaver
Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Mr.
Owens's state law claims. [Filing No. 93.] On August 3,
2017, the Court sua sponte reconsidered its decision
to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Owens's
state law claims against the Beaver Defendants, dismissed
those claims without prejudice, [Filing No. 101],
and entered final judgment in favor of the Government
Defendants, [Filing No. 102]. On August 31, 2017,
Mr. Owens filed his Motion to Amend, arguing that the
Court's grant of summary judgment for the Government
Defendants was in error. [Filing No. 103.] For the
following reasons, the Court DENIES Mr.
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a party to move to
“alter or amend a judgment” within 28 days after
the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Rule
59(e) “does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo
its own procedural failures, and it certainly does not allow
a party to introduce new evidence or advance arguments that
could and should have been presented to the district court
prior to the judgment.” Bordelon v. Chicago Sch.
Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir.
2000) (internal quotation omitted). Nor may a party use Rule
59(e) to “rehash previously rejected arguments.”
Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir.
2014) (internal quotation omitted). Rather, the Court, in its
discretion, may grant a Rule 59(e) motion only where
the movant “‘clearly establish[es]' (1) that
the court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2)
that newly discovered evidence precluded entry of
judgment.” Blue v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins.
Co., 698 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Harrington v. City of Chi., 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th
relevant facts were recited in detail in the Court's
summary judgment order, [Filing No. 93 at 3-11], and
need not be fully repeated here. Facts pertinent to Mr.
Owens's arguments are included below as appropriate.
Owens challenges the Court's summary judgment order on
multiple grounds, arguing that the Court erred in determining
that Deputy Gabehart had probable cause to file criminal
trespass charges; finding that Mr. Owens waived any argument
that he suffered a constitutional deprivation of liberty; and
determining that Sheriff Downey cannot be held liable for the
pretrial order which prohibited Mr. Owens from accessing the
disputed land. The Court addresses each issue in turn,
keeping in mind the strict standard imposed by Rule 59(e).
Probable Cause for Deputy Gabehart
Owens first argues that the Court incorrectly assumed that
Deputy Gabehart had not consulted Deputy Hoffman's
investigation narrative and incorrectly concluded that there
was no evidence that Deputy Gabehart was aware of the dispute
between the Beaver Defendants and Mr. Owens. Mr. Owens
directs the Court back to evidence that he cited in his
summary judgment brief-specifically, Deputy Gabehart's
probable cause affidavit, in which Deputy Gabehart averred:
In doing some research through the computer system, there
have been several calls in reference to him mowing a patch of
grass located on Mr. Beaver's property. They have had
some on going [sic] law enforcement issues. . . . Mr. Owens
continues to mow approximately 4-6' of Mr. Beaver's
hay field, in which he just mowed, and he is currently being
displaced approximately a swath of hay in which he uses to
feed his livestock. [sic] . . . Mr. Owens continues to, on a
weekly basis, mow on the property line and over into Mr.
Beaver's hay field.
[Filing No. 73-17 at 3-4;
No. 104 at 12 (quoting affidavit).] Mr. Owens argues
that Deputy Gabehart lacked probable cause due to his failure
to further investigate the Beaver Defendants' allegations