United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC'S
MOTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
William T. Lawrence, United States District Judge.
cause is before the Court on the motion to dismiss filed by
Correct Care Solutions, LLC (“CCS”) (Dkt. No.
43). The motion is fully briefed, and the Court, being duly
advised, DENIES the motion for the reasons
set forth below.
moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's federal claims pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6), arguing
that the Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted and fails to provide any factual basis for his
claim. Dkt. No. 43 at 1-2.
reviewing a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court
“must accept all well pled facts as true and draw all
permissible inferences in favor of the plaintiff, ”
Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 683
F.3d 328, 334 (7th Cir. 2012), and determine whether the
“complaint provide[s] the defendant with ‘fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests, '” id. (quoting Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)) (omission in original).
In addition, “[the] complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 697 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “‘A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.'” Roberts v. City
of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564-65 (7th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, ” are insufficient to state
a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680.
purposes of this Entry, the Court accepts the following facts
from the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as
true. CCS provides medical services to inmates
at the Marion County Jail. The Plaintiff was arrested,
brought to the Marion County Jail Processing Center on May
25, 2016, and jailed at the Marion County Jail. He is an
insulin-dependent diabetic. Jennifer Neese, a CCS employee,
failed to appropriately monitor and document his blood sugar
levels, which led to a hypoglycemic episode in which he
became agitated and struck a television. The Plaintiff was
tazed as a result of this incident. Ms. Neese further failed
to designate that the Plaintiff required a special diet. The
Plaintiff informed a city employee that he was receiving the
wrong insulin, but that employee did not pass that
information along to CCS staff. “Rather than provide
[the Plaintiff] with proper medication and diet, he was
placed on suicide watch by Brian Carter . . . an employee of
[CCS].” Am. Compl. ¶ 12. While on suicide watch on
May 27, 2016, the Plaintiff's blood sugar was documented
to be 376mg/dl,  which is high, and medical staff did not
administer insulin for two hours. At some point, the
Plaintiff was found unresponsive in his cell. The Plaintiff
went to the hospital for treatment for diabetic ketoacidosis.
Dkt. No. 48 at 2. Dr. John Foster and CCS failed to
appropriately train and monitor nursing staff in treating the
Plaintiff. They failed to provide immediate and proper
medical treatment and “failed to have in place policies
and procedures for the timely administration of medical
care.” Am. Compl. ¶ 19.The Plaintiff has brought
state law and federal law claims against the City of
Indianapolis, CCS, and several individual defendants. The
Plaintiff brings an Eighth Amendment claim against all
Defendants, arguing that they were deliberately indifferent
to his diabetic condition.
Seventh Circuit has explained, a private company acting under
color of state law can be held liable for harms caused by the
company's policy or custom. See Glisson v. Indiana
Dep't of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied, sub nom. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc.
v. Glisson, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2017 WL 2289613 (U.S. Oct. 2,
2017) (No. 16-1406) (“[I]f institutional policies are
themselves deliberately indifferent to the quality of care
provided, institutional liability is possible.”);
see also Chatham v. Davis, 839 F.3d 679, 685 (7th
Cir. 2016) (Monell liability “applies in
§ 1983 claims brought against private companies acting
under color of state law.”). A company's inaction
can also form the basis for liability. To determine
liability, “[t]he key is whether there is a conscious
decision not to take action.” Glisson, 849
F.3d at 381.
argues that the federal claims against it should be dismissed
because “[the] Plaintiff has failed to allege that a
policy, practice, or procedure of CCS violated his
Constitutional rights, ” Dkt. No. 44 at 3, but no such
allegation is required. The Plaintiff alleges that
“[the] Defendants failed to have in place policies and
procedures for the timely administration of medical care,
” and that he was injured as a result. Am. Compl. ¶
19(e). This lack of policy or procedure is what gives rise to
the Plaintiffs federal cause of action against CCS. The lack
of action on CCS's part, if deliberate, could lead to
liability under section 1983. As a result, the Plaintiff has
pled sufficient facts to state a claim against CCS and has
provided CCS with “fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Agnew, 683 F.3d at 334 (citations omitted).
Therefore, CCS's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs federal
claims for failure to state a claim is
DENIED in its entirety.
 The Court has also included facts
found in the Plaintiff's response brief (Dkt. No. 48).
See Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799
F.3d 633, 640 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2015) (A party opposing a motion
to dismiss “is free to elaborate upon ...