United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
REX K. GROVES, Plaintiff,
SAMUEL J. BYRD Dr., FOSTER Officer, WEXFORD MEDICAL SERV., BLACKMAN SGT., WALTERS OFFICER, I.D.O.C. Commissioner, Defendants.
ENTRY DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT OFFICER FOSTER, AND
DENYING MOTION TO STAY AS MOOT
William T. Lawrence, Judge
Groves filed this case on June 29, 2017, complaining of
rectal bleeding and seeking, among other forms of relief, a
temporary restraining order requiring defendants to
immediately provide certain medical treatment and procedures.
Defendants have responded in opposition to injunctive relief.
Groves has now moved to stay the injunctive relief request
asserting that he is scheduled for rectal surgery. Groves
also moves to dismiss defendant Officer Foster. For the
reasons explained below, the motion for a temporary
restraining order, Dkt. No. 5, is denied.
The motion to dismiss defendant Officer Foster, Dkt. No. 50,
is unopposed and is granted. The motion to
stay the injunctive proceedings, Dkt. No. 54, is
denied as moot.
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy
that is available only when the movant shows clear need.
Goodman v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. and Prof'l
Regulation, 430 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2005). A party
seeking a preliminary injunction must show (1) that his case
has “some likelihood of success on the merits, ”
and (2) that he has “no adequate remedy at law and will
suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is
denied.” Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684,
694 (7th Cir. 2011). If the moving party meets these
threshold requirements, the district court “weighs the
factors against one another, assessing whether the balance of
harms favors the moving party or whether the harm to the
nonmoving party or the public is sufficiently weighty that
the injunction should be denied.” Id. The
district court's weighing of the facts is not
mathematical in nature; rather, it is “more properly
characterized as subjective and intuitive, one which permits
district courts to weigh the competing considerations and
mold appropriate relief.” Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group,
Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895-96 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6,
12 (7th Cir. 1992)).
Eighth Amendment claim is that officials were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. To make a
successful Eighth Amendment claim, Groves must show that (1)
he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition;
and (2) the defendant knew about his condition and the
substantial risk of harm it posed, but disregarded that risk.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 8374 (1994);
Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison, Ill.,
746 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2014); Arnett v.
Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750-51 (7th Cir. 2011).
stage of the litigation, Groves cannot show a likelihood of
success on the merits. In his complaint, Groves notes that
when he had medical issues associated with his rectal
bleeding, he was seen within two hours by a Wabash Valley
Correctional Facility medical provider. Officers contacted
medical personnel without delay. In their response to the
motion for a temporary restraining order, the medical
defendants note that Groves is scheduled for surgery to
address the rectal bleeding issues. Groves confirms this in
his motion to stay the injunctive relief proceedings.
Therefore Groves has not shown a likelihood of success on the
merits that defendants disregarded a risk of substantial harm
harm is harm which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down
again, [or] atoned for. . . . [T]he injury must be of a
particular nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone
for it.” Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 130 F.3d
293, 296 (7th Cir. 1997). While Groves describes his
condition as “life-threatening, ” he has come
forward with no evidence to support this conclusion. There is
thus no evidence that Groves will experience an injury that
cannot be repaired.
context and at this stage Groves cannot show a likelihood
that he will prevail on a deliberate indifference claim and
has not shown irreparable harm. Therefore his motion for a
temporary restraining order, Dkt. No. 5, must be
Motion to Stay Injunctive Relief Proceedings
motion to stay the injunctive relief proceedings, Dkt. No.
54, is denied as moot in light of the ruling
in Section I, supra.
Motion to Dismiss Defendant Officer Foster
September 20, 2017, motion to dismiss Officer Foster, Dkt.
No. 50, is unopposed and is granted.
The clerk is directed to terminate Officer
Foster as a defendant.