September 18, 2017
from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. l:16-cv-3898 -
John Z. Lee, Judge.
Bauer, Flaum, and Sykes, Circuit Judges.
Michael Piatt, individually and on behalf of a putative
class, challenges Illinois's imposition of a mandatory 1%
bail bond processing fee pursuant to 725 Ill.Comp.Stat.
§ 5/110-7. He argues this fee violates his and similarly
situated plaintiffs' due process and equal protection
rights under the United States and Illinois Constitutions.
Appellant also alleges this practice violates the uni-
formity clause of the Illinois Constitution and constitutes
unjust enrichment under Illinois common law. The district
court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim.
to January 1, 2016, criminal defendants in Cook County could
secure their pretrial release in three ways: (1) personal
recognizance, see 725 Ill.Comp.Stat. § 5/110-2;
(2) execution of a full deposit bail bond, to be fully
returned to the defendant upon performance of the bond
conditions, see id. § 5/110-8; or (3) execution
of a 10% bail bond, 10% of which (i.e., 1% of the
total bail amount) is retained by the State upon performance
of the bond conditions (the "Bail Bond Fee" or the
"Fee"), see id. § 5/110-7.
2014, plaintiff Michael Piatt was arrested and charged with
murder. His bail amount was set at $2 million. Plaintiff
secured his pretrial release by executing a 10% bail bond of
$200, 000. After plaintiff's trial (where he was
acquitted), the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of
Cook County returned $180, 000-his original 10% deposit less
the 10% Bail Bond Fee of $20, 000.
2015, the Illinois General Assembly passed H.B. 1119, which
contained an amendment to § 5/110-7 that caps the Bail
Bond Fee at $100 in counties with a population greater than
3, 000, 000. H.B. 1119, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (111.
2015). H.B. 1119 became effective January 1, 2016.
brings his suit individually and on behalf of a putative
class of individuals who paid a Bail Bond Fee of more than
$100 in the five years preceding January 1, 2016. He sues
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County Dorothy Brown and
Cook County Treasurer Maria Pappas in their official
capacities. Plaintiff alleges that the State's retention
of the 1% Bail Bond Fee violated his and other
plaintiffs' due process rights under the United States
and Illinois Constitutions because the Fee bears no rational
relationship to the cost incurred in administering bail
bonds. Furthermore, plaintiff asserts that the Fee violated
his equal protection rights under the United States and
Illinois Constitutions because he and other similarly
situated plaintiffs paid significantly higher Bail Bond Fees
than other criminal defendants. Lastly, plaintiff claims that
the Fee violates the uniformity clause of the Illinois
Constitution and constitutes unjust enrichment under Illinois
moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.
The district court granted the motion. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
review a district court's grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss de novo. Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810
F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2016). To survive a motion to
dismiss, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is
not akin to a 'probability requirement/ but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). In reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, "[w]e
accept as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff." Kubiak, 810 F.3d at 480-81.