United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
NORETTA F. BOYD, Plaintiff,
JACOBS PROJECT MANAGEMENT COMPANY, HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION COUNTY THE WISHARD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL REPLACEMENT FACILITY “THE NEW WISHARD PROJECT”, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
[DOCKET NOS. 34 AND 52]
EVANS BARKER, JUDGE.
2014, Plaintiff pro se Noretta F. Boyd
(“Boyd”) sued her former employer Keystone
Construction alleging various harms arising from Boyd's
work for Keystone in 2013 as a project manager on the
construction of a new hospital. Boyd v. Keystone
Construction, et al., No. 1:14-cv-119-WTL-MJD. That case
settled and was closed on the Court's docket on January
11, 2016. Id., Dkt. 139.
lawsuit arises from the same facts. This time Boyd sues the
owner of the new hospital, the Health and Hospital
Corporation of Marion County (“HHC”), and Jacobs
Project Management Company (“Jacobs”) (together,
“Defendants”), a project- management contractor
on the construction project, which contracted certain work on
the project to Keystone Construction.
the Court are HHC's and Jacobs's motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. 34 (HHC), Dkt. 52 (Jacobs). Boyd and
Defendants raise a host of issues and arguments in their
briefing. Not all of them are relevant or require our
consideration. In fact, most of them, we need not decide,
because the impact of a few clear-cut legal rules dictates
that Boyd's claims be dismissed. And because there is
nothing Boyd could do to fix these legal problems, her claims
will be dismissed with prejudice.
main problem with Boyd's lawsuit is that it came too
late. Boyd believes that, by filing her earlier lawsuit
against Keystone, or by the mistakes and misconduct of
defense counsel and this Court, she is able to avoid
dismissal for lateness. This is not correct.
pleading that states a claim to relief must contain . . . a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a); Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720,
728 (7th Cir. 2014). A motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
“test[s] the legal sufficiency of a complaint.”
Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d
583, 586 (7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by
Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
To survive dismissal,
a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009).
Factual allegations are accepted as true at the pleading
stage, but “allegations in the form of legal
conclusions are insufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.” McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Inc., 694 F.3d 873, 885 (7th Cir.2012) (citing
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Adams, 742 F.3d at 728.
as here, the deadline for amending a complaint as of right
has passed, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1)(B), further amendment
requires leave of court or the defendants' consent.
Id. at (a)(2). “Although leave to file a[n] .
. . amended complaint should be granted liberally, a district
court may deny leave for several reasons including . . .
futility of amendment.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2004)
complaints typically do not address affirmative defenses, the
statute of limitations may be raised in a motion to dismiss
if the allegations of the complaint itself set forth every
necessary to satisfy” the limitations defense
“because the relevant dates are set forth unambiguously
in the complaint.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d
574, 579 (7th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citation omitted);
see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)
(“Whether a particular ground for opposing a claim may
be the basis for dismissal for failure to state a claim
depends on whether the allegations in the complaint suffice
to establish that ground, not on the nature of the ground in
seeks to hold Defendants liable in Count (I) for discharge in
violation of public policy, discharge in violation of Indiana
Code § 22-5-3-3, and discharge in violation of Indiana
Code § 5-11-5.5-2 et seq.; in Count (II) for
“intentional . . . interfer[e]nce with an economic
advantage”; in Count (III) for libel and defamation
per se; in Count (IV) for invasion of privacy and
false light; in Count (V) for “conspiracy agains[t]
rights  U.S.C. [§] 241; and in Count (VI) for race,
age, and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Executive Order 11, 246, and Executive
Order 13, 673.
Boyd's Claims Under Counts (I), (II), (III), and (IV) Are