United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division
DAVID A. SCOTT, JR., Plaintiff,
LEAR CORPORATION, Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
LOZANO, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment
filed by Lear Corporation on January 31, 2017 (DE #99). For
the reasons set forth below, this motion is
GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED
A. Scott, Jr. (“Scott”) was employed by Lear
Corporation (“Lear”) from October 2010 until his
termination on April 23, 2013. Approximately a year after his
termination, he filed the instant law suit pro se,
naming Lear and several individuals as defendants. He alleges
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 12101), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5), and wrongful termination.
This Court previously dismissed the individual defendants (DE
#33), leaving only Lear as a defendant.
filed the instant motion on January 31, 2017. Lear also
served Scott with a “Notice of Summary Judgment
Motion” that explained what a summary judgment motion
is and his obligations in response to the motion. (DE #102).
The notice explained that factual allegations must be
supported with citations to the evidence, and that the court
is not required to consider materials that are not cited.
Despite this notice, Scott filed a nine page response to the
instant motion devoid of any citations. He also provided over
400 pages of exhibits. Lear filed a reply brief on March 20,
2017, and the motion is now ripe for adjudication.
judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A
genuine dispute of material fact exists when “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505,
91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Not every dispute between the parties
makes summary judgment inappropriate; “[o]nly disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Id. To determine whether a genuine
dispute of material fact exists, the Court must construe all
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.
See Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir.
opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion may not
rely on allegations in her own pleading but rather must
“marshal and present the court with the evidence she
contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat'l
Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010).
“[I]nferences relying on mere speculation or conjecture
will not suffice.” Stephens v. Erickson, 569
F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). If the
nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an
essential element on which she bears the burden of proof at
trial, summary judgment is proper. See Massey v.
Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006).
Scott's response is without citations to the evidence,
the well-supported facts presented by Lear are undisputed and
will be accepted as true. The facts are as follows:
an automotive supplier. Lear employed Scott at its Hammond,
Indiana facility. (Def. Ex. 1: Scott Dep. I at 23; Def. Ex.
2: Scott Dep. II at 12). UAW Local 2335 (“UAW”)
represents the facility's hourly bargaining unit
employees such as Scott. (Scott Dep. II at 19, 21). Lear and
the UAW were parties to a collective bargaining agreement
entered into on September 12, 2009. (Def. Ex. 4). The
bargaining unit employees were subject to Lear's no-fault
attendance policy. (Def. Ex. 5). Scott received a copy of
that policy. (Def. Ex. 6).
Receives Permanent Work Restrictions
began his employment with Lear in October 2010. (Scott Dep. I
at 23; Scott Dep. II at 12). In February 2011, Scott reported
to Lear that he injured his finger. (Scott Dep. I at 29). In
March or April 2011, Scott reported that his feet were
hurting. (Scott Dep. I at 33). Scott went to the doctor in
June 2011 for his feet, but was not placed on any work
restrictions. (Scott Dep. I at 34-35). In May 2011, Scott
alleged that he hurt his shoulder while working at Lear.
(Scott Dep. I at 35; Scott Dep. II at 13). On July 11, 2011,
Scott filed a worker's compensation claim for the
shoulder injury he suffered in May 2011. (Scott Dep. I at 42;
Def. Ex. 7). On November 14, 2011, after performing a
functional capacity evaluation, Dr. Joseph Schwartz put Scott
on permanent restrictions consisting of “light physical
demand level with 20 pounds of occasional lifting, 10 pounds
of frequent lifting, and negligible constant lifting.”
(Scott Dep. I at 44; Def. Ex. 8).
Leave of Absence
December 2011, Scott applied for and received leave under the
Family and Medical Leave Act for Achilles tendinitis.
Concurrent with his leave, he applied for and received
short-term disability benefits. (Scott Dep. I at 47-48; Scott
Dep. II at 14-15). Scott's leave of absence began on
December 20, 2011, and ended on August 29, 2012. (Scott Dep.
I at 48; Scott Dep. II at 15).
Work at Lear from August 29, 2012 - November 28, 2012
returned to work from his leave of absence on August 29,
2012. (Scott Dep. I at 48, 82; Scott Dep. II at 15). Scott
did not have any restrictions stemming from his Achilles
tendinitis. (Scott Dep. I at 82-83). However, the November
2011 permanent restrictions issued by Dr. Schwartz remained
in place. (Id.).
first day back on August 29, 2012, Lear assigned Scott to a
job steaming seats that was similar to a job he had
previously performed. (Scott Dep. I at 83-84). He performed
no other job that day. (Def. Ex. 3: Scott Dep. III at 59). As
Scott admitted, that job “was within my
restrictions” and it was “easy for me to
do.” (Scott Dep. II at 182; Scott Dep. III at 57). At
the end of his shift, his right shoulder felt “fine,
” and on a zero to ten pain scale, his level of pain
was “zero.” (Scott Dep. III at 59).
August 30, 2012, Scott initially worked on the job steaming
seats that he performed on August 29, 2012. (Scott Dep. I at
87-88). He next worked on a job that had “something to
do with the bolts.” (Id. at 90). Scott had no
issue with performing this job. (Id. at 91). After
an hour or two, Scott returned to the job steaming seats.
(Id.). Scott was later moved to a job
applying leather covers to headrests. (Id. at 89).
He described the task as follows:
I had to take the leather and put it on a ball which you
press on the lever and it releases steam and it's
supposed to loosen up the leather. And then I have to put the
leather on the headrest and snap it closed.
(Id.). There were also “some kind of
clamps” that Scott had to close down. (Id. at
90). Finally, there was a lever that made the seat lay down.
(Id.). Scott performed no other jobs on August 30,
2012. (Id. at 91). Scott asked Dianne Jewell, the
Health and Safety Manager, if the job was consistent with his
permanent work restrictions. (Scott ...