United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division
WILLIAM B. CLARK, Plaintiff,
MATTHEW DJUKIC, DAMIAN MURKS; FRANCISCAN ALLIANCE, INC., d/b/a St. Margaret Mercy Hospital, and TOWN OF SCHERERVILLE, IN, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
T. MOODY JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
William B. (“Billy”) Clark alleges that, after a
traffic stop, he was forcibly catheterized against his will
so that officers could obtain a urine sample. (DE # 1.) Clark
sued those officers, Matthew Djukic (“Djukic”)
and Damian Murks (“Murks”), as well as the Town
of Schererville, Indiana (“the Town”), and
Franciscan Alliance, Inc. (Id.)
matter is now before the court on a motion for summary
judgment brought by defendants Djukic, Murks, and the Town
(collectively, “the Town Defendants” or
“defendants”). (DE # 46). Plaintiff filed a
response to the motion (DE # 53) and defendants filed a reply
brief (DE # 61). Accordingly, the motion is fully briefed and
is ripe for ruling.
18, 2012, Schererville Police Officer Matthew Djukic was on
patrol when he encountered plaintiff's vehicle. (DE #
47-1 at 2.) Djukic contends that he suspected the driver was
either distracted or driving under the influence.
(Id. at 5.) Djukic activated his lights, and
plaintiff pulled over in response at 10:57 p.m. (Id.
at 2, 6.) Djukic is a K-9 officer who is unable to transport
persons following a traffic stop, so he made a report to
dispatch, and, shortly thereafter, Officer Damian Murks
arrived on scene. (Id. at 5-6, 8.)
to Djukic, plaintiff consented to a K-9 search of his
vehicle. (Id. at 34.) Djukic asserts that he found
marijuana residue in the vehicle. (Id. at 20.)
Djukic then administered field sobriety tests and a Portable
Breath Test. (Id. at 16, 25, 32.) Plaintiff
registered a blood alcohol level of .11 on the test.
(Id. at 25.) Plaintiff then consented to go to the
hospital to provide bodily fluid samples. (DE # 54-1 at 3.)
transported plaintiff to the St. Margaret Mercy Hospital (the
"hospital"), which was operated by defendant
Franciscan Alliance. (DE # 47-1 at 20.) Plaintiff arrived at
the hospital in handcuffs, where Djukic informed staff that
plaintiff was at the hospital to provide bodily fluid
samples. (DE ## 47-1 at 21; 47-2 at 4.) Initially,
plaintiff's blood was drawn by a nurse with his consent.
(DE ## 1 ¶35; 54-1 at 6.) Following the blood test,
plaintiff consented to a urine screen test. (DE # 54-1 at 7.)
It is uncontested that plaintiff agreed to urinate into a
cup, but was not able to voluntarily urinate before he was
catheterized. (Id. at 7-9.) After that point, the
witnesses' stories diverge, as each individual provides
very different testimony regarding how plaintiff's urine
was ultimately drawn through a catheter.
to plaintiff, his right hand was handcuffed to the corner of
the bed while he attempted to urinate into the cup. (DE #
54-1 at 8.) After some time, Djukic instructed Nurse Tina
Partain (“Partain”) to catheterize plaintiff to
remove urine. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff asserts that he
did not consent to this. (Id. at 7.) He further
testifies that Djukic held him down and was “laying on
top of [him]” during the catheterization. (Id.
to Partain, plaintiff's handcuffs were removed after he
arrived at the hospital, before his blood and urine were
drawn. (DE # 54-2 at 7.) She testifies that Dr. Bryan Swanson
ordered her to catheterize plaintiff, after he was unable to
urinate. (Id. at 30-31.) She then purportedly asked
plaintiff if he wanted to be catheterized, to which he
responded “Yeah, let's go.” (Id. at
31.) She testifies that she then inserted the catheter, while
Djukic stood at the door approximately seven to eight feet
away from her. (Id. at 37.) According to Partain,
the catheter only remained inserted into plaintiff's
urethra for a period of “seconds.” (Id.
claims that-not only did he not order the catheterization-it
was actually plaintiff's idea to use the catheter. (DE #
47-1 at 30.) Djukic says plaintiff was not handcuffed to the
bed, but he admits that he did hold plaintiff's shoulder
during the process to avoid him from jumping during the
insertion of the tube. (Id. at 30-31.) Djukic also
asserts that plaintiff “just laid there” with the
catheter inserted into his urethra for a period of time that
“really seemed like a while.” (Id. at
Dr. Swanson has no recollection of anything from the evening
in question and does not recall ordering a catheterization.
(DE # 54-3 at 5-6.) He also reviewed the written order for
the catheterization and noted that it was not in his
handwriting. (Id. at 6-7.)
on these events, plaintiff filed a complaint on May 9, 2014,
alleging that Djukic, Murks, and the Town violated
plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights (along
with an additional claim against Franciscan Alliance, Inc.).
(DE # 1.) The court previously denied a motion for summary
judgment filed by Franciscan Alliance, Inc. (DE # 64.) The
court now turns to the Town Defendants' motion for
summary judgment. (DE # 46.)
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party
“who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate-in
fact, is mandated-where there are no disputed issues of
material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law.
In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable
jury could find for the non-moving party.” Dempsey
v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d
832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and quotation marks
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that
these requirements have been met. Carmichael v. Village
of Palatine, Ill., 605 F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010).
“[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by
‘showing'-that is, pointing out to the district
court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case.” Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 325. Once the moving party has met his burden, the
non-moving party must identify specific facts establishing
that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986);
Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir.
2003) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). In doing
so, the non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone,
but must present fresh proof in support of its position.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Donovan v. City of
Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). In viewing
the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, the
court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of that party. Chmiel v. JC Penney Life Ins.
Co., 158 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1998).
Town Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims
against them. (DE # 46.) They enumerate seven arguments in
support of their motion. (Id.) The court will
discuss each of defendants' arguments, in turn.
Claim Regarding the K-9 Search of Plaintiff's
alleges, in his complaint, that Officer Djukic's K-9
search of his vehicle constituted a violation of his Fourth
Amendment Rights. (DE # 1 ¶ 58(a).) Defendants move for
summary judgment on this claim, on the basis that plaintiff
consented to the search. (DE # 47 at 12.) Alternatively,
defendants argue that probable cause existed for the search.
(Id. at 13.)
response brief, plaintiff concedes that the search of his
vehicle was either consensual or was otherwise not a
violation of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE # 53
at 5.) Since plaintiff has abandoned his claim, the court
will grant summary judgment on this claim.
Claims Against Murks
argue that Officer Murks is entitled to summary judgment
because he was not personally involved in the alleged
constitutional deprivations. (DE # 47 at 13.) Plaintiff
agrees that Murks was not present during the
catheterization. (DE # 53 at 5.) Further, he concedes that
Murks is entitled to summary ...