United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ENTRY DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND
DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
William T. Lawrence, Judge
Falcon Gallegos is an inmate confined in this District
seeking a writ of habeas corpus based on his contention that
the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has
improperly computed his federal sentence imposed by the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California in No. CR-11-00592-001 (“the federal
sentence”). Although Gallegos disparages the
government's explanation, the Court finds that
explanation to be entirely in accord with both the facts and
the controlling law.
thus considered the pleadings and the expanded record, and
being duly advised, the Court finds that Gallegos's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied.
federal sentence was imposed on February 22, 2013. It was
initially for a term of 100 months and was later reduced to
92 months. According to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a), “[a]
sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the
defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to .
. . the official detention facility at which the sentence is
to be served.” Credit for prior custody is specifically
addressed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which provides:
A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a
term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official
detention prior to the date the sentence commences-
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant
was arrested after the commission of the offense for which
the sentence was imposed; that has not been credited against
calculating the sentence, the BOP determines (1) when the
federal sentence commenced, and (2) whether there are any
credits to which the prisoner may be entitled. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3585. In other words, a federal prisoner can receive
credit for certain time spent in official detention before
his sentence begins, as long as that time has not been
credited against any other sentence. However, “Congress
made clear that a defendant could not receive a double credit
for his detention time.” United States v.
Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337 (1992). The Seventh Circuit
has likewise made clear that § 3585(b) forbids the BOP
from giving prior custody credit when that credit has been
applied to another sentence. See Gigsby v. Bledsoe,
223 Fed.Appx. 486, 489 (7th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000).
In Gigsby, the Seventh Circuit determined that where
the state credited the petitioner for time spent in custody
before the commencement of his federal sentence, he was not
entitled to the same benefit from the BOP merely because his
subsequent federal sentence was ordered to run concurrently.
Gigsby, 223 Fed.Appx at 489.
pivotal facts in this case are undisputed and are these: The
federal sentence was imposed on February 22, 2013. At the
time, Gallegos was serving a sentence imposed by the
California state courts. He had come into federal custody on
October 28, 2011 pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum. Gallegos received credit from the State of
California for various the state court sentences until he was
released to the exclusive custody of federal authorities on
May 5, 2014. More specifically, Gallegos received credit from
the State of California for the period of time for which he
seeks credit in the present case. By the same token, however,
Gallegos was given prior credit time for the period from July
17, 2012 through May 4, 2014.
being physically in the custody of federal authorities is not
determinative. A prisoner detained pursuant to a writ of
habeas corpus ad prosenquendum remains in the
primary jurisdiction of the first jurisdiction “unless
and until the first sovereign relinquishes jurisdiction over
the prisoner.” Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257,
274 (3d Cir. 2000); BOP Program Statement 5880.28 § 3b
(1999) (emphasizing that ad prosenquendum writs do
not effect a transfer to federal custody). Until then, a
prisoner in the primary custody of a state earns no credit
against the federal sentence for any period credited toward
an undischarged state sentence. See Sinito v. Kindt,
954 F.2d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Kanton, 362 F.2d 178, 179 (7th Cir. 1966). Here,
California did not relinquish jurisdiction prior to the time
that Gallegos completed his state sentences. That was the
point at which his service of the federal sentence commenced.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a)(“A sentence to a
term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is
received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives
voluntarily to commence service at, the official detention
facility at which the sentence is to be served.”).
explained above, Gallegos has failed to show that the BOP has
miscalculated the federal sentence or has improperly denied
him credit toward that sentence. See, e.g., Matthews v.
Hollingsworth, 2011 WL 2534017, at *4 (S.D.Ill. June 27,
2011) (“Once the state sentence began accruing credit
towards petitioner's incarceration, the [BOP] properly
refused to credit petitioner's federal sentence for the
same time. Neither the subsequent order that his federal and
non-federal sentences run concurrently, nor the fact that
petitioner was temporarily detained by federal authorities
during his state sentence transform his time spent in state
prison into presentence nonfederal time for ...