United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
KERRY D. YOUNG, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
ENTRY DENYING MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE
William T. Lawrence, Judge
Court entered Final Judgment in this action on August 23,
2017, ruling that the petitioner's Johnson claim
lacked merit and that his Dean and Mathis
claims were not properly before the Court. Presently before
the Court is the petitioner's Motion to Correct error in
which he asks the Court to reconsider that decision. Notably,
the petitioner did not file a reply to the respondent's
response to his § 2255 motion, so the petitioner seeks
to utilize this Rule 59 motion as a substitute for his
failure to reply. Nevertheless, given its substance, this
motion shall be treated as a Rule 59(e) motion. See
Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493-94 (7th Cir.
2008) (“[W]hether a motion . . . should be analyzed
under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) depends on the
substance of the motion, not on the timing or label
affixed to it.”).
purpose of a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule
59(e) is to have the Court reconsider matters “properly
encompassed in a decision on the merits.” Osterneck
v. Ernst and Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174 (1988). To
receive relief under Rule 59(e), the moving party “must
clearly establish (1) that the court committed a manifest
error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence
precluded entry of judgment.” Edgewood Manor
Apartment Homes, LLC v. RSUI Indem. Co., 733 F.3d 761,
770 (7th Cir. 2013). A “manifest error” means
“wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to
recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir.
2000). Relief through a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration
is an “extraordinary remed[y] reserved for the
exceptional case.” Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d
582, 584 (7th Cir. 2008).
petitioner has failed to establish that the Court made a
manifest error of law and does not contend that there is any
newly discovered evidence. As to the petitioner's
Johnson claim, the Court rejected it on two grounds
that remain sound. First, the Court noted that the petitioner
was not sentenced pursuant to the career offender provision
of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, but was instead
sentenced pursuant to the Plea Agreement. Second, even if the
career offender provisions impacted the petitioner's
sentence, the Supreme Court in Beckles v. United
States, 137 S.Ct. 886 (2017), held that the Sentencing
Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the
Due Process Clause, which means that Johnson does
not apply to claims like the petitioner's here.
the Court make a manifest error of law as to the
petitioner's claims raised pursuant to Dean v. United
States, 137 S.Ct. 1170 (2017), and Mathis v. United
States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016). The Court explained:
the Seventh Circuit only authorized the petitioner to raise a
Johnson claim in his successive § 2255 motion.
See No. 1:09-cr-00081-WTL-KPF-1, Dkt. 39 at 1
(“[W]e . . . AUTHORIZE the district court to consider
the Johnson claim, along with the government's
defenses.”). The petitioner cannot raise
non-Johnson claims, such as those under
Dean and Mathis, without first receiving
authorization from the Seventh Circuit. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see also Holt v. United
States, 843 F.3d 720, 722-23 (7th Cir. 2016). Because he
has not done so, this Court may not consider those claims.
Dkt. 14 at 2-3. The petitioner argues that his Dean
and Mathis claims should not be considered part of a
second or successive § 2255 motion because they were
unavailable at the time of his first § 2255 motion, and
thus not subject to the authorization process of §
2244(b)(3)(A). Dkt. 16 at 7- 8 (citing United States v.
Obeid, 707 F.3d 898, 903-04 (7th Cir. 2012)). But
Obeid holds that second-in-time § 2255 motions
are not considered second or successive when the
“factual predicate that gives rise to the
claim has not yet occurred.” Id. at 902
(emphasis added); see Flores-Ramirez v. Foster, 811
F.3d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 2016). Here, the petitioner's
Dean and Mathis claims were not unavailable
to him in the sense that the factual predicate for them
recently occurred, but they were unavailable in that the
legal predicate-Dean and Mathis -did. The
holding of Obeid does not cover the latter
situation. If it did, § 2255 motions raising
Johnson claims would not be considered second or
successive and thus would not require authorization, which is
of course not the case. See, e.g., Holt, 743 F.3d at
722-23. Therefore, the Court did not make a manifest error of
law in concluding that the petitioner's Dean and
Mathis claims required authorization from the
these reasons, the petitioner's Rule 59(e) motion, Dkt.
No. 16, is denied.