United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
Magntis-Stinson, chief Judge
matter is before the Court on Defendant Med-1 Solutions,
LLC's (“Med-1”) Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Standing. [Filing No. 14.] Plaintiff Erin Swike
alleges that Med-1 continued to attempt to collect Ms.
Swike's unpaid debt despite her written refusal to pay,
in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692c.
[Filing No. 1.] Med-1 now moves to dismiss Ms. Swike's
complaint, arguing that Ms. Swike lacks a concrete injury as
required to invoke this Court's jurisdiction under
Article III of the Constitution. For the following reasons,
the Court DENIES Med-1's Motion. [Filing
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) “allows a
party to move to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of
Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th
Cir. 2009). Jurisdiction is the “power to decide,
” and federal courts may only decide claims that fall
within both a statutory grant of authority and the
Constitution's limits on the judiciary. In re
Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 794 F.2d 1182, 1188 (7th
Cir. 1986). When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1), the Court accepts the allegations in the
plaintiff's complaint as true and draws all reasonable
inference in the plaintiff's favor. Long v.
Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th
Cir. 1999). The burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate
that subject matter jurisdiction exists for his or her
claims. See Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456,
468 (7th Cir. 2003).
following facts are drawn from Ms. Swike's Complaint,
[Filing No. 1], and are accepted as true for the purposes of
resolving Med-1's Motion.
2014, Ms. Swike incurred several debts for medical services.
[Filing No. 1 at 2.] Ms. Swike was unable to timely pay the
debts, so the medical provider sent them to Med-1 for
collection. [Filing No. 1 at 2.] On April 16, 2015, Med-1
sent a collection letter to Ms. Swike demanding that she pay
one of her outstanding debts. [Filing No. 1 at 2; Filing No.
1-3.] In response to Med-1's collection letter, Ms. Swike
sent a letter stating that she was “refusing to pay for
the alleged debt that you are trying to collect.”
[Filing No. 1-4 at 1.] Ms. Swike's letter was delivered
to Med-1 on April 23, 2015. [Filing No. 1-4 at 2.]
Ms. Swike's written refusal to pay, Med-1 resumed its
attempts to collect the debt in 2017. [Filing No. 1 at
2-3.] Med-1 contacted Ms. Swike by telephone on March 7
and May 2, 2017, and sent a collection letter to Ms. Swike on
May 4. [Filing No. 1 at 2-3; Filing No. 1-5.]
8, 2017, Ms. Swike filed her Complaint in this Court, [Filing
No. 1], alleging that Med-1's conduct violates 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692c(c) which provides that “[i]f a consumer
notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer
refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt
collector to cease further communication with the consumer,
the debt collector shall not communicate further with the
consumer with respect to such debt, ” except in
specific circumstances not relevant here. Ms. Swike seeks
“actual and statutory damages, costs, and reasonable
attorneys' fees” for Med-1's alleged violations
of the FDCPA. [Filing No. 1 at 4.]
argues that Ms. Swike's Complaint must be dismissed
because Ms. Swike lacks standing to bring her claim.
Specifically, Med-1 argues that Ms. Swike has failed to
allege, and is unable to allege, a concrete injury-in-fact as
required to establish Article III standing. In support, Med-1
primarily relies upon Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S.Ct.
1540 (2016), and three recent Seventh ...