Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Trustees of Teamsters Union No. 142 Pension Fund v. Major League Trucking LLC

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division

August 29, 2017

TRUSTEES OF THE TEAMSTERS UNION NO. 142 PENSION FUND, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
MAJOR LEAGUE TRUCKING LLC, Defendant.

          OPINION AND ORDER

          JOHN E. MARTIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 16], filed on February 22, 2017, a Motion to Strike Evidence of Settlement Agreement [DE 19], filed by Defendant on March 9, 2017, and a Motion for Leave to File Counterclaims [DE 28], filed by Defendant on June 23, 2017.

         I. Procedural Background

         On September 12, 2016, Plaintiffs, Trustees of the Teamsters Union No. 142 Pension Fund, Trustees of the Teamsters Union No. 142 Training and Apprenticeship Fund, and Trustees of the Teamsters Union No. 142 Annuity Fund, filed their Complaint against Defendant Major League Trucking, LLC, for delinquent contributions pursuant to the Employment Retirement Income Security At ¶ 1974 (ERISA). On November 23, 2016, the parties represented to the Court that they had reached an agreement as to payments so that no discovery was needed in the case.

         The instant Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on February 22, 2017. Defendant filed the instant Motion to Strike on March 9, 2017. Plaintiffs filed a response on March 14, 2017, and on March 21, 2017, Defendant filed its reply. Defendant responded to the Motion for Summary Judgment on March 20, 2017, and on April 4, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their reply.

         On June 23, 2017, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Leave to File Counterclaims. Plaintiffs responded on June 30, 2017, and Defendant filed its reply on July 7, 3017.

         The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

         II. Summary Judgment Standard

         The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Rule 56 further requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate - in fact, is mandated - where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law. In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.” Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and quotations omitted). To demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, ” but must “come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

         In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

         III. Undisputed Material Facts

         On July 25, 2014, Defendant entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) with Plaintiffs. Defendant employed persons represented for collective bargaining purposes by Local No. 142 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“the Union”). In its Answer to the Complaint, Defendant admits that it is a party to the CBA and was bound by its terms and agreements. See Def. Answer, ¶¶ 6, 7. The CBA requires Defendant to make periodic contributions on behalf of its employees to the Pension Trust Fund, the Annuity Fund, and the Training Trust Fund, in amounts established by the CBA. From June 1, 2014, through May 31, 2017, Defendant was required to contribute to the Training Trust Fund at the rate of $.40. The CBA provides that from June 1, 2014, through May 31, 2015, Defendant was required to contribute to the Pension Trust Fund at the rate of $8.87, with the amount for the following years to be determined. Similarly, from June 1, 2014, through May 31, 2015, it was required to contribute to the Annuity Fund at the rate of $3.80, with the amount for the following years to be determined.

         A payroll audit was conducted on June 16, 2016, and determined that Defendant owed $1, 360.80 to the Pension Fund, $57.80 to the Training and Apprenticeship Fund, and $576.85 to the Annuity Fund in contributions owed from April 17, 2015, through March 31, 2016. Plaintiffs were billed $1, 900.00 for the payroll audit. Defendant failed to pay the amounts claimed in the payroll audit and failed to make contributions to the Pension Trust Fund or complete contributions to the Annuity fund for May through August, 2016, accruing an additional $48, 611.62 due to the Pension Fund and $17, 411.85 due to the Annuity Fund, as well as interest on those delinquent contributions and interest to the Training Trust Fund for amounts paid late. Since November 14, 2016, Defendant has made some payments toward its past due amounts, but has not fully paid for the amounts due, interest, attorney fees, or liquidated damages.

         As a signatory to the CBA, Defendant is bound by the Restated Agreement and Declaration of Trust (“Trust Agreement”). The Trust Agreement provides that if Defendant is found to be delinquent in contributions, Plaintiffs, as the Trustees, are at liberty to take any steps necessary to collect the funds and Defendant shall pay the costs of an audit, interest on all moneys due, liquidated damages, and attorney fees and costs. In addition, the Trust Agreement and Employer Contribution Collection Policy (“Collection Policy”) requires Defendant to pay ten percent per ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.