United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ENTRY DISCUSSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
William T. Lawrence, Judge
convicted and after exhaustion or waiver of any right to
appeal, a defendant is presumed to stand “fairly and
finally convicted.” United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982).
reasons explained in this Entry, the effort of Jonathan
Michael Hankins to show otherwise with respect to his Johnson
County convictions fails. For the reasons explained in this
Entry, the petition of Jonathan Michael Hankins for a writ of
habeas corpus must be denied. In addition,
the Court finds that a certificate of appealability should
not be issued.
facts pertinent to the respondent's arguments that the
statute of limitations had expired prior to Hankins's
filing of his petition for writ of habeas corpus and that the
action is barred by procedural default are the following:
May 11, 2010, Hankins was charged in Johnson County with two
counts of Class C felony child molesting. Hankins entered a
plea of guilty to both charges on October 8, 2010 and he was
sentenced to concurrent sentences of eight (8) years.
April 1, 2011, Hankins's direct appeal was dismissed with
Hankins filed an action for post-conviction relief on March
13, 2011. The motion for post-conviction relief was denied on
December 14, 2015. No appeal was filed pertaining to the
motion for post-conviction relief.
January 17, 2017, Hankins's petition for permission to
file a successive post-conviction relief petition was denied
by the Indiana Court of Appeals.
Applying the prison mailbox rule, Hankins filed his petition
for writ of habeas corpus on January 30, 2017. His amended
petition was filed on April 26, 2017.
petitioner must overcome several procedural barriers before a
court will review the merits of a petition for a writ of
federal habeas corpus. As Justice O'Connor noted in
Daniels v. United States, “Procedural
barriers, such as statutes of limitations and rules
concerning procedural default and exhaustion of remedies,
operate to limit access to review on the merits of a
constitutional claim.” 532 U.S. 374, 381 (2001);
see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731
(1993). Accordingly, “when examining a habeas corpus
petition, the first duty of a district court . . . is to
examine the procedural status of the cause of action."
United States ex rel. Simmons v. Gramley, 915 F.2d
1128, 1132 (7th Cir. 1990).
Statute of Limitations
attempt to “curb delays, to prevent
‘retrials' on federal habeas, and to give effect to
state convictions to the extent possible under law, ”
Congress, as part of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), revised several of
the statutes governing federal habeas relief. Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). “Congress
enacted AEDPA to advance the finality of criminal
convictions.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644,
662 (2005). “To that end, it adopted a tight time line,
a one-year limitation.” Id. Along with
triggering dates not applicable here, “[u]nder 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), a state prisoner ...