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Yancey v. Superintendent

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division

August 10, 2017

JARON YANCEY, Petitioner,
v.
SUPERINTENDENT, Respondent.

          ENTRY DISCUSSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

          HON. JANE MAGNUS-STINSON, CHIEF JUDGE

         For the reasons explained in this Entry, the petition of Jaron Yancey for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the Court finds that a certificate of appealability should not issue.

         Background

         An Indiana jury convicted Yancey in 2011 of dealing in cocaine as a Class A felony. His conviction was affirmed in Yancey v. State, 972 N.E.2d 419 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012). No timely petition to transfer was filed. On March 21, 2013, Yancey filed a petition for post-conviction relief. That action remained pending until September 21, 2016. Applying the prison mailbox rule, this action was then filed on April 25, 2017.

         The State of Indiana, through Yancey's custodian, has opposed Yancey's petition for writ of habeas corpus by arguing, among other things, that the petition was not timely filed and that Yancey's habeas claims are not reviewable because he committed procedural default on them in the Indiana state courts.

         Discussion

         A. The Statute of Limitations

         In an attempt to “curb delays, to prevent ‘retrials' on federal habeas, and to give effect to state convictions to the extent possible under law, ” Congress, as part of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), revised several of the statutes governing federal habeas relief. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). One such provision provides:

a state prisoner has one year to file a federal petition for habeas corpus relief, starting from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Wood v. Milyard, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1831 (2012)(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)).

         The one-year period of limitations is the default provision by which the timeliness of a habeas petition is measured. Johnson v. Robert, 431 F.3d 992, 992 (7th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. McBride, 381 F.3d 587, 588-89 (7th Cir. 2004).

         Yancey's conviction became final at the expiration of the 30-day period during which he could have filed a petition to transfer regarding the decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals in his direct appeal. This was September 7, 2012.

         The AEDPA's limitations period is subject to statutory tolling. See Wood v. Milyard, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1831 (2012). One such provision provides:

“The one-year clock is stopped, however, during the time the petitioner's ‘properly filed' application for state postconviction relief ‘is pending.'” Day [v. McDonough, 547 U.S. ...

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