United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ENTRY DISCUSSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
JANE MAGNUS-STINSON, CHIEF JUDGE
reasons explained in this Entry, the petition of Jaron Yancey
for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and the action
dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the Court finds that a
certificate of appealability should not issue.
Indiana jury convicted Yancey in 2011 of dealing in cocaine
as a Class A felony. His conviction was affirmed in
Yancey v. State, 972 N.E.2d 419 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012).
No timely petition to transfer was filed. On March 21, 2013,
Yancey filed a petition for post-conviction relief. That
action remained pending until September 21, 2016. Applying
the prison mailbox rule, this action was then filed on April
State of Indiana, through Yancey's custodian, has opposed
Yancey's petition for writ of habeas corpus by arguing,
among other things, that the petition was not timely filed
and that Yancey's habeas claims are not reviewable
because he committed procedural default on them in the
Indiana state courts.
The Statute of Limitations
attempt to “curb delays, to prevent
‘retrials' on federal habeas, and to give effect to
state convictions to the extent possible under law, ”
Congress, as part of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), revised several of
the statutes governing federal habeas relief. Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). One such provision
a state prisoner has one year to file a federal petition for
habeas corpus relief, starting from “the date on which
the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review
or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”
Wood v. Milyard, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1831 (2012)(quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)).
one-year period of limitations is the default provision by
which the timeliness of a habeas petition is measured.
Johnson v. Robert, 431 F.3d 992, 992 (7th Cir.
2005); Johnson v. McBride, 381 F.3d 587, 588-89 (7th
conviction became final at the expiration of the 30-day
period during which he could have filed a petition to
transfer regarding the decision of the Indiana Court of
Appeals in his direct appeal. This was September 7, 2012.
AEDPA's limitations period is subject to statutory
tolling. See Wood v. Milyard, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1831
(2012). One such provision provides:
“The one-year clock is stopped, however, during the
time the petitioner's ‘properly filed'
application for state postconviction relief ‘is
pending.'” Day [v. McDonough, 547 U.S.