United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
Jane Magntts-Stinson, Chief Judge
pending before the Court are two Motions filed by pro
se Plaintiff Brenda Parker to set aside final orders
entered by the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“FRCP”) 60(b). [Filing
No. 128 (requesting to set aside Filing No. 120
and Filing No. 123); Filing No. 129
(requesting to set aside Filing No. 119).]
Defendants City of Indianapolis, Officer Loyal, Officer
Pilkington, and Officer Rolinson (collectively, the
“City Defendants”) and Defendant Mark
Senesac did not respond to the Motions. Accordingly, Ms.
Parker's Motions are now ripe for review. Ms. Parker also
filed a Motion to Proceed on Appeal in forma pauperis,
[Filing No. 131], which the Court will address in a
Parker's present Motions come nearly two years after she
filed an Amended Complaint setting forth numerous claims
related to the repossession of her vehicle in May of 2014.
[Filing No. 11.] In its Screening Order,
the Court summarized the incident giving rise to Ms.
Parker's claims as follows:
[Ms. Parker] called the police at the time the vehicle was
being towed and told officers that the creditor had
“charged off” the debt in 2012 when it reported
the car loan to be an uncollectible debt. The officers
reviewed papers that the towing company had, determined that
the towing company's paperwork was more current than [Ms.
Parker's paperwork], and allowed the towing company to
repossess her car.
[Filing No. 21 at 2 (analyzing Filing No.
Court has dismissed several of the claims set forth in Ms.
Parker's Amended Complaint, including all claims against
Defendants Capital One Auto Finance, a division of Capital
One N.A. (“Capital One”), and Onyx
Acceptance Corporation (“Onyx”).
[Filing No. 21; Filing No.
45.] As a result, the only Count of Ms.
Parker's Amended Complaint that remains pending is a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 due process claim against the City
Defendants and Mr. Senesac- the tow truck driver. [Filing
No. 45 at 8; Filing No. 120 at 7-8 (directing
the clerk to update the docket to reflect Defendant
Dalias' actual name-Mark Senesac).]
Parker now asks this Court for relief from two final Orders.
First, Ms. Parker requests that this Court grant relief from
its Order entered on April 28, 2017, [Filing No.
120], and Partial Final Judgment, [Filing No.
123], which: (1) denied her Motion for Leave to File a
Second Amended Complaint; (2) denied her Motion to Set
Aside/Vacate Order Dismissing Capital One and Onyx; and (3)
entered Partial Final Judgment for Capital One and Onyx.
[Filing No. 128 at 1.] Second, Ms. Parker requests
that this Court grant relief from its Order on Objections to
Two Magistrate Judge Orders, [Filing No. 119],
which: (1) overruled Ms. Parker's Objection to Magistrate
Judge Baker's Order dated February 21, 2017; and (2)
overruled Ms. Parker's Objection to Magistrate Judge
Baker's Order dated February 27, 2017. [Filing No.
129 at 1.]
Court notes that on the same day she filed a Motion to Grant
Relief from Order and Partial Final Judgment, [Filing No.
128], Ms. Parker also filed a notice appealing the
Court's Partial Final Judgment for Capital One and Onyx.
[Filing No. 130 (appealing Filing No.
the filing of a notice of appeal “is an event of
jurisdictional significance” which “confers
jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district
court of its control over those aspects of the case involved
in the appeal.” Kusay v. U.S., 62 F.3d 192,
193 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer
Discount Co.,459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)). However, motions
for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b) provide an
exception to this rule. The Seventh Circuit has held that
“[d]istrict courts possess limited authority to deny
Rule 60(b) motions while an appeal is still pending, allowing
the court of appeals to make its resolution a final one,
knowing that a district court has no desire to amend its
ruling.” Ameritech Corp. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Local 21, 543 F.3d 414, 418-19 (7th Cir. 2008).
Conversely, in the event a district court is inclined to
grant a Rule 60(b) motion, the Seventh Circuit has held that
the district court should notify the Seventh Circuit of its
intention and the Seventh Circuit ...