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Parker v. Officer Loyal

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

June 12, 2017

BRENDA PARKER, Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER LOYAL, in official and individual capacity, OFFICER PILKINGTON, in official and individual capacity, OFFICER ROLINSON. in official and individual capacity, MARK SENESAC, CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, Defendants.

          ORDER

          Hon. Jane Magntts-Stinson, Chief Judge

         Presently pending before the Court are two Motions filed by pro se Plaintiff Brenda Parker to set aside final orders entered by the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 60(b). [Filing No. 128 (requesting to set aside Filing No. 120 and Filing No. 123); Filing No. 129 (requesting to set aside Filing No. 119).] Defendants City of Indianapolis, Officer Loyal, Officer Pilkington, and Officer Rolinson (collectively, the “City Defendants”) and Defendant Mark Senesac did not respond to the Motions. Accordingly, Ms. Parker's Motions are now ripe for review. Ms. Parker also filed a Motion to Proceed on Appeal in forma pauperis, [Filing No. 131], which the Court will address in a separate order.

         I.

         Background

         Ms. Parker's present Motions come nearly two years after she filed an Amended Complaint setting forth numerous claims related to the repossession of her vehicle in May of 2014. [Filing No. 11.] In its Screening Order, the Court summarized the incident giving rise to Ms. Parker's claims as follows:

[Ms. Parker] called the police at the time the vehicle was being towed and told officers that the creditor had “charged off” the debt in 2012 when it reported the car loan to be an uncollectible debt. The officers reviewed papers that the towing company had, determined that the towing company's paperwork was more current than [Ms. Parker's paperwork], and allowed the towing company to repossess her car.

[Filing No. 21 at 2 (analyzing Filing No. 11).]

         The Court has dismissed several of the claims set forth in Ms. Parker's Amended Complaint, including all claims against Defendants Capital One Auto Finance, a division of Capital One N.A. (“Capital One”), and Onyx Acceptance Corporation (“Onyx”). [Filing No. 21; Filing No. 45.][1] As a result, the only Count of Ms. Parker's Amended Complaint that remains pending is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due process claim against the City Defendants and Mr. Senesac- the tow truck driver. [Filing No. 45 at 8; Filing No. 120 at 7-8 (directing the clerk to update the docket to reflect Defendant Dalias' actual name-Mark Senesac).]

         Ms. Parker now asks this Court for relief from two final Orders. First, Ms. Parker requests that this Court grant relief from its Order entered on April 28, 2017, [Filing No. 120], and Partial Final Judgment, [Filing No. 123], which: (1) denied her Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint; (2) denied her Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Order Dismissing Capital One and Onyx; and (3) entered Partial Final Judgment for Capital One and Onyx. [Filing No. 128 at 1.] Second, Ms. Parker requests that this Court grant relief from its Order on Objections to Two Magistrate Judge Orders, [Filing No. 119], which: (1) overruled Ms. Parker's Objection to Magistrate Judge Baker's Order dated February 21, 2017; and (2) overruled Ms. Parker's Objection to Magistrate Judge Baker's Order dated February 27, 2017. [Filing No. 129 at 1.]

         II.

         Jurisdiction

         The Court notes that on the same day she filed a Motion to Grant Relief from Order and Partial Final Judgment, [Filing No. 128], Ms. Parker also filed a notice appealing the Court's Partial Final Judgment for Capital One and Onyx. [Filing No. 130 (appealing Filing No. 123).]

         Generally, the filing of a notice of appeal “is an event of jurisdictional significance” which “confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Kusay v. U.S., 62 F.3d 192, 193 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.,459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)). However, motions for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b) provide an exception to this rule. The Seventh Circuit has held that “[d]istrict courts possess limited authority to deny Rule 60(b) motions while an appeal is still pending, allowing the court of appeals to make its resolution a final one, knowing that a district court has no desire to amend its ruling.” Ameritech Corp. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 21, 543 F.3d 414, 418-19 (7th Cir. 2008). Conversely, in the event a district court is inclined to grant a Rule 60(b) motion, the Seventh Circuit has held that the district court should notify the Seventh Circuit of its intention and the Seventh Circuit ...


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