United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
J. McKINNEY, JUDGE.
Shamir Chappell (“Chappell”) has filed this
habeas corpus petition alleging various constitutional and
evidentiary irregularities in his trial and alleging that
both trial counsel and appellate counsel violated the
Strickland standard in not bringing these
constitutional problems to the attention of the trial and
appellate courts. Dkt. Nos. 1 & 9. For the reasons stated
herein, the Court DENIES Chappell's motion and denies a
certificate of appealability.
stands convicted of one count of Class A Felony Aiding and
Abetting Burglary Causing Bodily Injury and one count of
Aiding or Abetting or Causing a Class C Felony Battery.
Chappell's concern is that the victims of the burglary
had been the subjects of an eviction judgment and had not yet
removed themselves from the burgled home and so they had no
possessory interest in the home. He urges, as best the Court
can tell, that an individual who has been evicted and stays
in a home cannot be the victim of a burglary under the
Indiana statute defining burglary because that evicted person
has no legally recognized possessory interest in the home.
Chappell complains that his counsel at both trial and on
appeal were negligent in not urging this theory upon the
courts and making the proper objections to any directly
contrary theories of prosecution. He urges further that a
conviction for these two crimes constitutes double jeopardy
and those who neither propounded this theory on his behalf
upon the trial courts, or preserved the record for such on
appeal or urged the argument on appeal are operating below
the Strickland standard.
arguments, or arguments that stem from these basic
allegations have been raised on direct appeal and in the
exercise of his post-trial remedies so that there are no
exhaustion issue herein. The Indiana Court of Appeals
disposed of these arguments both on direct appeal and on
appeal from petitioner's post-conviction relief petition.
See Chappell v. Indiana, 966 N.E.2d 124 (Ind.Ct.App.
2012); see also Chappell v. Indiana, Cause No.
89A01-1503-PC-124, 2016 WL 228982 (Ind.Ct.App. Jan. 19,
v. Smith, 574 F.3d 399, 402 (7th Cir. 2009),
provides the standard of review for this Court: “Under
the [Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, ] AEDPA,
a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state
court's adjudication of the petitioner's
constitutional claims was based on unreasonable fact-finding
or was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established federal law.” (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
376-77 (2000)). Further, under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to succeed on his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim Chappell must
“show that (1) counsel's performance was
objectively unreasonable and (2) counsel's errors
affected the outcome of the proceeding.”
Starkweather, 574 F.3d at 402 (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
facts here are not in dispute and are set out with
particularity in both state court opinions cited above.
Briefly, Chappell broke into a home the inhabitants of which
were related to the individual on the lease. The leaseholder
failed to abide by the terms of the lease and had been, prior
to the break in, the subject of a court ordered eviction.
While the lease holder had honored the notice of eviction,
her relative and his wife did not. Once inside the home
Chappell and his accomplice, Wilkerson, in individual
incidents, assaulted the inhabitants. It is significant to
note that Chappell does not allege that anyone authorized his
entry into the house, a very difficult claim to make given
that the evidence was that he kicked in the door.
Indiana burglary statute states:
Sec. 1. A person who breaks and enters the building or
structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony
or theft in it, commits burglary, a Level 5 felony. However,
the offense is:
(1) a Level 4 felony if the building or structure is a
(2) a Level 3 felony if it results in bodily injury to any
person other than a defendant;
(3) a Level 2 felony if it:
(A) is committed while armed with a deadly weapon; or
(B) results in serious bodily injury to any person other than