United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division
OPINION & ORDER
P. SIMON JUDGE.
Anton Lamont James has filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, To Sever, which alleges violations of the Speed
Trial Act. (DE 653.) He argues that the delay in trying this
case between December 18, 2016, and October 16, 2017, is not
excludable under the Act and that he has been prejudiced by
this violation of the law. (Id.; DE 704 at 1-2.) I
have reviewed the entries on the docket pertaining to
excludable time, audio recordings of the hearings held by
Magistrate Judge Andrew Rodovich, and the parties'
briefs, and I heard oral argument by the parties. For the
reasons below, James's motion is denied.
Speedy Trial Act
Speedy Trial Act requires me to dismiss an indictment on the
motion of the defendant if more than 70 days has passed
between the defendant's appearance and the beginning of
the trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (a)(2). However, the Act
includes a “long and detailed list of periods of delay
that are excluded in computing the time within which trial
must start.” Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S.
489, 506-7 (2006) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)). Two of
the enumerated delays are at issue here:
(6) A reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined
for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial
has not run and no motion for severance has been granted.
(7)(A) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance . .
., if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his
findings that the ends of justice served by taking such
action outweigh the best interest of the public and the
defendant in a speedy trial.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6)-(7).
3161(h)(7) also delineates certain factors that the court
must consider in deciding whether a continuance is excludable
under the “ends-of-justice” provision, two of
which are relevant here:
(ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the
number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the
existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial
proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits
established by this section.
. . .
(iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a
[non-complex] case . . . would unreasonably deny the
defendant or the Government continuity of counsel, or would
deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the
Government the reasonable time necessary for effective
preparation, taking into account the exercise of due
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii), (iv).
exclude time from the speedy trial clock under the
ends-of-justice provision in section 3161(h)(7), the court is
required to “set forth, in the record of the case,
either orally or in writing, its reasons for granting an
ends-of-justice continuance.” United States v.
O'Connor, 656 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citation and internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
The Act does not specify when the findings made at the time
of the continuance must be put into the record, but “at
the very least the Act implies that the district court must
enter the findings into the record not later than