United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ENTRY SCREENING COMPLAINT, DISMISSING INSUFFICIENT
CLAIMS AND DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
William T. Lawrence, Judge United States District Court.
plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis,
dkt , is granted. The assessment of even
a partial filing fee is not feasible at this time.
courts have an obligation under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints before service on the
defendants, and must dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. Dismissal under the in forma pauperis
statute is an exercise of the Court's discretion.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992). In
determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court
applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
See Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th
Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal under federal pleading
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, a
“plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on
paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader,
might suggest that something has happened to her
that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v.
Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010)
(emphasis in original).
plaintiff's claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. A cause of action is provided by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against “[e]very person who, under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory, . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws” of the United States. Section 1983 is not
itself a source of substantive rights; instead, it is a means
for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)
(citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3
(1979)). The initial step in any § 1983 analysis is to
identify the specific constitutional right which was
allegedly violated. Id. at 394; Kernats v.
O'Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir. 1994);
see also Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 489-90
(7th Cir. 1997).
the plaintiff has filed a motion for request of hearing that
the Court construes as a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Mr. Mapes alleges he was wrongfully convicted of
a crime in Texas that would require him to register as a sex
offender in Indiana pursuant to Indiana Code §
11-8-8-19. He alleges that the requirement he register as a
sex offender in Indiana violates his rights under the First,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009), the
Indiana Supreme Court held the ex post facto clause
of the Indiana Constitution prohibits the application of
Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”) to
an individual whose offense predates the enactment of the
statute. Id. at 384. In Wallace, the Court determine
that no person is required to register as a sex offender on
the Indiana registry if they committed their offense prior to
July 1, 1994. Here, based on the documents the plaintiff
attached to his complaint, it appears that the crime he
committed in Texas for which he is required to register in
Indiana occurred in 1998. [dkts. 1-1, at pp. 3-27]. As such,
the holding in Wallace provides him no protection
from the Indiana registration requirement.
Mapes' complaint fails to state a claim on which relief
can be granted. He states that he has shown that he was
wrongfully convicted; however, it does not appear from the
complaint that a Texas state court has determined Mr. Mapes
was wrongfully convicted or that any court has vacated his
conviction. As such, he does not have a constitutional claim
challenging the requirement that he register on the Indiana
Sex Offender Registry. Because Mr. Mapes has not shown that
his conviction in Texas has been vacated, nothing in the
conduct Mr. Mapes attributes to the defendant violated any of
his federally secured rights.
all of the remaining arguments in Mr. Mapes complaint are
simply conclusory statements of law that have no relation to
his claim. As the Supreme Court recently explained,
“[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007). For example,
Mr. Mapes refers to an appeal he filed with an unidentified
actions seem quite suspicion under 28 C.F.R. 36.206 in a very
illicit, dissuading manner. Mr. HAPES wrote and faxed his
appeal regarding this issue and nothing has been done
regarding his concerns and ongoing repetitious violations
under Constitutional, Federal, and State laws in the 30 days
alloted for this type of action. Mr. MAPES did in fact bring
notice up on or about the 6 th day of March 2017 when he did
his first registry within the State of Indiana almost 17 yrs
after his release date from Texas. Mr. MAPES has also been
educated that this Department shall decide the Appeal within
3© calendar days of the day upon which it receives the
Appeal and shall notify the Local Subject of its decision in
writing. We are quite concerned how members employed by a
State has chosen to aid in acts of sedition and ongoing
suspicious activities under violations of U.S., Federal, and
Mr. Mapes' complaint recites legal doctrines that have no