United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
ANDREW J. SLOCK, Petitioner,
OPINION AND ORDER
DEGUILIO, United States District Court Judge
J. Slock, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus
petition challenging a prison disciplinary hearing
(ISO-16-08-016) conducted at the Indiana State Prison, where
he was found guilty of engaging in an unauthorized financial
transaction in violation of Indiana Department of Correction
(IDOC) policy B-220. ECF 1 at 1. The Conduct Report states:
on 8-6-16, at approx. 14:15 while shaking down Slock A.
197525 W-1, R-1, B-2A five (5) pieces of paper was (sic)
found containing thirteen (13) unauthorized financial
transaction numbers wrapped in plastic bag that contained a
bar of state indigent soap up against the wall in his bed
area. Numbers sent to evidence locker ISP guard hall.
ECF 4-1 at 1. Slock's hearing was held on August 19,
2016, by the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO). ECF 1 at 1.
Slock was sanctioned with the loss of 75 days earned credit
time and was demoted from Credit Class 1 to Credit Class 2.
argues that the DHO had insufficient evidence on which to
find him guilty. ECF 1 at 2. According to Slock, the DHO
“never proved” that the numbers were financial
transaction numbers. Id. Slock points out that the
numbers confiscated from his cell were each 10-digits long,
and that credit and debit card numbers contain 16-digits.
disciplinary context, “the relevant question is whether
there is any evidence in the record that could support the
conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985).
“In reviewing a decision for some evidence, courts are
not required to conduct an examination of the entire record,
independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the
evidence, but only determine whether the prison disciplinary
board's decision to revoke good time credits has some
factual basis.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d
784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted).
[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only]
have the support of some evidence in the record. This is a
lenient standard, requiring no more than a modicum of
evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long as the
record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the
disciplinary board were without support or otherwise
arbitrary. Although some evidence is not much, it still must
point to the accused's guilt. It is not our province to
assess the comparative weight of the evidence underlying the
disciplinary board's decision.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000)
(quotation marks, citations, parenthesis, and ellipsis
omitted). A Conduct Report alone can be sufficient evidence
to support a finding of guilt. McPherson, 188 F.3d
IDOC defines offense B-220 as “[e]ngaging in or
possessing materials used for unauthorized financial
transactions. This includes, but is not limited to, the use
or possession of identifying information of credit cards,
debit cards, or any other card used to complete a financial
transaction.” Adult Disciplinary Process, Appendix I.
his hearing, Slock told the DHO that the numbers were not
long enough to be credit card or debit card numbers. ECF 4-6
at 1. He also stated that the numbers were phone mailbox
numbers. Id. The DHO researched the confiscated
numbers on two websites: http:www.allareacodes.com
and http:www.exactbins.com. ECF 4-4 and 4-6. When
the DHO checked allareacodes.com, he discovered that ten of
the thirteen numbers were not possibly phone numbers.
Id. at pp. 1-11. The DHO then checked exactbins.com
to determine whether the numbers possessed by Slock were
associated with any credit or debit card numbers. This
website allows a user, such as the DHO, to input the first
six digits of a number and the site identifies whether those
digits match any bank identification number. “The first
six digits of any debit or credit card number is the Bank
Identification Number (“BIN”). A BIN identifies
the bank or institution that issued the card and the ATM
network that the card belongs to.” Burns v. First
Am. Bank, No. 04 C 7682, 2006 WL 3754820, at *11 (N.D.
Ill.Dec. 19, 2006). “ATMs do not store users'
names. Instead they keep track of each transaction by
assigning a 10-digit identification number to it. The first
six digits identify the user's bank; the last four
identify that user.” Hughes v. Kore of Indiana
Ent., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir.
2013). The DHO learned that the first six digits of the
numbers found in Slock's possession contained bank
identification numbers. ECF 4-6; ECF 4-4 at pp. 12-14.
had sufficient circumstantial evidence to find Slock guilty
of violating IDOC B-220. A hearing officer is permitted to
rely on circumstantial evidence to establish guilt. See
Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir.
1992). Here, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for
the DHO to determine that Slock had violated IDOC B-220 by
possessing identifying information of a credit, debit, or
other card used to complete a financial transaction. The DHO
considered Slock's statements at the disciplinary
hearing, the video evidence, the photo evidence, the Conduct
Report, the confiscation review form, and the results of the
internet search. The DHO was able to confirm that 10 of the
13 numbers were not possibly phone numbers, and Slock was
unable to provide any other explanation for what the numbers
were or why he had them. To the contrary, the DHO confirmed
that the first six digits of the numbers contained BIN
numbers of credit or debit cards, and was aware that Slock
had intentionally concealed the numbers to avoid detection.
Together, this was “some evidence” that Slock
violated IDOC B-220. Although Slock denies that the numbers
contain identifying information of any bank, debit or credit
card, it is not the province of this court to reweigh the
evidence. McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786.
reasons set forth above, the petition (ECF 1) is DENIED. The