United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
OPINION AND ORDER
S. VAN BOKKELEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Robertson, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition
challenging the prison disciplinary hearing (WCC 16-11-252)
where a disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) found him guilty
of Assault/Battery in violation of Indiana Department of
Correction (IDOC) policy A-102. (ECF 1 at 1.) As a result, he
was sanctioned with the loss of 180 days earned credit time
and was demoted from Credit Class 2 to Credit Class 3.
(Id.) Robertson identifies three grounds in his
Ground One, Robertson argues that the DHO was not provided
with a complete account of events by the correctional officer
who wrote the Conduct Report. (ECF 2 at 2.) According to
Robertson, the Conduct Report did not provide a complete
recitation of the facts, and instead reported only the
officer's point of view. (Id.) Robertson also
asserts that there was an internal affairs investigation and
fifteen inmate witnesses gave statements. (Id.) He
does not identify what these witnesses reported, or whether
the evidence would have been exculpatory. Finally, in Ground
One, Robertson admits that he was fighting, and argues that
his charge should have been for Fighting, a lesser offense.
One does not identify any due process violation. Robertson
could have raised facts not contained in the Conduct Report
(i) during his hearing; (ii) through his lay advocate; (iii)
by calling witnesses; or (iv) by presenting evidence. (ECF
2-1 at 2.) Robertson was provided with notice of the
disciplinary hearing and the charges, but declined the
opportunity to call any witnesses, present any evidence, or
accept the offer of a lay advocate. (Id.)
Robertson's due process rights were adequately protected
by the procedural safeguards afforded to him pursuant to
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 556 (1974). That he
declined to invoke these rights, and was subsequently found
guilty, is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. Therefore,
Ground One is denied.
Ground Two, Robertson challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence on which he was found guilty. (ECF 2 at 2.) The
imposition of prison discipline will be upheld so long as
there is some evidence to support the finding.
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985).
“[T]he relevant question is whether there is any
evidence in the record that could support the conclusion
reached by the disciplinary board.” Id.
“In reviewing a decision for some evidence, courts are
not required to conduct an examination of the entire record,
independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the
evidence, but only determine whether the prison disciplinary
board's decision to revoke good time credits has some
factual basis.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d
784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted).
[T]he findings of a prison disciplinary board [need only]
have the support of some evidence in the record. This is a
lenient standard, requiring no more than a modicum of
evidence. Even meager proof will suffice, so long as the
record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the
disciplinary board were without support or otherwise
arbitrary. Although some evidence is not much, it still must
point to the accused's guilt. It is not our province to
assess the comparative weight of the evidence underlying the
disciplinary board's decision.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000)
(quotation marks, citations, parenthesis, and ellipsis
omitted). The court will overturn the hearing officer's
decision only if “no reasonable adjudicator could have
found [the prisoner] guilty of the offense on the basis of
the evidence presented.” Henderson v. United States
Parole Comm'n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994).
inmate violates IDOC A-102 by “[c]omitting
battery/assault upon another person with a weapon (including
the throwing of body fluids or waste on another person) or
inflicting serious bodily injury.” Adult Disciplinary
Process, Appendix I.
http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02- 04-101 APPENDIX
I-OFFENSES 6-1-2015(1).pdf. The IDOC defines
“serious bodily injury” as:
[a]n injury to a person that requires urgent and immediate
medical treatment (normally more extensive than mere first
aid, such as bandaging a wound; but which might include
stitches, setting of broken bones, treatment of concussion,
etc.) and/or that creates a substantial risk of death or that
• Serious permanent disfigurement;
• Extreme pain;
• Permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of a bodily ...