United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
DUSTIN T. CHADWICK, Plaintiff,
NEW CASTLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, RANDALL Ms., Unit Team Manager, MCDANIELS Manager, HALL Ms., Manager, Defendants.
ENTRY DISCUSSING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING FURTHER
WALTON PRATT, JUDGE United States District Court.
Dustin Chadwick, an Indiana inmate, brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986
alleging that the defendants conspired to obtain a
disciplinary conviction against him.
Chadwick is a “prisoner” as defined by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(h), the complaint is subject to the screening
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Pursuant to this
statute, “[a] complaint is subject to dismissal for
failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true,
show that plaintiff is not entitled to relief.”
Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910, 921 (2007). To survive
a motion to dismiss, the complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face. . . . A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(quotations omitted). Pro se complaints such as that filed by
the plaintiff, are construed liberally and held to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94; Obriecht v.
Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008).
alleges that the defendants conspired against him to
confiscate his property boxes and obtain a disciplinary
conviction against him, which resulted in the deprivation of
his right to earn credit time. Based on the screening
described above, Chadwick's complaint must be dismissed.
any claim based on the confiscation of his property box must
be dismissed because he had an adequate post-deprivation
remedy. See Zinerman v. Burch, 110 S.Ct. 975, 983
(1990) (“Deprivation of a constitutionally protected
interest in ‘life, liberty, or property' is not in
itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the
deprivation of such an interest without due process of law .
. . . The constitutional violation actionable under §
1983 is not complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not
complete unless and until the State fails to provide due
process.”); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
533 (1984)(“For intentional, as for negligent
deprivations of property by state employees, the state's
action is not complete until and unless it provides or
refuses to provide a suitable post deprivation
remedy.”). Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588,
593 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Wynn has an adequate
post-deprivation remedy in the Indiana Tort Claims Act, and
no more process was due.”).
any claim related to the disciplinary against taken against
Chadwick is not properly the subject of a civil rights
complaint because a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the
exclusive avenue to challenge the fact or duration of
confinement. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)
(when a prisoner makes a claim that, if successful, could
shorten his term of imprisonment, the claim must be brought
as a habeas petition, not as a § 1983 claim); see
also, Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 809-810 (7th Cir.
1996) (the denial of access to educational programs does not
infringe on a protected liberty interest, even if denied the
opportunity to earn good time credits). This is true, even
if, as Chadwick suggests, the defendants acted fraudulently
in pursuing the disciplinary conviction. Lagerstrom v.
Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Even
assuming fraudulent conduct on the part of prison officials,
the protection from such arbitrary action is found in the
procedures mandated by due process.”) (quoting
McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir.
1999)); see also Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137,
1141 (7th Cir. 1984) (“We find that an allegation that
a prison guard planted false evidence which implicates an
inmate in a disciplinary infraction fails to state a claim
for which relief can be granted where the procedural due
process protections as required in Wolff v.
McDonnell, [418 U.S. 539');">418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)] are
provided.”); Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747,
751-52 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that no federal
constitutional claim - in particular none premised on
substantive due process - exists for “malicious
foregoing reasons, Chadwick's complaint is dismissed. He
shall have through May 19, 2017, to show cause why judgment