Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Neely v. Facility Concepts, Inc.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

April 4, 2017

ELVIS NEELY on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v.
FACILITY CONCEPTS, INC., Defendant.

          Edward E. Hollis FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP (Indianapolis)

          Rozlyn M. Fulgoni-Britton FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP (Indianapolis)

          Sarah Elizabeth Caldwell Breslin FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP (Indianapolis)

          Eric S. Pavlack PAVLACK LAW LLC

          Colin E. Flora PAVLACK LAW, LLC

          ORDER

          Hon. Jane Magntis-Stinson, Chief Judge

         Elvis Neely was an employee at Facility Concepts, Inc. (“Facility Concepts”) from July 2013 until he was involuntarily terminated in August 2016. [Filing No. 1-2 at 3.] Mr. Neely claims that Facility Concepts had an unfair and unlawful systematic policy of rounding its employees' pay in a manner detrimental to its employees. [Filing No. 1-2 at 3-4.] Mr. Neely initiated this litigation on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, alleging that Facility Concepts violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the Indiana Wage Payment Statute (“IWPS”), the Indiana Wage Claims Act (“IWCA”), and asserting a claim under the common law theory of quantum meruit. [Filing No. 1-2 at 7-11.] Facility Concepts has now filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint or for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, [Filing No. 10], and Mr. Neely opposes that motion, [Filing No. 13]. The motion is now ripe for the Court's consideration.

         I.

         Standard of Review

         Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2)). “Specific facts are not necessary, the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

         A motion for judgment on the pleadings brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is governed by the same standard that applies to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1581 (7th Cir. 1991). A “court may consider only matters presented in the pleadings and must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Nat'l Fid. Life Ins. Co. v. Karaganis, 811 F.2d 357, 358 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 785 F.2d 174, 177 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1986)). The Court should “take all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiffs' pleadings to be true, and [should] view the facts and inferences to be drawn from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Republic Steel Corp., 785 F.2d at 177 n. 2. However, “a court is ‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). The documents a court may consider under Rule 12(c) include the complaint, the answer, and any written exhibits attached as exhibits [to either].” N. Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. 163 F.3d at 452 452 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 10(c)). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted only if the moving party clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that [the moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Karaganis, 811 F.2d at 358 (citing Flora v. Home Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 685 F.2d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1982)).

         II.

         Background

         Facility Concepts is a manufacturer of commercial furniture, décor, and fixtures in Indiana and Florida. [Filing No. 1-2 at 3.] Mr. Neely worked at Facility Concepts from July 2013 until he was involuntarily terminated in August 2016. [Filing No. 1-2 at 3.] According to Mr. Neely, Facility Concepts engaged in time rounding practices that were detrimental to the employees. [Filing No. 1-2 at 5.] Mr. Neely claims that although the employees recorded their time, Facility Concepts did not compensate them based upon their actual time entries. [Filing No. 1-2 at 3.] He alleges that Facility Concepts calculated the hourly employees' pay in fifteen-minute intervals. [Filing No. 1-2 at 3.] He claims that it deducted at least fifteen minutes from its employees' pay when the employees “clocked in even a single minute late or clocked out even a single minute early.” [Filing No. 1-2 at 3.] According to Mr. Neely, based on this policy and practice of downwardly adjusting the employees' time records, Facility Concepts was “underpaying its employees significant[ly] . . . on a daily basis.” [Filing No. 1-2 at 4.]

         Mr. Neely claims that his timecards were “similarly systematically altered.” [Filing No. 1-2 at 4.] Prior to this lawsuit, he filed an Application for Wage Claim with the Indiana Department of Labor (“IDOL”) and received a referral letter from the Office of Attorney General on behalf of the IDOL that authorized his lawyer to “represent the individual plaintiff” in pursuit of his claim. [Filing No. 1-2 at 5; Filing No. 1-2 at 15.]

         A. Federal Lawsuit

         On October 27, 2016, Mr. Neely initiated this litigation in state court on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, arguing that Facility Concepts violated the IWPS, the IWCA, common law theory of quantum meruit, and the FLSA. [Filing No. 1-2.] On November 14, ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.