United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
OPINION AND ORDER
S. VAN BOKKELEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
2006, Plaintiff Pamela Podemski bought a home with a mortgage
loan that eventually was transferred to Defendant US Bank.
She defaulted on her payments two years later and US Bank
filed a foreclosure action in the Elkhart Superior Court. The
superior court entered judgment against her in 2009. In 2011,
the court ordered a sheriff’s sale. In 2013, the court
of appeals affirmed the superior court.
28, 2015, Plaintiff sent Defendants a notice pursuant to the
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) purporting to
rescind the mortgage loan she took out in 2006. The
Defendants essentially ignored the notice and took no action
against it. A week later, the superior court entered its
fifth order of sale. The sale took place on October 28, 2015,
with US Bank buying the home.
beginning of 2016, the superior court ordered Plaintiff
evicted from the property.
before the eviction order was entered, Plaintiff sued
Defendants in this Court seeking an injunction to halt any
action against her in state court in relation to her home.
She believes that her rescission notice in 2015 nullified the
mortgage when Defendants failed to take any court action
moved to dismiss this case, and the Court grants that motion.
amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she sent Defendants
a rescission notice on July 28, 2015, which became effective
upon Defendants’ failure to challenge it in court
within twenty days of that date. She therefore maintains that
Defendants have conceded that she’s entitled to live in
the home without any encumbrance of the mortgage. Her
argument overlooks two things.
she ignores the fact that under TILA, except for
circumstances that are not alleged in this case, the right to
rescission exists only for three years from “the date
of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the
property, whichever occurs first.” 15 U.S.C. §
1635(f). Here, the purported notice of rescission was sent
nine years after the mortgage loan was signed.
Plaintiff ignores the plain language of TILA as to the
When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under
subsection (a) of this section, he is not liable for any
finance or other charge, and any security interest given by
the obligor, including any such interest arising by operation
of law, becomes void upon such a rescission. Within 20 days
after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall
return to the obligor any money or property given as earnest
money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action
necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any
security interest created under the transaction.
15 U.S.C. § 1635(b).
is, Plaintiff overlooks the fact that the creditor’s
duties arise only if an obligor has a right to rescind the
transaction in the first place. Here, Plaintiff had no right
to rescind because that right, if it ever existed, was
extinguished once the three-year period for rescission
expired. See Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790, 792 (2015) (“[R]ight
to rescind does not last forever. Even if a lender never
makes the required disclosures, the ‘right of
rescission shall expire three years after the date of
consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the
property, whichever comes first.’”). As such,
Plaintiff’s amended complaint is based on internet
fiction, not the law.
brings this matter to a core problem. In filing her lawsuit
and seeking the injunctive relief, Plaintiff essentially
wants to set aside state court rulings regarding the
foreclosure of the property in question, the sheriff’s
sale, and her eviction. If this Court were to agree with
Plaintiff’s preposition---wrong as it is---that she
properly rescinded the mortgage loan, it would necessarily
overrule the Indiana court of appeals and the superior court.
This is prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
See Epps v. Creditnet, Inc., 320 F.3d 756, 759 (7th
Cir. 2003) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a principle
of jurisdiction that precludes the lower federal courts from
applying appellate review to state court decisions. An action
in federal court that alleges an injury ‘inextricably
intertwined’ with a state court decision, such that
success in the federal court would require ...