United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
JANE MAGNUS-STINSON, CHIEF JUDGE.
Community Health Network, Inc.
(“Community”) hired Plaintiff Julie
Garrett to work as a nurse. Before accepting the position,
Ms. Garrett underwent hip surgery. After she started working,
she suffered an injury while at work and reported her injury
to Community to seek compensation under the Workers
Compensation Act. Community subsequently terminated her
employment. Ms. Garrett initiated this litigation against
Community, alleging that it terminated her employment when it
learned of her disability in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and in
retaliation for reporting her injury to seek compensation
under the Workers Compensation Act. [Filing No. 1 at
1-2.] Community has filed a Motion to Dismiss Ms.
Garrett's Complaint, [Filing No. 12], and Ms.
Garrett opposes that motion, [Filing No. 14].
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.'” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 8(a)(2)). “Specific facts are not necessary, the
statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (quoting
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
motion to dismiss asks whether the complaint
“contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must
accept all well-pled facts as true and draw all permissible
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Active
Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d 883, 886 (7th
Cir. 2011). The Court will not accept legal conclusions or
conclusory allegations as sufficient to state a claim for
relief. See McCauley v. City of Chicago,
671 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011). Factual allegations must
plausibly state an entitlement to relief “to a degree
that rises above the speculative level.” Munson v.
Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012). This
plausibility determination is “a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id.
relevant background is set forth from the allegations of Ms.
Garret's Complaint, [Filing No. 1], which the
Court must accept as true pursuant to the applicable standard
of review at this stage of the proceedings. The Court
emphasizes that these allegations are considered to be true
only for purposes of deciding the pending motion.
Garrett began her employment as a nurse with Community on
January 5, 2015. [Filing No. 1 at 2.] Prior to
accepting employment with Community, Ms. Garrett had hip
surgery. [Filing No. 1 at 2.] On August 22, 2015,
Ms. Garrett injured her back on the job while assisting a
patient. [Filing No. 1 at 2.] She reported her
injury to Community and “a claim for workers
compensation was opened.” [Filing No. 1 at 2.]
On November 4, 2015, Community terminated Ms. Garrett's
employment, “stating that she would have never been
hired had [Community] known of her previous hip
condition.” [Filing No. 1 at 2.]
March 2016, Ms. Garrett filed a charge of discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). [Filing No. 1 at 2.] The EEOC
issued Ms. Garrett a Right-To-Sue letter on July 20, 2016.
[Filing No. 1 at 2.] On December 5, 2016, Ms. Garrett filed
the underlying lawsuit alleging that Community terminated her
employment when it learned of her disability in violation of
the ADA and in retaliation for reporting her injury to seek
compensation under the Workers Compensation Act. [Filing
No. 1.] Community has filed a Motion to Dismiss Ms.
Garrett's claims, [Filing No. 13], and Ms.
Garrett opposes that motion, [Filing No. 14]. The
Court will now address the merits of the pending motion.
raises two issues: 1) whether Ms. Garrett failed to allege an
ADA discriminatory discharge claim, [Filing No. 13 at
9]; and 2) whether she failed to allege a retaliatory
discharge claim under Indiana common law. [Filing ...