United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
LOUSHAWN A. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,
D. COX, Defendant.
ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
William T. Lawrence, Judge United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Loushawn A. Robinson (“Mr. Robinson”) is a
federal inmate formerly confined at the United States
Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana (“USP Terre
Haute”). After screening the complaint and dismissing
some claims, the Court determined that Mr. Robinson's
claim of excessive force would proceed against Officer David
Cox (“Officer Cox”).
defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that
Mr. Robinson's claim is barred because he failed to
exhaust his available administrative remedies. Mr. Robinson
has opposed the motion for summary judgment and the defendant
has replied. The motion is ripe for ruling.
reasons explained in this Entry, the defendant's motion
for summary judgment [dkt. 29] is granted.
judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material fact”
is one that “might affect the outcome of the
suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine only if a
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.
Id. If no reasonable jury could find for the
non-moving party, then there is no “genuine”
dispute. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party and all reasonable inferences are drawn in
the non-movant's favor. Ault v. Speicher, 634
F.3d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 2011).
applicable substantive law will dictate which facts are
material.” National Soffit & Escutcheons, Inc.,
v. Superior Systems, Inc., 98 F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir.
1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The
substantive law applicable to the motion for summary judgment
is the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),
which requires that a prisoner exhaust his available
administrative remedies before bringing a suit concerning
prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Porter
v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). “[T]he
PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits
about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances
or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive
force or some other wrong.” Id. at 532
(citation omitted). The Court must consider the issue of
exhaustion before reaching the merits. Perez v. Wis.
Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 1999)
(“The statute [requiring administrative exhaustion] can
function properly only if the judge resolves disputes about
its application before turning to any other issue in the
following statement of facts was evaluated pursuant to the
standards set forth above. That is, this statement of facts
is not necessarily objectively true, but as the summary
judgment standard requires, the undisputed facts and the
disputed evidence are presented in the light reasonably most
favorable to Mr. Robinson as the non-moving party with
respect to the motion for summary judgment. See Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has promulgated an
administrative remedy system which is codified in 28 C.F.R.
§ 542.10, et seq., and BOP Program Statement
1330.18, Administrative Remedy Program. The administrative
remedy process is a method by which an inmate may seek formal
review of a complaint related to any aspect of his
imprisonment. 28 C.F.R. § 542.10. To exhaust his
remedies, an inmate must first file an informal remedy
request through an appropriate institution staff member via a
BP-8. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a). He must then file a formal
administrative remedy request with the Warden, Regional
Director, and General Counsel.
inmate is not satisfied with the informal remedy response
(BP-8), he is required to address his complaint at the
institutional level with the Warden via a BP-9 form within
twenty (20) calendar days of the incident. 28 C.F.R. §
542.14(a). If the inmate is dissatisfied with the
Warden's response to his BP-9, he may appeal to the
Regional Director within twenty (20) calendar days of the
Warden's response, via a BP-10. 28 C.F.R. §
542.15(a). If dissatisfied with the Regional Director's
response, the inmate may appeal to the General
Counsel/Central Office within thirty (30) calendar days of
the Regional Director's response, via a BP-11.
Id. Once an inmate receives a response to his appeal
from the General Counsel/Central Office, after filing
administrative remedies at all required levels, his
administrative remedies are deemed exhausted, as to the
specific issue(s) properly raised therein. See BOP Program
Statement, Administrative Remedy Program, 1330.16, available
codified BOP Program Statements are available for inmate
access via the institution law library, including BOP Program
Statement 1330.16. Administrative remedy filing procedures
are outlined in an Inmate Information Handbook, which ...